


THE VOICE OF DAFOE



JOHN W. DAFOE, LL.D., F.R.S.C.

THE VOICE OF DAFOE

*A Selection of Editorials
on Collective Security
1931-1944*

by

JOHN W. DAFOE

Editor-in-chief, "Winnipeg Free Press", 1903-1944

"With fifty years of enforced peace, even the threat of war might be banished from the world"—J. W. Dafoe, *Winnipeg Free Press*, June, 1940

Edited by W. L. MORTON

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FOREWORD

J. W. DAFOE occupied a unique place in Canadian journalism and has often been described as "the last of the great editors". During a long and very active career his interests ranged far and wide, embracing not only the Canadian scene but more particularly Canada's place in the world community. None saw more clearly the dangers which would threaten a sparsely populated but wealthy country in a power-ridden and warring world. It was natural, therefore, that among his greatest contributions to contemporary thinking was his unceasing advocacy of collective security, of international good will and understanding.

Writing with an intimate knowledge of the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, which he attended at the invitation of Sir Robert Borden as one of the advisers of the Canadian delegation, drawing on a wealth of experience derived from his participation in the periodical conferences of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, of which he was President from 1936 to 1938, and as Chairman of the Institute of Pacific Relations in the same years, he set forth with vigour and clarity his views on the necessity of organized peace. Argument, exhortation, and if need be, denunciation, were all weapons to be used without fear or favour, and he was equally at home in whatever atmosphere suited the occasion and the high purpose closest to his heart.

During the 1930's when self-centred nationalism grew rankly throughout the world, and the apostles of

appeasement were popular in the land, almost alone he held steadfast to his faith, and not infrequently incurred the deep displeasure of life-long friends who had succumbed to the temptation of accepting the short-sighted and, as it turned out, the disastrous policy of no-commitments and splendid isolation.

In the near future the world will have a second chance to arrange its affairs in a way which will enable the common man to look forward to a life of reasonable security and freedom, but the difficulties and problems are such as to tax the wisdom and character of even the most stout-hearted.

To those seeking light in the troubled days ahead there could be no clearer guide than Mr. Dafoe's warnings in the past. By a complete circle the world has come again to the same test which it faced twenty years ago, and what Mr. Dafoe wrote between the wars is as timely today as when it came from his pen. This selection from his writings, therefore, is not history but an examination of the world situation in our time by one of its ablest minds.

Mr. Dafoe's associates on the *Free Press* are deeply indebted to Professor Morton and Mrs. Edgar Duncan for their painstaking and exacting work in producing this volume, which is presented not only as a memorial to a great Canadian whose faith weathered the storm unimpaired, but also in the hope that it may prove of some value to those whose sacrifices in this war can only be justified by the hope of a better world for their children to live in.

VICTOR SIFTON.

PREFACE

THE editorial columns of the *Winnipeg Free Press* from 1931 to 1944 contain close on one thousand editorials and articles by John W. Dafoe on collective security. This book is a selection, in whole or in part, of sixty-three from that number.

The selection has been made on the principle that in a memorial volume the man himself should speak as fully and freely as he did at the moment of going to press. It is an attempt to give the representative utterance, in style and content, of Mr. Dafoe. The text is that which appeared in the *Free Press* except for minor corrections, in no way affecting the sense. Editorials, for the most part, are quoted in full. Where deletions are made, the purpose is to avoid repetition; where extracts only are made, it is because they enhance the total effect of the book, while the remainder of the editorial is devoted to that hammering at points already made, which is so much a part of the journalist's task, and so peculiar to that of a defender of a cause.

It has been possible to choose with confidence because it is the practice of the *Free Press* to clip and file daily editorials and articles from the editorial page, with the initials of the writer.

The columns of the *Free Press* are the only source of the selections printed. The other writings of Mr. Dafoe, papers, addresses and books, have been drawn on for the summary of his views from 1919 to 1930, and for the commentary which puts each editorial in its setting. These latter are particularly valuable for

this purpose because they supplement the authoritative tone of the editorial by the more personal touch of the spoken word or the signed article. Thus, they furnish more intimate and often more trenchant expression of his fundamental thought than do the editorials, produced as they were from day to day in the stress of public advocacy.

No claim is made that this is a canon of Mr. Dafoe's writings on the League, or a scholarly edition of those published here. The evaluation of the man and his work will, of course, require long study. This is a memorial volume, an attempt to give the public a timely memento of Mr. Dafoe. Neither did time permit nor the occasion require an effort to re-assemble in footnotes all the resources upon which Mr. Dafoe drew, or to set forth the full historical context in which the editorials were written. The selection represents the development of Mr. Dafoe's thinking rather than the sequence of events. There is, of course, a close relation between the two.

The number of editorials here reproduced varies from time to time with the output of Mr. Dafoe on the theme of collective security. The variation follows from the division of labour in a great newspaper office. For example, though the *Free Press* as a paper gave the usual space to international affairs in 1935, Mr. Dafoe himself did not contribute to the discussion as fully as might be expected. In that year a general election took place in Canada, and Mr. Dafoe's pen was devoted to the defeat of a government which had raised Canadian tariff rates to unprecedented heights.

For the opportunity to prepare this volume for the press I am indebted to Mr. Victor Sifton, publisher of the *Winnipeg Free Press*. The advice and comments of Mr. G. V. Ferguson, executive editor, have been of the greatest assistance and stimulus. To the staff of the *Free Press* library, to Mr. J. L. Johnston, Provincial Librarian of Manitoba, and especially to Mr. F. A. Hardy, Parliamentary Librarian, and their staffs, I am much indebted for courteous and patient aid. Mr. Frederick W. Gibson of Queen's University was kind enough to read the first draft of the manuscript in great part, and it has benefited much by his criticism and his knowledge of the Dafoe Papers. To Flight Lieutenant F. L. Morton and the staff of the London *Observer* I owe a particular obligation in that in war-time London, under bombardment by the V2, they took the trouble to verify a quotation.

Especially must acknowledgment be made of the work of Mrs. Edgar Duncan, who made the original selection, who has shared equally the task of editing the text and who has carried out the difficult task of preparing the index. To ability Mrs. Duncan has added patience with a colleague of many shortcomings, and a devotion to Mr. Dafoe's memory which members of the *Free Press* staff will appreciate. These acknowledgments, of course, in no wise carry with them responsibility for errors or omissions, that being wholly the editor's.

Nor is it possible to close without adding a word of pride in being one of the many younger men of this city and country to whom Mr. Dafoe owes so much of his great

patience gave counsel and encouragement, and who, thanks to him, grew up in the atmosphere and neighbourhood of greatness.

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INTRODUCTION

"THE TEN YEARS THAT WERE LOST"

THE years from 1919 to 1930 are not less important in the history of the League of Nations, and of Dafoe's thought on collective security, than the years from 1931 to 1944. Considerations of space largely determined the choice of the opening date of this volume. To this must be added the fact that the former decade was a time of anxious hope for the proponents of the League, while the latter was a period of hope struggling against mounting disappointment. It is perhaps more profitable to study failure than success.

Yet a full understanding of Dafoe's defence of collective security in the years that heard Manchuria, Abyssinia and Munich thud in goose step on the road to war, is impossible without some outline of his reaction to the war of 1914-1918, and his early concepts of the function and future of the League.

The war of 1914 came to Dafoe, as it did to all Canadians, as a devastating surprise, as a violation of democratic principles and liberal hopes. He supported the war effort of the Allies as an attempt to beat down a resurgence of primitive barbarism and to re-establish the peace of the world on surer foundations. At home he became a powerful advocate of conscription and of Union Government, breaking with the Liberal chieftain, Sir Wilfrid Laurier, the better to serve the Allied cause. Abroad he welcomed the entry of the United States as confirming the righteousness of that cause, and

Wilson's leadership as the most inspired expression of the hopes of free men.

In 1918, as representative of the Canadian Bureau of Public Information, and unofficial adviser, he accompanied Prime Minister Sir Robert L. Borden and the Canadian Delegation to the Peace Conference. There he witnessed the struggle for Dominion representation at the Peace Conference, the Peace Conference itself, and the birth of the League. In the League of Cecil, Smuts and Wilson, Dafoe found the one possible assurance of renewed democratic progress and a peaceful world, and gave it the devotion that was to prove lifelong. "I saw the brat born," he said in 1936, "and I am going to stay with it as long as it has a bit of life in its body."¹

From these experiences he drew conclusions from which, though they were modified by the events of the inter-war years, he never departed. Central to all his thought on war and peace is the idea that, in the modern world, war and civilization—liberal, democratic civilization—are incompatible. This he expressed in December, 1923, with the fierce realism of which he was so often capable. "One of the reasons why the world cannot enjoy the doubtful excitement of war is that under modern conditions you can make war, but you cannot make peace. I think the experience from 1914 to 1918 showed that the human heart and human mind are equal to the demands even of modern war, but the developments from 1918 to 1923 have shown that the human mind and human wisdom and human resolution are not capable of patching up

¹ Address to the Empire Club of Canada, January 30, 1936, MS., p. 5.

the wrecked machinery which war leaves."² This thought rolls in sullen reverberation through his addresses in the days of the League's tribulation. "War under modern conditions, hyperbolic war (in Ferrero's phrase),³ a war without limitation or restraint, war without consideration of anything but victory—that is, a war that cannot be ended."⁴ So he conceived the war of 1914 to have been; it was to avert the renewal of such war that he strove to maintain the League.

Of success Dafoe was not too hopeful from the beginning. In March, 1919, he returned to Canada from the Peace Conference, and spoke before the Canadian Club of Winnipeg on the peace that was being made. It was the difficulties of peace-making that he stressed. "The making of peace is in fact more difficult than has been the winning of the war."⁵ For war had united while peace was already beginning to divide the victorious powers. "Peace came and found the great powers unprepared. There was no real expectation the German collapse would come when it did. The situation would have been far happier if the Allies had taken time to reach, among themselves, definite decisions as to what the conditions of peace would be if, by the providence of God, they won. If they had reached these decisions at a time when under the pressure of possible defeat and confronted with the enormous difficulties of waging war, and, having reached them, had then

² The Bulletin of the League of Nations Society in Canada, December, 1923, p. 2, col. 1.

³ Ferrero, Guglielmo, *Peace and War*, tr. Bertha Pritchard, Macmillans, New York, 1933.

⁴ "Canada's Interest in the World Crisis": An address to the Canadian Club, Montreal, November 7, 1935, p. 479.

⁵ Address to the Canadian Club of Winnipeg, April 8, 1919, *Addresses of the Year*, p. 98.

had the happiness of forcing an unconditional surrender in the field, there could then have been a dictated peace on the battlefield, and the situation of today would have been widely different.”⁶

It followed that any peace that might be made would be imperfect. “What is being done at Paris is to produce, if possible, something that will meet the judgment of the world today, and something that, when it comes to be looked back upon one hundred years from now, will not be seen to have in it the seeds of war and death. That is an enormous strain upon the foresight, the statesmanship and the moral courage of the men at Paris.”⁷ There had, in addition, to be some instrument to supervise the peace when made. “If you do not form a League of Nations, you will have to have something in its place; because any peace treaty that will be made will not operate itself. There has got to be somebody behind it as the sponsor, to see that the conditions are observed, or we shall inevitably have forty or fifty years of little wars, keeping the world in a constant state of unrest.”⁸

If a League of Nations were created, however, the most that could be expected of that institution was that it might somehow maintain the precarious peace until the tissues of civilization re-knit, and the habits of peaceful intercourse were re-established among nations. “You and I, alive by the sacrifice of better men, are in a position to help in this work. Today we are in troubled waters, but we hope that somewhere, downstream, these waters will be smoother and there will be peace

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 98-9. Cf. “Unconditional Surrender”, p. 188.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 99.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

and happiness. That will, however, be in the day of a future generation. For this one there can be no abiding peace. The whole world is in travail, and must jointly bear its burden."⁹

That was his hope, never extravagantly held, never abandoned. It would be realized, if it were to be realized, not only by a consciousness of the dangers of renewed war—men in their folly might chance one—but by the fulfilment of the moral obligation assumed in signing the Covenant. A public moral sense can be developed and expressed only by free public opinion. From this sprang Dafoe's preoccupation with public opinion, and the linking of the League with democracy. Only in the field of democratic public opinion could "the imponderables come to the rescue"¹⁰ of a faltering government or an abandoned League. Hence also Dafoe's concern with the relationships of the English-speaking nations with the League. They had the greatest experience of the democratic way of life; theirs was the most highly developed public opinion. The support of the English-speaking nations might well be the decisive factor in upholding the League in its hazardous task.

The refusal of the United States to enter the League was a heavy blow.¹¹ Dafoe ascribed it, however, to the trickery and short-sightedness of politicians rather than to the conscious choice of the American electorate. He hoped that again the "imponderables" would muster in

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 103.

¹⁰ "Economic Depression and Political Realignment" from *The Liberal Way*, J. M. Dent & Sons, Toronto, 1933, p. 226.

¹¹ "It looks very much as if the United States . . . has placed the entire prospect of the League of Nations . . . in jeopardy." *Manitoba Free Press*, March 22, 1920—"A World Tragedy".

time to avert the worst, and that the United States would in the future, as in 1917, be found on the side of the principles for which the League stood.¹² In this context the "imponderables" were the affinities of the English-speaking nations, not easily defined, often obscured in quiet times, but always emergent in stress. "May we not then hope that in the society of English-speaking nations, in whose solidarity the hopes of the race and perhaps the future of the world are bound up, an honoured place may be found by the side of the Motherland, now first among equals, for the great Republic of the United States of America."¹³ And again: "I am convinced—it is the faith by which I live—that all these difficulties arise from conditions that are temporary, and that we are moving irresistibly by the discoveries of science, by the ingenuity of man, by the necessities of our life, to the condition of a world community of peace in which there will be harmonious co-operation between great nations and small nations. I am sure that in the furthering of that end the English-speaking world—the British Empire, and something more than the British Empire—will be a potent and a dominating factor."¹⁴

While the English-speaking nations might mean much to the League, the League in turn meant much to the development of the Commonwealth. The League

¹² "The League needs the United States and can never do the work which awaits it without its support and co-operation; and the United States will feel increasingly the obligation to associate itself with the other nations of the world in the great causes to which the League is dedicated." *Manitoba Free Press*, June 21, 1920—"The U.S. and the Future".

¹³ "Empire Partnership": An Address to the Imperial Press Conference, Ottawa, August 6, 1920, p. 12.

¹⁴ Address delivered to the Imperial Press Conference, London, June 6, 1930, last page.

was primarily a guarantee of the right of small nations to survive, as the war had been fought to ensure that survival. The development of the British Commonwealth was hastened by the war, recognized at the Peace Conference, and confirmed under the aegis of the League. Commonwealth and League were in some sense a twin birth, and this identity was never far from Dafoe's thought. The two themes interweave in his writings. Moreover, for the United States a Commonwealth in which the Dominions could achieve sovereignty would be a more acceptable partner than the traditional centralized Empire, and a League in which the Dominions exercised an effective autonomy would be a more inviting association than a League which contained a "bloc" of British votes had been made to appear by American isolationists. In 1920, while the presidential campaign was under way with both Democrats and Republicans supporting American entry into an international organization, Dafoe was careful to stress, before the Balfour Declaration, that "the British Empire is a partnership of nations of equal status united in a partnership of consent".¹⁵

No less aware was Dafoe that in the League the British Nations could find a common ground of foreign policy which might otherwise be sought in re-centralization. As early as 1927 he warned, "If the League of Nations and all that it stands for were to go by the board there are questions of Imperial relationships, at present of only academic interest, to which answers would have to be found. Chief among these would be the matter

¹⁵ "Empire Partnership": An Address to the Imperial Press Conference, August 6, 1920, p. 7.

of to what degree one British nation could involve another in active war by pursuing an individual policy to the point of embarking upon hostilities."¹⁶

These in outline were the hopes and issues of the twenties, as Dafoe saw them. In 1941, reviewing Viscount Cecil's *A Great Experiment*,¹⁷ he commented, "The record of the tragic last ten years is there also; but the explanation of the failures of the second decade is to be found in the story of the ten years that were lost when they might have been put to the purpose of making the League an impregnable citadel of peace."¹⁸

Why, then, were these years lost? The answer, as Dafoe saw it, may at present best be found in the following pages. Impercipient views of statesmen, continuance of traditionalist views of national interest, errors of the peace treaties, public apathy, pacifist support of the League, intransigence on the part of France and the succession states, war debts and reparations, ill-treatment of minorities—all are cited.

These failures to appreciate the nature of the commitments entered into in the Covenant and the implications of modern war became clearer as disaster piled on disaster in the thirties. In the twenties Dafoe himself was preoccupied with the development of the Commonwealth. He hoped that the League might succeed, as the habits of peace were renewed and as international trade revived, by processes of conciliation. One great step in this direction would be disarmament as called for by Article VIII of the Covenant.

¹⁶ "Canada and the British Empire": An address delivered upon the Harris Foundation, University of Chicago, 1927. *Great Britain and the Dominions*, University of Chicago Press, p. 217.

¹⁷ Cecil, Viscount, *A Great Experiment*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1941.

¹⁸ *Winnipeg Free Press*, August 3, 1941.

Clear across the path of disarmament lay the obstinate French demand for security and French insistence on finding security in armaments, in weakening Germany, and in a system of alliances. To meet this demand and to counteract the dangers latent in French policy, the Draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol and, finally, the Locarno Pacts, were evolved.

Dafoe supported the British rejection of the Draft Treaty and the Protocol, and approved Locarno. Substantially the objection to the first two was that they would have involved the British nations in commitments beyond the Covenant to uphold a *status quo*, which could not be perpetuated. Dafoe never accepted Article X as it stood.¹⁹ In addition the Protocol, as amended on the motion of Japan, threatened interference with the domestic affairs of member nations, with the possibility of war arising out of such intervention. Moreover, the whole "ironclad, inelastic system of compulsory arbitration and automatic application of sanctions"²⁰ departed from the spirit and purposes of the Covenant, making it, in the phrase of M. Politis of Greece, a principal draughter of the Protocol, "more an instrument of peace than of justice."

Locarno, on the other hand, promised at once to give France a guarantee which would quieten her apprehensions, and not to commit Great Britain to upholding all the 1919 frontiers of Europe. No less was it satisfactory in that the Dominions were not signatories to it, and were involved in no commitments beyond those of

¹⁹ *Border Cities Star*, February 6, 1934. "The Collective System of Making Peace and of Enforcing Peace": An address to the Border Cities Branch of the League of Nations Society, p. 3.

²⁰ *Manitoba Free Press*, February 28, 1925—"Europe, Canada, and the Protocol".

the Covenant. "Locarno represents a workable theory of foreign relationships for the Empire in contrast with a theoretical system, which is much more symmetrical in appearance, but in practice will prove quite unworkable."²¹ "Without tying up one nation to another to definite action in this or that particular field the League of Nations remains as an instrument towards peace. It is doubtful if it has yet been put to its fullest service. In the meantime, that other league—the British Commonwealth of Nations—appears to be finding its feet as a result of a growing understanding of how it is to operate in the future."²² This, of course, is not to be taken as meaning that Dafoe regarded the Commonwealth as an alternative to the League.²³

The Protocol, embodying "the idea of an armed peace providing a doubtful security resting on potential force"²⁴ having been laid aside, Dafoe hailed the Kellogg Pact, coupled with the optional clause of the World Court, as an omen of a change of heart in the nations seeking peace. "These nations, face to face with one another and in the presence of the imponderables, renounce war as an instrument of national policy, and take upon themselves the obligation of always seeking a pacific settlement of disputes. It is a noble gesture of peace, never before made; and it will not be an idle gesture, because the hearts and consciences of the people of the world will not permit this. It is an international landmark; and it will rise high on the skyline of the world as the generations go forward."²⁵

²¹ *Manitoba Free Press*, October 4, 1926—"Locarno and the Dominions".

²² *Manitoba Free Press*, September 14, 1927—"A Diplomacy of Caution".

²³ *Winnipeg Free Press*, February 16, 1937—"Only One League".

²⁴ *Manitoba Free Press*, September 27, 1929—"Closing the Gap".

²⁵ *Manitoba Free Press*, January 17, 1929—"A World Landmark".

With the Dominions achieving full autonomy in a world in which the League was "an instrument towards peace", in the post-Locarno, pre-depression years, such hopes might be indulged after the dark forebodings of 1919-1923. But how if the League had been challenged? No explicit answer can be given, for the necessity of considering whether the League from being "an instrument towards peace" should become an instrument to enforce peace did not arise until the thirties.

Between 1919 and 1931 Dafoe hoped that the "imponderables", the moral conscience of free men, might prevail, and the need of resort to force not arise. After Manchuria destroyed these hopes, based on the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact, which jointly committed sixty nations, including the United States, not to resort to war, he began grimly to exhort the nations to stand by their pledges, to the point of force if necessary. In this matter, crucial in the evaluation of his thought on international affairs, Dafoe frankly shifted from emphasis in the years before 1931 on the need to consolidate peace by peaceful processes—if this were pacifism, his critics might make the most of it—to emphasis, after the aggression of Japan in Manchuria and the rise of Hitler in Germany, on the need of maintaining peace by force of the collective action of peace-loving nations. His stand on this essential matter of military sanctions was that of Wilson: "Armed force is in the background; and if the moral force of the world will not suffice the physical force of the world shall. But it is a last resort, because this is intended as

a constitution of peace, not as a league of war.”²⁶ In the first ten years the League was not driven to the last resort, and the hope that it might continue a constitution of peace still lived. In the next decade the last resort was reached indeed, but the force was not forthcoming.

Not, however, for want of advocacy by Dafoe, as the following pages witness. As the “ruinous peace” crumbled in still more ruinous war he called with deepening insistence for the defence of peace, until he could see taking shape a new League, founded on the utter defeat of the enemy, and affording a constitution of peace backed by power, capable of giving the world “fifty years of enforced peace” in which liberal democracy might renew its virtue and work with confident vigour in the affairs of men and nations.

²⁶ *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 8, 1936—“Assessment of Responsibility”. Wilson, Woodrow, *International Ideals*, Harper Brothers, New York and London, 1919, p. 125. Speech delivered on presenting the Covenant to the Peace Conference, February 14, 1919. Baker, Ray Stannard, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, Doubleday, Page & Co., 1922, I, p. 285.

THE VOICE OF DAFOE

I

THE BEGINNING OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR

On September 18, 1931, Japanese clashed with Chinese troops at Mukden in Manchuria. The military occupation of all Manchuria which followed was a challenge, not the less clear for being covert, to the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations, by which members of the League undertook to refrain from aggression; of the terms of the Kellogg Pact, by which signatories renounced war as an instrument of national policy; of those of the Nine-Power Treaty of Washington of February 6, 1922, by which the signatories undertook to respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial and administrative integrity of China. Japan was a party to the Covenant and these treaties. In retrospect, her action was the beginning of the second World War.

A TRAGIC ANNIVERSARY

(September 18, 1941)

SEPTEMBER is a month of tragic anniversaries. Germany invaded Poland on September 1st, 1939; Great Britain declared war on Germany September 3rd, Canada did likewise on September 10th. But there is a still more tragic September anniversary. It was on September 18th, 1931—ten years ago today—that the Japanese army staged the Mukden incident. This event created some immediate perturbation in the chancelleries of various nations; but there was nowhere the slightest realization of what the action of the Japanese militarists signified and portended. On that day, in that remote place, a fuse was lighted that has blown to pieces the world order that was envisaged in the Covenant of the League of Nations.

During its first ten years of existence the League was apparently making slow but steady progress; by 1930 there was a general belief, as expressed in publications, books and public declarations, that with the Pact of Paris supplementing the Covenant, war as an instrument of national policy had become obsolete. This hope rested on the engagement not to resort to war to which every nation in the world had subscribed and the belief that in Article XI of the Covenant a workable method for adjusting difficulties had been established, replacing the more drastic provisions of Article X and Article XVI. Article XI declared that

“any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any members of the League or not is hereby declared to be a matter of concern to the whole League and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations.”

The handful of Japanese troops who took possession of Mukden ten years ago today reduced the Pact of Paris to a meaningless jumble of words and destroyed the League. This was not evident the day after the aggression, but it is evident now, looking back over a decade of ever-widening war and international anarchy.

Mukden was a challenge to the Covenant and to the Pact of Paris. If it had been met by the concerted action of the League and the United States, which while not a member of the League was the fashioner of the Pact of Paris, the world would have had ten years of deepening peace instead of a decade of mounting disaster. But the challenge was evaded and the responsibility can be pretty evenly divided between the United States and the League powers.

The action at Mukden may have been the deed of mutinous troops as was claimed at the time, or it may have been instigated by the Japanese Government, which seems highly probable in the light of Japanese policy as subsequently revealed. The pretence that the Japanese Government disapproved of the action and if left alone would deal with the matter in a satisfactory manner was successful in preventing joint representations by the United States and the League at a time when they might have been effective; and by the time,

three months later, that the United States administration began to realize the seriousness of Japan's action, the chief League powers were indifferent to Mr. Stimson's proposal that the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact should be convened to deal with the matter. They preferred to leave the matter to the League; and the League which they controlled never went beyond words in deprecating Japan's course. Japan was completely successful in her plans to add to her empire the whole vast area of Manchuria which proved to be merely the beginning of a vast enterprise of conquest and aggression.

One of the early criticisms of the League advanced by Lord Morley and others was that it would tend to enlarge local conflicts into world wars. Against this was the conception that peace was indivisible and that if it were broken anywhere it would, given time, be broken everywhere. This opinion was first expressed, we believe, by President Wilson, but it is chiefly associated with the name of Litvinov. It was savagely attacked as an absurdity by all those who were resolved that the League of Nations should deny the role which it was brought into existence to play; but the soundness of the principle has been only too completely demonstrated by the terrible developments of the past ten years.

That Mussolini was encouraged to go ahead with aggressive designs against Ethiopia by the demonstration that the League would not protect its members and that the Pact of Paris was an empty shell cannot be disputed. With the invasion of Ethiopia the precarious peace of the world vanished; there has been

since that day a continuing state of war in the world ever growing in range and intensity. The civil war in Spain began before the conquest of Ethiopia was complete; while it was in progress Japan thought the time had come to renew her march to the domination of the Far East; and thus the fire spread with consuming fury from country to country until the conflagration now threatens the whole world. The connection between the successive outbreaks of war is plain to view; the sequence is unbroken.

Japan, by her aggression of September 18th, 1931, denied her engagements as a member of the League, dishonoured her signature as a subscriber to the Pact of Paris, and repudiated the Nine-Power Treaty of which she was joint author. Japan thus became the first of the outlaw nations and, as such, impervious to every consideration but that of the mailed fist. When Sir John Simon said on behalf of Great Britain that he excluded every consideration of force and relied solely upon processes of conciliation,¹ he sold the pass to the Japanese, who despised and rejected conciliation but, at least at that time, would not have dared to stand up against the invoking of either economic or military sanctions. September 18th, 1931, was a turning-point in history; it saw the beginning of the second World War.

¹ Speech before the Assembly of the League, March 7, 1932. Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs, 1932*, Oxford University Press, London, 1933, pp. 577-8.

II

WORLD CRISIS

The collapse of the world economy, burdened since 1919 by war debt and reparation payments, began with the crash of the Wall Street boom in October, 1929. The debacle in the field of economics put in jeopardy all that had been achieved in the field of politics since 1919, including the peace settlement and the League of Nations. The consequent world crisis turned upon the question whether economic health could be restored before the revolutionary and aggressive forces, sprung from war and augmented by depression, could seize and consolidate such power as would enable them to challenge the new order of which the League was symbolic.

[Clearly the peace of the world is at stake. The ill-treatment of minorities by the succession states and the refusal of the continental nations to disarm are factors threatening the peace. But the main cause of the crisis is the clogging of international trade by war debt and reparation payments.]

THE WORLD CRISIS

(July 14, 1931)

GERMANY, trembling on the edge of the precipice, with financial chaos and political revolution awaiting her if she falls, becomes suddenly an object of world-wide consideration and concern. If there is financial chaos in Germany it will not stop at her boundaries. If there is a political revolution, the political and economic structure of the world will not escape the tremors. At the imminence of the peril, the "statesmen" of the world brush the cobwebs out of their eyes and take the wool out of their ears and hurry, perhaps too late, to the rescue. Not all, however. France holds back, still obstinately adhering to the formula that has inspired her post-War policies, that for her there is prestige and security in a prostrate Germany.

If the already half-ruined world receives another staggering shock from Germany sinking convulsively to subterranean depths, enlightened contemporary opinion and posterity will have no difficulty in putting the responsibility where it belongs—upon the incred-

ible stupidity of the "statesmen" of the associated and Allied powers, who won the War, dictated the peace and determined the conditions under which the post-War world had to try to right itself after the cataclysm. Something might be said as well of their selfishness and greed; but if this selfishness which is inseparable from nationalism had been linked with intelligence it would not have done much damage. The "statesmen" of the victor nations did not know that the things they wanted to do could not be done, and that the results of their attempts would be disastrous to themselves. They did not know; and they could not be told. It was not that they did not have advisers; but these were ignored and shoved aside. The great men were arrogant in their belief that they could deal with economic conditions by political methods; to warnings that they were attempting the impossible they were deaf.

Consider, for instance, the monumental ignorance that lay behind the confidence that the payment of War debts and reparations could be exacted without the easy transfer between the debtor and creditor nations of goods. The wisdom that would have made a clean sweep of War debts and reparations, as part of the peace settlement, was not attainable perhaps in the mood in which the nations found themselves when the War ended in victory; but with the most elementary knowledge of the conditions under which international payments are made they would have known that these payments could be made only by borrowing or by the building up of credit by the sale of goods. The whole scheme of War debt payments was based upon the exaction of reparations from Germany, notwithstand-

ing the comfortable "belief" of the United States vehemently avowed at intervals that there was no connection between the two sets of transactions. The War debts of the victor nations fell on Germany and, as well, heavy additional reparation payments. At this point, no doubt, some reader will say: "Well, was not this right? Was Germany not guilty of the war?"; thus giving expression anew to the economic idiocy which has landed the world into its present predicament. All the world's legions cannot take more out of a pot than there is in it. It was a simple thing like that that the wonder-workers of Paris did not know—or if they did know, forgot.

The original idea was to make Germany pay the entire cost of the War. The earlier estimates of what should be exacted read today like the calculations of Monte Cristos incarcerated in lunatic asylums. Mr. Lloyd George has been kept busy in recent years explaining that the figures were known to be fanciful; they were just put in to humbug the people of the victorious nations, to make them think they were going to escape having to pay for the War. Finally, by bringing in the economists, reparations were cut down to levels which might possibly have been within the power of Germany to pay—if creditor nations had been willing to accept payment in German goods. Reparations to the amount specified, over \$400,000,000¹ a year—out of which all the victorious nations planned to get their payments to the United States—meant, inescapably, that Germany would have to sell abroad enough goods

¹ These figures cannot be verified. They refer, it would seem, to the payments under the findings of the Reparations Commission, April 27, 1921, of \$486,000,000 a year plus 25% of the value of Germany's exports.

to build up a volume of credits out of which these payments could be made. This meant the dumping of German goods. Germany has been dumping goods against the constantly rising tariff barriers of the creditor nations; and has been supplementing these amounts by borrowing money from the United States. By these means the reparations have to date been paid. But the procedure was essentially irrational, and it has now broken down, Germany threatens to collapse, and in falling to spread ruin far and wide. The nations are alarmed; and their statesmen and bankers are hurrying and scurrying to see if some means cannot be devised to stave off the catastrophe. All except France, which would sooner be top-dog in a ruined world than consent to readjustments that might operate to make conditions less onerous for Germany. Such is the condition to which the world has been brought by the bankrupt statesmanship of the victor nations in the World War.

[Accordingly the passing of reparations is welcome, but long overdue. Then as part of the race to complete the unfinished business of conciliation begun at Locarno before Germany turns to revolution and repudiation, the Disarmament Conference convenes, February 2, 1932.]

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

(January 29, 1932)

THE DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE, which is to meet in Geneva on Tuesday, will apply the acid test to the sincerity of the nations which, ever since the War, have

been proclaiming their devotion to the cause of peace. In the twelve years that have elapsed since the League of Nations was organized, little has been done to give effect to the requirements of Article VIII which deals with disarmament, or to redeem the pledges of mutual disarmament made to Germany when the treaty of Peace was signed. This default has not been due to lack of reminders. As long ago as 1920 the Brussels Financial Conference declared that there could be no economic recovery until there was a lessening of the armament burdens carried by the nations; yet though all the events of the intervening years have confirmed this warning, the nations in the year 1931 spent on armaments a sum not less than four and a half billion dollars.

Not but what there have been gestures in favour of disarmament. After six years of fruitless effort by the League to find a basis for mutual reduction, the preparatory commission was created to prepare for the holding of a disarmament conference; and after five years of labour, it produced the very slim draft treaty which forms the agenda for the Conference which is now about to meet. This treaty hardly goes beyond indicating the methods by which some slight reductions may be made, if the nations, many of whom have filed reservations, can be got to agree. Yet predictions abound that the provisions of this treaty will be too radical for the nations; that no basis for a progressive limitation of armaments will be found; that this failure will lead to the collapse of the League and the renewal on a large scale of competition in armament building, with a sure descent, at no distant date, into war. This

may be too gloomy a view; but the situation without a doubt is critical. "It is not too much to say," said Nicholas Murray Butler in a recent statement, "that the fate of the world for the next generation will be at stake when this conference meets. Should it fail in capacity, in competence, or in courage, and thereby permit the nations to fall back into their old relationships of armed and competitive nationalism, no man would dare predict the future or its results."²

What is the explanation of this divergency between the professions of the nations and their persistence in practices which make disarmament impossible? It is that this divergency records a profound difference of opinion within the nations themselves. A struggle goes on between those who look forward and those who look back; between those of the old world slowly dying, and those of the new world struggling into life. But the battle is not clearly joined. A body of public opinion, unorganized but powerful, compels the nominal adherence of the nations to the causes of disarmament and peace; but when an attempt is made to give practical effect to these pious aspirations by disarming, other and powerful influences come into play. The old traditional beliefs are predominantly held by the official governing class, by the departmental bureaucrats, the military and naval general staffs, the diplomatic forces. They give lip service to the cause of peace; but in their hearts they hold to the old beliefs—that man is incurably combative; that war must always be the ultimate expression of policy; that there can only be fitful

²It has not been possible to trace this quotation. The same thought is expressed in "Disarmament" in Dr. Butler's *Looking Forward*, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1932, p. 316.

and uneasy periods of peace; that other nations of comparable strength are always potential enemies; that an advantage in armaments over these possible enemies must be sought with diligence. Whatever their professions, they live and act in keeping with the code which has made a battleground of the world.

The demand by all the nations for the right to maintain powerful armaments on grounds of the need for protection is an explicit denial both of the spirit and the engagements of the Covenant and the Kellogg Pact. The list of signatories of these treaties includes every nation in the world. When these nations insist upon maintaining forces at a strength to ensure security, the question can properly be asked: Security for what purpose and against whom? The moment an answer to that question is demanded, the reluctance of the nations to give effect to engagements to which they have pledged their honour is nakedly revealed. They act upon one of two theories or on both. They do not believe that the other signatory powers intend to honour their pledges or they themselves cherish in the back of their minds an intention to break their engagements if an opportunity for national aggrandizement occurs. The nations by their actions thus mutually justify the distrust which they entertain for one another. Their determined battling for advantage goes ill with the professions of an intention and desire to further the cause of peace which so abound whenever the nations meet together, and of which there will be no lack when the Disarmament Conference convenes at Geneva.

The contribution which the Geneva Conference will

make to the cause of world peace is the revelation which it will make to the people of each country of the sincerity of their own representatives in furthering the causes for which the Conference has been called. The plain ordinary people of all countries, who pay the taxes and carry the burdens and supply fodder for the guns when war comes, have much more radical views upon the question of disarmament than the officials and experts who will undertake to speak for them at Geneva. To their simple intelligence it is monstrous that nations that have renounced war, pledged themselves against acts of aggression, and solemnly agreed to seek pacific solutions for all disputes, should remain armed to the teeth at a cost which is patently ruining the world. The result of the Conference will depend upon whether this desire that something substantial should be accomplished in the lessening of armaments, and the abatement of war-breeding national hatreds, can make itself felt at Geneva. If the Conference is sufficiently insulated against these tides of opinion, there will go on within the cordon thus thrown around its deliberations the traditional struggle between the nations for national advantage. The result in that case may well be calamitous failure.

The hope for the Conference—and it is one with a real foundation—is that the pressure of circumstances, the menacing future, the mounting distress of the peoples of the world, the obvious need for lightening burdens, will make the responsibility of wrecking the Conference one which no nation or no combination of nations will dare to accept. If the Conference fails

totally, the failure must not be taken too tragically. World movements against the resistance of vested interests and rooted convictions meet with many checks, and move forward slowly. Failure at Geneva will remit the issue to world public opinion, which will not be content to accept the failure as final.

III

MANCHURIA

The Japanese adventure in Manchuria showed that there were limits in this particular case beyond which the members of the League would not go in asserting the principles of the Covenant, and that the Kellogg Pact was no stronger than the scruples of its signatories. It was much, however, that the League should condemn and not condone the action of Japan in seizing Manchuria, and that the United States should adopt the doctrine of "non-recognition". This moral outlawry would have its effect, and meantime the opinion of the world might be rallied behind the Covenant. The question of the worth of League principles had been put squarely before the world, and must be faced.

WATCHMAN, WHAT OF THE NIGHT?

(April 2, 1932)

How goes the cause of international peace in these distressful times? To this question the answer might be made with some show of reason that it goes badly. One foundation stone of world peace is the Covenant of the League of Nations. We have seen war between two members of the League, with the aggressor nation blandly defending itself by claiming that though indubitably armed forces have been in conflict, towns have been sacked, civilians have been butchered and businesses have been confiscated, there has been no breach of the Covenant. Another pillar of world peace is the Kellogg Pact, the signatories of which have pledged themselves never to resort to force but always to seek a solution of difficulties by pacific means. Again the aggressor nation points out that it is understood that even under the Kellogg agreement nations that are assailed can defend themselves. With great Oriental politeness Japan explains that the marching of her legions in Manchuria, the ejection of Chinese authority, the confiscation of Chinese businesses, the creation of a vassal government in Manchuria, the bloodshed at Shanghai, the bombing of open cities from the air were strictly defensive measures not coming within the prohibitions of the Kellogg Pact. The Nine-Power Pact, by which nine nations, Japan included, engaged themselves to respect China's sovereignty in Manchuria and

not to make the disorganized state of China the occasion for furthering their special interests, certainly seemed to have a direct bearing on the situation; but Japan has evaded it with the plea that there was here an implied principle of limitation as to time which justifies intervention in the "defence" of Japanese interests.

What has made these events so threatening to the cause of international peace has been the sympathy with which Japan's actions have obviously been regarded by powerful influences theoretically dedicated—as is also the influence of Japan—to the maintenance of peace. Japan's performance in Manchuria was a typical pre-War, imperialistic, land-grabbing stunt; the contention that it could be done within the ambit of the League has been irresistibly attractive to the pre-War minds that are still in charge in the War Offices and the Foreign Offices in London, Paris and Rome. The further claim that one member of the League having treaty rights with another member could resort to force to enforce its own interpretation of the rights without any right of intervention by the League itself, either to interpret the treaty itself or to put a stop to violence, came as an agreeable revelation to the Quai d'Orsay, as it looked forward into the years and speculated as to possible developments in Germany.

Obviously if the net of the Covenant and the Pact is so widely spaced that large-sized wars, with all the accompaniments of bloodshed, rapine and seizure of territory, can escape through it, the whole structure of international peace, laboriously erected in the last twelve years, is a sham edifice built upon shifting sands.

This has been the joyful interpretation of these events by all those who have always despised and hated the League and all it stands for; their name is legion and they are found everywhere in the world in high places. And it has been as well the sorrowful interpretation by many supporters and well-wishers of the League who have seen in Japan's unchecked course of aggrandizement and violence evidence that all that has been done in the way of building protection against war is about to be swept away.

But this would be to take a much too sombre view of the situation. There are in the situation elements of hope. These arise almost wholly from the growing evidence that world opinion has not been affected in the least by the cynical misrepresentations of the Japanese, or by the complacent acceptance of them by the governments of the great powers which are associated with Japan on the Council of the League. The publics of the nations belonging to the League, with inconsiderable exceptions, have declined to be humbugged. They know that Japan has broken her pledge; and that the League has failed to function as hoped through the recreancy of governments to their engagements. But they are not consenting and submitting parties. The striking difference between the present and the pre-War world is that the peoples of the world do not follow their governments like sheep in matters of international policy, and especially where policy involves a resort to force.

World opinion has condemned Japan as a breaker of pledges and as a menace to world peace; and is resolute in its determination that this offending nation

will not escape the penalties which go with this condemnation. Equally, world public opinion declines to agree to the view that the League of Nations can be rendered impotent by acts of sabotage by one of its members; and the ultimate outcome of the sad manifestation of incapacity made by the Council will be the dowering of the League with larger and more definite powers of international intervention and control. The comfortable theories implicit in the "outlawry of war" doctrine that if nations pledge their honour they will scrupulously live up to their engagements having been destroyed by events, the world, instead of throwing up its hands in despair at its impotence, will go forward in search of more effective formulas for the prevention of war and the disciplining of nations that seek an exemption for themselves in their own selfish interests.

The declaration by the Assembly that gains and advantages obtained by Japan by methods not in keeping with League principles are not to be validated is the first-fruits of this new spirit; and this is a symbol of promise which offsets in large measure the earlier and discouraging record of fumbling incompetence. What is now desirable is the expression, by every available means such as public meetings, resolutions by organizations, discussions in legislative bodies, of a widespread, deep-seated determination by the people favourable to a re-statement and reinforcement of the principle upon which the League was built—that nations must not be judges in their own quarrels and that the application of force to the settlement of disputes or to

the furthering of national interests must be definitely and finally outlawed.

[The Japanese claims to justifiable grounds for their action in Manchuria cannot be accepted. "Either Japan does not succeed in her plans, or the world goes back to the practices of the pre-War world."¹ Meantime it is encouraging that the Kellogg Pact is not to be allowed to go by default.]

TEETH FOR THE PACT

(April 22, 1932)

THE KELLOGG PACT was hailed by the "Outlawry of War" advocates as the triumph of their principle. By "outlawry of war" they understood that all nations would agree not to resort to arms, thus removing war from a weary world. The suggestion that it might be necessary to make provision for dealing with nations that broke their engagements in this respect was displeasing to them; even to mention the contingent possibility of a need of force was to break the flawless perfection of the conception of a world basking in universal unending peace. The United States Government in deference to the public opinion which they represented refused to consider the need for provisions by which sanctions could be invoked.

The value of signatories to the Kellogg Pact and solemn engagements to refrain from war have recently been tested in a world-public manner; and one result has been the introduction into the United States Senate by Senator Capper of Kansas of a resolution which

¹ *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 14, 1932—"Japan's Defence".

"reiterates the 'Stimson doctrine', forbids shipment of arms to Kellogg Pact violators, forbids trade or financial arrangements with them and asks the President to call a conference of signatories of the pact to define their obligations should the agreement be broken."²

The resolution may not pass; but its introduction and the evident popular approval which is given it, are a portent of the ultimate triumph of the principle which it embodies. If world public opinion is hardening against war, against the nations which desire to retain it as a weapon in the national armoury, and against statesmen who foment and encourage it—as is undoubtedly the case—a way will be found to deal with breakers of the peace. Perhaps Senator Capper's resolution points the way.

[In the rest of the world things go ill. Dictatorship threatens in Germany.³ The United States continues obdurate on the question of war debts, adding yet another strain to the sagging structure of the peace.⁴ But the League still stands as the agent of the conscience of the world.]

THE TEST OF THE LEAGUE

(December 10, 1932)

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS is now at grips with the problem of China, Japan and Manchuria. Of all the serious international problems now awaiting solution, this is the gravest; for involved in it is the simple, easily understandable question of whether or not the

² Congressional Record, Senate, April 6, 1932, p. 7527. The resolution did not pass.

³ *Winnipeg Free Press*, August 10, 1932—"Germany and the World".

⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, December 8, 1932—"A Kind of Tragic Lunacy".

principles upon which the League rests are to be abandoned because their application is being resisted by one of the major powers of the world. Japan is profuse in threats that she will withdraw from the League if the situation which she has created in Manchuria by force, in contempt of her solemn engagement as a signatory of the treaty entered into at Washington ten years ago, is not accepted and regularized by the League.

However, this is a risk that should be accepted. It would be far better that the League should be blown to pieces in an attempt to vindicate the principle that nations can no longer be judge of their own cause in such matters as the capture of territory and the making of war, thus living in history as a pathetically inadequate attempt, born out of due time, to control the predatory instincts of humanity, than to survive as the agent and apologist of imperialism. But there is no likelihood of the League disappearing if it stands steadily and unflinchingly behind the assertion of its right to pass judgment on Japan's actions in Manchuria and to say what should be done in order that, so far as is possible in a situation so confused and complex, a solution may be reached which will safeguard the extensive privileges of Japan, remove her legitimate grievances and at the same time, preserve the indefeasible rights of China. That end can best be served by upholding the unanimous finding of the Lytton Commission.⁵ The acceptance of this report or

⁵ The Commission of enquiry appointed under the chairmanship of Lord Lytton to go into the Sino-Japanese dispute in Manchuria. Its unanimous finding condemned the actions of Japan from the Mukden incident on, and was unanimously accepted by the Assembly of the League, February 24, 1933.

its rejection virtual or actual, is the test which the League must forthwith make. . . .

The active co-operation of the British nations in giving leadership to the League of Nations at this critical moment might easily prove a turning point in history. There is, of course, no suggestion of the application of sanctions. The powers and the opportunities of the League do not at this time go beyond making clear to Japan the righteous course, as this appears to the judgment of the nations. The responsibility of flouting that opinion and thus setting in motion the imponderables that will ultimately exact an accounting would rest with Japan. Despite all the brave words at Geneva, it is just possible that the powers now dominant in Japan, who undoubtedly do not speak for a wholly united country, would hesitate before taking up a position of defiance if they clearly realized that this involved the consequences which would appear to be inseparable from such an act.

[The accession of Hitler to power in Germany, January 30, 1933, bodes no good. "There is no mania quite so self-revealing as that of Jew-baiting."⁶ Moral condemnation, however, as of Japan, depends for its effectiveness on the development of active international opinion.]

BUILDING INTERNATIONAL OPINION

(August 14, 1933)

It is something of a paradox that at a time when the relations between countries are in a high state of ten-

⁶ *Winnipeg Free Press*, April 1, 1933—"Germany and the World".

sion international conferences, intended to improve relations between nations, abound as never before. How is it that while the agencies for international contacts and co-operation multiply, the difficulties in the way of inducing countries to adjust their differences on reasonable grounds, involving in many cases compromise, seem to increase? The explanation in part is to be found in the greater participation in foreign affairs of the people themselves. Until a relatively late date the foreign affairs of each country were in almost the sole control of its Foreign Office; and while the political complexion of the head of the office might change from time to time the foreign policy which it administered was constant. The adjustments made between countries under these conditions often did not serve the needs of the nations nor the peace of the world; but they were arrived at much more simply and expeditiously than is possible under modern conditions. When Castlereagh represented Great Britain at the Congress of Vienna, he was free to take the course which he deemed in keeping with the traditional policies of his country, but a century later Lloyd George's course at Versailles was subject to supervision and indirect control by a parliament fresh from the people and inflamed with resentments and prejudices. Upon one occasion when he showed an inclination to lessen the indignities to Germany in the interests of future peace he was summoned to London by a telegram signed by over three hundred members of parliament and subjected to discipline. There is a reason for the notorious difficulty that has always existed when a nation has sought to come to terms with the United

States, the explanation being that the U.S. Senate, an elected body, has always divided with the President the responsibility for treaty-making.

The change which has made the public a party to a country's foreign engagements is, taking the long view, in the interests of world understanding and peace; but while the peoples of the world are in their present moods of national truculence and suspicion it puts many difficulties in the way of cordial and mutually useful international relationships. The peoples of the world have now to learn that in their dealings with one another they cannot hope to get anywhere if each country must have the advantage in every deal and if free play is to be given to the fears and suspicions which are so large a part of the attitude which every nation takes towards the rest of the world. When the franchise was widely extended in England Robert Lowe said: "We must now educate our masters", and this is even more true in the field of international relationships. Here, as in other respects it is, in Wells' phrase, a race between education and disaster. The growing interdependence of the nations, the result of the unseen pressure of thousands of influences, supplies both the occasion and the necessity every year for countless international conferences of one sort or another ranging all the way from elaborate official gatherings like the Assembly of the League of Nations or the late lamented World Economic Conference in London to friendly meetings of benevolent and fraternal societies. They all make a contribution to the forces which are slowly but painfully bringing into being an international public opinion which will temper and modify

and in time—let us hope—control the external policies of individual nations. Even conspicuous failures, like the recent London fiasco, have an educational value; in each country which took part in that abortive gathering there is a body of opinion, not insignificant, which, deploring its failure, will seek to determine the measure of accountability for the failure which rests upon its national delegation. The world indeed moves, though slowly. . . .

[The hope of "a world on the very brink of disaster"⁷ still remains, after the failure of the World Economic Conference, the maintenance of the Covenant. Plans such as the Four-Power Pact of June 7, 1933, among Great Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, are to be condemned.]

TO REFORM THE LEAGUE

(December 7, 1933)

. . . . THE showdown with respect to the League of Nations is at hand. There appear to be only three ways out of the present impasse. The League will be established in a stronger position than it has been for some years past with the obligations of the members more clearly defined and its powers for collectively enforcing peace more widely recognized. Or it will remain until it is blown up by the next war, as a key-hole listener at the door of the room in which the great men

⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, November 11, 1933—"Remembrance and Dedication".

representing the great powers deal with the issues of peace and war with the privilege of supplying an admiring chorus when the great men strut forth in all their glory to tell the world what their decisions are. Such a league, during the short period of its remaining life would continue its useful work for co-ordination of international activities in matters about which there was common consent; but it would be the mere temporary survival into the era of world anarchy of an institution established by the nations in the fleeting period of sanity which they enjoyed in the sober moment which followed the war. Or the League will collapse and go out of business, taking its place in history as humanity's most tragic failure. The preferable courses are the first and the third; and it is one of these that will be taken. The smaller nations may not be able to do anything worth while to make the League effective, but they can reduce it to nothingness by also withdrawing—a course which surely they will prefer to being allowed to remain, merely as ornaments on the flowing robes of the four or five Cæsars who will divide the world.

. . . . The League is an attempt to bring something like the democratic principle into international relations. Every nation in the League ranks as an equal with every other nation; and there are provisions, governing both the Assembly and the Council, which give the small nations an opportunity to exercise at least negative power. It is not possible for three or four great powers to get together and put policies into operation against the desire of nations not so great and powerful. This is why Mussolini thinks that the prin-

ciple upon which the League is organized is "absurd". It naturally would so appear to one who boasts that he has danced upon the corpse of liberty. A proposal⁸ is now to be made by Italy for a "reformation" of the League by which, presumably, it is to cease to be "absurd" in the eyes of Mussolini; which means that it will be proposed that the League should become an agency for the carrying out of orders handed down from above. Now that the world is in the melting pot it is wholly in order that this question as to the powers, functions and future of the League should be raised in order that a decisive answer one way or another may be given by the peoples of the world.

⁸ This was made by the Fascist Grand Council of Italy on December 6, 1933, as result of dissatisfaction with the outcome of the Four-Power Pact which had been inspired by Signor Mussolini. Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs, 1933*. Oxford University Press, London, 1934, p. 223.

IV

THE IMPASSE OF ECONOMIC NATIONALISM

If the peace were to be maintained some way of escape must be found from the tightening coils of economic "self-sufficiency". The political structure of 1919 could not bear much longer the racking to which the world depression was subjecting it. Though the difficulties with which the Disarmament Conference was labouring were inauspicious, the World Economic Conference of June 12, 1933, might do much to find a way out if statesmen would provide for stabilization of international exchange, freer trade and settlement of war debts. This hope was wrecked on the incompatibility of the New Deal programme with the measures needed to restore world trade. This very failure, however, and the fact that 1934, which saw the blood-purge in Germany, June 30, the assassination of Dollfuss, July 25, and the joint assassination of King Alexander of Yugoslavia and Barthou, Foreign Minister of France, October 9, yet did not see the outbreak of war, might arouse world opinion to stem the drift through economic nationalism to war.

[In the Disarmament Conference—which begins its sessions February 2, 1932, to continue until December 9, 1935—lie the hopes of completing the work of political pacification begun in 1919. This work is now threatened by the depression, and the World Economic Conference is intended to alleviate the economic strain on the political structure. Yet prosperity can hardly be hoped for unless peace is confirmed, nor peace be assured without prosperity.]

THE FIRST STEP TO WORLD RECOVERY

(June 8, 1933)

THE adjournment of the Disarmament Conference¹ with all the various projects designed to minimize the prospects of war in a state of indeterminate inconclusiveness is not a particularly heartening prelude to the meeting of the World Economic Conference. The economic ills which plague the nations can be traced back to the World War; and it is the possibility and perhaps the imminence of war that make the adoption of remedial plans difficult, if not an impossibility. Without a reasonable assurance of permanent peace nothing much can be done about stabilizing currencies, establishing international standards of value, removing barriers to international trade and relieving tension between the nations; and anything that may be accomplished to these ends will be subject to the contingency of war and due to disappear at the first clash of hostili-

¹ June 8, 1933.

ties. The policies of national self-sufficiency which have reduced the old Commonwealth of Christendom to a jumble of jealous non-co-operative states, a condition of virtual world anarchy, are due in about equal proportions to resentments arising out of the last war and terror of the next.

Some means must be found to put a stop both to the threat of war and its actuality before there can be any firm ground upon which to build a world of security and prosperity. The hopes to this end reposed in the League of Nations have been destroyed; but something of worth has been gained from the demonstration of its powerlessness. The reason why the League fails has been very clearly shown. There will not be peace in the world until the nation that breaks the peace is dealt with by the nations that want to see the peace kept. The League must find means of defining the aggressor and methods of disciplining the aggressor when found. In other words, the world must choose between recurrent wars—though these may be disguised as defensive operations technically within the terms of the Covenant or the Kellogg Pact—which will keep the nations armed, in both a military and economic sense, and a system of sanctions, arranged in the light of the events of the past fourteen years, which will give effective guarantees to nations that dispense with economic and military armaments. The French demand for security, as precedent to disarmament, is beginning to be accepted "in principle" though there is not much likelihood that the French thesis will be adopted in its entirety.

The chief difficulty in the way of working out some

practical means of defining aggression and applying sanctions has been the reluctance of Great Britain to take on the vast responsibilities involved in putting her navy at the disposal of an external body for the purpose of enforcing sanctions, particularly in view of the aloofness of the United States, which has always had a markedly nationalistic conception of rights of trade in war-time. While the United States would give no assurance of co-operation in their application, sanctions were rejected by Great Britain; without sanctions France and her allies in the succession states maintained their control of Europe by an overwhelming superiority of force—giving Europe and the world an armed and precarious peace. This has been the situation ever since the War, and despite what has been going forward at Geneva during the past few months, it is pretty much the situation today. It must be changed if the remedial agencies decided upon at the World Economic Conference, assuming perhaps too hopefully that this will be the outcome of this gathering, are to have a chance to work.

One cheering sign is the interest taken in the question of bringing about disarmament and banishing war, by the President of the United States. His letter to the fifty-four nations,² and the statement to the Disarmament Conference by Norman H. Davis³ were quite in the Wilsonian tradition. But engagements or sugges-

² To the nations about to participate in the World Economic Conference. In this message, May 16, 1933, President Roosevelt advocated "the stabilization of currencies, the freeing of the flow of world trade, and international action to raise price levels." Toynbee, A. J., *op. cit.*, p. 44.

³ Made May 22, 1933, *ibid.*, p. 227. Mr. Davis declared on the authorization of the President that the United States would undertake to refrain from any act that would tend to defeat collective action in restraint of aggression.

tions by President Roosevelt, intended to induce a permanent change of policy in such a matter as the adoption of sanctions, have to be qualified by the fact that they could not in fact be implemented if the legislative branch of the government were not agreeable. Mr. Walter Lippman, touching upon this point, says:

"For example: has the President, under the American constitutional system, the authority to make the offer described by Mr. Davis? Will Congress ratify a treaty to that effect? Who in the American system of government would have authority to say that we concur in the judgment rendered as to the responsible and guilty party? Questions like these are inescapable in so far as we press toward what Mr. Davis called an immediate decisive step in general disarmament. For as matters stand today the problem of French disarmament is the problem of British and American support of the existing treaties."⁴

The indisposition of Congress to second President Roosevelt's disposition to use the power of the United States for the discouragement of aggressive action by nations in the pursuit of their own ends has been rather strikingly shown by the amendment⁵ made by the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate to the resolution before Congress to authorize the President of the United States to join with other nations in prohibiting

⁴ It has not been possible, without access to a file of *The Herald Tribune*, to verify this quotation. The basic idea is contained in Mr. Lippman's *Interpretations, 1933-1935*, Macmillans, New York, 1936, pp. 324-5. "To organize peace today is to underwrite the existing frontiers of Europe."

⁵ Adopted despite presidential pressure, February 28, 1934. Heald, Stephen, *Documents on International Affairs, 1933*, Oxford University Press, London, 1934, p. 454.

the export of arms and munitions to any country which he considered a menace to world peace. This resolution is completely in harmony with the offer made at Geneva by Mr. Davis. But the Foreign Relations Committee has destroyed the effect of the resolution by depriving the President of the power of exercising a choice. He may embargo shipments to all parties to a conflict, but he must not undertake to decide which nation is in the wrong and direct the embargo against the defenders. This is proof that the isolationist tradition is still strong in the Senate, and doubtless throughout the United States as well. Until there is a change there the prospects for world disarmament, in both the military and the economic sense, cannot be said to be bright.

[These disturbing signs in the United States raise the question why the Economic Conference was ever allowed to convene since the United States, committed to the New Deal programme, could not agree to the two things, stabilization of the dollar and of domestic price levels, necessary to the success of the Conference.

DOOMED TO FAILURE

(July 4, 1933)

HAVING regard to the extraordinary performances that have been going on in the United States these four last months, the refusal of the United States Government to agree to any stabilization of the dollar is understandable; but what must be clean beyond the

comprehension of the ordinary man is why the Economic Conference was permitted to convene while the United States continued in its highly adventurous and experimental state of mind. The Conference was not called until after the supposedly momentous conversation between Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and President Roosevelt. After this conversation, in a joint statement issued by Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Roosevelt, it was announced that it was the hope of both Governments that it might be possible to convene the Conference for June; and immediately thereafter it was called for June 12. The distinguished statesmen presumably talked about the Conference and its supposed purposes, for we read in the same statement:

“We have in these talks found a reassurance of unity of purpose and method. They have given a fresh impetus to the solution of the problems that weigh so heavily upon the most stable, industrious, and deserving men and women of the world—the human foundation of our civilization—whose hard luck it is our common object to alleviate.”⁶

These are fine resounding words; but the proceedings at London invest them with a hypocritical hollowness that ought to make them notable in the language of statecraft.

It was obvious at that time to many observers, and to the press and other commentators upon these developments, that the Government of the United States

⁶ Joint statement issued by President Roosevelt and Prime Minister MacDonald, April 25, 1933.

was embarking upon experimental policies which would make it difficult, if not impossible, for that country to co-operate in an international conference which was bound to fail if it could not bring about a stabilization of international currencies upon a basis which involved recognition of gold and also arrange for the clearing of the channels of international trade which involved lessening of tariff restrictions. The abandonment by the United States of the gold standard while the British delegation was at sea, and the explanation of the reasons for this abandonment which were given representatives of Great Britain when they reached Washington, should have warned Mr. MacDonald that Uncle Sam was in a mood which would make him a very awkward customer at any international gathering such as that which they had in mind.

The United States by that time was well embarked upon a campaign to raise domestic prices not by the device of flooding the banks with cheap money in the expectation that this would result in easier credit conditions, which had been tried with very limited effect in both Great Britain and the United States, but by drastic methods involving the fixing of prices, the possibility of large issues of fiat money, the employment of unemployed by compulsory shortening of the hours of labour, the prospect of dollar devaluation. These were intended to boost prices in terms of United States currency; and to this end depreciation of the currency was resorted to. The cheaper the dollar, the higher the apparent price of commodities—this is the invariable effect of inflation; the greater the inflation, the higher

the internal price level (always in terms of the domestic currency, it is to be borne in mind). It was thus reasonably evident to people whose thinking equipment was in fair running order that there were two things to which the consent of the United States Government could not be obtained while this movement was under way. It would not peg the dollar at any particular level, because this would put a brake upon the rising price of domestic commodities; and it would not consent to lower the tariff because, with the artificial enhancement of living and production costs by the processes set in force by the Government, tariff increases—and not decreases—were certain to be demanded by the industries thus burdened. These are the influences which, operating today, have made the United States the prime—but by no means the only—wrecking force in the Conference.

The United States is, of course, within its rights, in this imperfectly organized world, in pursuing domestic policies in entire indifference to their effect upon the rest of the world. But why be a party to the holding of a Conference which was bound to be a nullity unless it was prepared to modify these policies? An intelligent survey of the situation and ten minutes of plain talk by Mr. MacDonald and Mr. Roosevelt should have made it plain to both of them that a Conference at this time could not but end in deadlock and disappointment. What did these great men talk about during the hours they were closeted together? Obviously everything but the realities of the situation.

[Nonetheless the continuance of the Conference may not be without its value in awakening people to the need of liberal trade policies.]

A PROCESS OF EDUCATION

(July 10, 1933)

THE continuance of the World Economic Conference,⁷ should this be decided upon at today's meeting, may be useful as a means of enlightening the various peoples as to realities of the existing world situation—and, taking the long view, this may prove a contribution of value. The observation has become almost a commonplace that if the Conference fails there will be an intensification of economic nationalism. The purpose for which the Conference was called was to effect economic disarmament. With regard to this end, the Conference is a palpable failure; but it would be premature to say that the failure will confirm the governments and the peoples they represent in the policies which have made common action impossible. The reluctance of the national delegations in attendance at the Conference to admit its complete failure is a good sign; it suggests that they do not relish returning home with empty hands and the necessity that they would be under to explain the failure to their publics. It is from developments like this that we get the evidence that there is an international public opinion in every country of which governments have to take note. If the Conference blows up now,⁸ the United States

⁷ The Conference adjourned, July 27, 1933, and did not re-convene.

⁸ As a result of President Roosevelt's declaration of July 3, 1933, denouncing the proposals of the Conference for currency stabilization.

Government will bear the responsibility before its own people, in the judgment of the world and in the records of history. It is a prospect which to Mr. Roosevelt and his advisers is not attractive; hence the efforts of Mr. Hull to keep the Conference going meanwhile in the hope that something may develop which will in part disguise the fact of failure and permit a division of responsibility for this failure.

If the Conference goes on, the various sub-commissions will continue to wrestle with the subjects assigned to them; and the proceedings are bound to be enlightening, whether progress is made or not. Not a single question can be discussed without the forbidden subjects, the tariff and currency instability, entering in; yes, and debts as well. One such sub-commission is struggling with the matter of subsidies to shipping. The countries which want subsidies abolished are low-tariff countries with a free-trade tradition; those who defend them as essential to the maintenance of a merchant marine are protectionists. The tariff is, in fact, the issue. Into the consideration of controlled production and marketing, with which another sub-commission is dealing, the tariffs of the importing countries enter as a decisive factor. Another sub-commission is looking into practices by which tariffs, protective or prohibitive, are imposed in a disguised form—such as nuisance regulations as to marks of national origin, the imposition of embargoes on claimed grounds of protecting health or maintaining supposed standards. This is simply a phase of the general question of tariffs. And so on with respect to every question that will come up for discussion.

Mr. Roosevelt's idea, which the United States delegation champions, is that the important question before the Conference is some agreement upon credit policies by the various countries which will raise prices throughout the world. But the forbidden questions of currency and tariff constitute the very essence of the problem which the President calls upon the Conference to solve. Mr. Roosevelt's policy of raising prices in the United States involves the continuing depreciation of the American dollar in international markets. To the extent that it falls faster than the internal price level rises, which always happens in the early stages of this movement, United States exports to other countries are bonused. The result is likely to be an increase of tariff rates against United States imports by countries which regard the depreciation of its currency by an exporting country an unfair act. The seven gold countries of Europe conferred in Paris Friday for the furthering of plans to put a surtax on United States goods in keeping with the fall in the value of the dollar. If the United States dollar should fall below the Canadian dollar, which may happen, our Protectionist Government at Ottawa can be counted upon to meet the new condition by a special tax of some kind. The United States plan invites a war of currencies which will mean a recourse to tariff weapons between that country and every other country which is not prepared to boost prices by similar drastic and arbitrary methods. This will be very speedily made clear to the Conference if it undertakes to consider policies of credit and price levels in terms of uncontrolled currencies.

A continuance of the Conference with these matters

freely discussed under the eyes of the people of the world might have valuable educative results. It might tend to make clear to the nations the choice that is before them: The continuation of the existing conditions of economic war with its progressive strangulation of such world trade as remains; or the reversal of the policies which are responsible for the war. These are the policies of economic nationalism as they have been worked out and applied since the Great War; and the tap-root of them all from which has come the poison that has brought disaster to the world is the building of ever higher trade barriers. While it is perhaps hopeless to expect that anything can now be done at London to bring about that concerted movement towards saner policies which the Conference was called to pursue, it may be doubted whether the various governments will joyously seize the fact of its failure to redouble their policies of exclusiveness. They and the peoples they speak for may acquire a measure of enlightenment as to whither the world is tending that will at a later date not far distant, bring about results not now attainable.

[Only a return by the nations, both in domestic politics and in international trade, to policies and practices of liberalism can avert tyranny at home and war abroad.]

IN DEFENCE OF FREEDOM

(July 21, 1933)

SOMETHING has been said in these columns about the philosophy of Liberalism and its applicability to the

problems of today. It is easy, in imagination, to hear a taunting voice say, "Take a look at the world today and see what Liberal democratic policies have done to it." To which the reply, firm but polite, must be made that what the nations of the world, with a few exceptions, have been particularly busy about for the last sixty years has been the repudiation of Liberal ideas of economics and of statecraft. Instead, we have had experiments on a large and determined scale with theories which are now being recommended anew in a fresher setting, as affording a solution for the world's ills. Most of the nations have been pursuing policies of "planned national economy" looking to "self-sufficiency". There have been the artificial encouragement on national grounds of uneconomic production; restrictions upon the free movement of world commerce; controls of trade and finance by various devices—all directed towards setting up behind the national boundaries a state which would make its own sunshine and prosperity, regardless of what might happen to the "lesser breeds without the law". The result is seen in today's world wreckage. And the remedies that are now being offered are nothing but variants, under new faces, of the policies of bureaucratic control of individual action, interference with the freedom of trade and a still more rigid application of the formula of "planned national economy". Humans are slow to learn!

A quite convincing case can be made out in support of the claim that the transformation which took place in the Western world in the half century beginning about 1860 was due to the very limited application, in

the face of these restrictions, of Liberal policies of freedom of trade and liberty of individual action. The fulcrum which lifted the whole world out of scarcity into that state of comparative opulence and security which marked the first decade of this century was the relative ease with which commerce and money flowed throughout the world. The pump which kept these fructifying currents flowing was, as can readily be seen in retrospect, free trade England. The world's chief creditor nation, she took payment in whatever goods her debtor could send her, and these goods she used herself or disposed of somewhere in the world. The gold standard was tied in, as is now equally evident, with this free movement of goods; it was a currency for the world, managed in fact by Great Britain, which made possible the movements of goods and gold along the lines of maximum profit. The War hopelessly disorganized this mechanism; and through the strengthening of nationalist appetites and prejudices, there has been an obliteration of Liberal policies in trade, in international relations and in internal government. How completely Liberal ideas have been submerged, the World Conference has revealed. In the sixty-six national delegations there appears to be one lone Liberal: Mr. Cordell Hull, of the United States, who has been repudiated by his colleagues and spanked by his President.

The world now has the choice of getting back to Liberal principles or going forward to still more elaborate experiments in controlled national economy looking towards "self-sufficiency". If the latter road is taken, a second choice will have to be made between

Fascism and Socialism. Notwithstanding all the sweet assurances that are being put about that choice will be made by Force. Nothing has been more startling in post-War developments than the prompt emergence of Fascism in countries as an answer to aggressive Socialism; and the evidence thus far available certainly suggests that if a Western country gets to the point where it feels that it has got to be bossed by somebody, it prefers the strong-armed Fascist to the meddling Socialist. The nation that is through with Liberal doctrines of individual freedom and freedom of trade is in for lively times.

In the face of these portents it is not fanciful to foresee a great revival of Liberalism in all countries concerned to maintain an ordered and progressive civilization. In all these countries there have been powerful Liberal elements, but they have been divided by minor political differences and by that indifference to political developments which has been characteristic of many in the post-War age. A reintegration of all these elements on some wider and more generous basis than has served for parties in the past is the pressing need of the times. It is a time for people who believe in freedom to get together, forgetting the petty differences that have separated them, unless they are prepared to accept in due time, in a spirit of resignation, the booted foot on their necks. While this is specially true of trans-Atlantic nations, we need not be indifferent in Canada to the warning signals that are everywhere flying. There are policies and possessions, precious to the Canadian people, which can only be defended by an organization into which all the ele-

ments, which do not admire the prospect of a servile state, can be drawn.

[The failure of disarmament, political and economic, and the blood-stained events of the year of violence, 1934, present a black picture. Yet the very perils of the times may provide their own antidote in a rallying of world opinion to policies of economic and political liberalism.

" . . . it [the war of 1914-1918] has permanently affected the minds of men, warping those attitudes of mind and feeling which make civilization possible. And now we have something which we call the depression; and what it is going to do to the world no man knows."⁹ "Liberals, in military phrase, must hold the line until the imponderables come to the rescue. . . "¹⁰

But the light thickens. "The world, which, as we must bear in mind, includes Canada, is now back to 1914 . . . the democratic countries which desire collective security should form a defensive alliance pledged to arbitration among themselves and to joint action against aggressors. Round this nucleus a wider collective system could grow until no nation would feel safe outside it."¹¹ Such a guarantee of peace might make economic revival possible.

THE TREND OF 1934

(December 31, 1934)

. . . . THE year 1934 has supplied not one, but many warnings to the nations that their international policies both political and economic are making war inevitable. They can see, if they but will, the easy road down hill to the brow of the precipice and beyond, the fires of

⁹ "Economic Depression and Political Realignment", by J. W. Dafoe: *The Liberal Way*, J. M. Dent & Sons, Toronto and Vancouver, 1933, p. 219.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

¹¹ *Canadian Business*, December, 1934. "The World at Work", pp. 10-11.

Tophet. Despite all the sabre-rattling and platform glorification of war, it is difficult to believe that any person in the world having power to bring about war has the courage or the willingness, at the moment, to put a lighted match into the open powder-keg which is Europe; though the sorry history of mankind shows only too clearly that too many parades, a too-numerous supply of uniforms and a weakness for gasconade sometimes create a singular delusion of power in the minds of strutting Cæsars. But certain it is that the peoples of the world do not want war—the cannon-fodder, after centuries of acquiescence, begins to protest.

This fear of what war might do to them and their world which has restrained the potential war-lords and this popular hostility to war has kept the peace despite the tensions of the past two or three years; but this does not remove the grave and undeniable fact that the return of all the nations to what has come to be termed "power politics" can have only, one end: another world war which would complete the destruction of the edifice of organized society which was so well begun by the late episode that there is some doubt as to whether another war will be needed to push it over.

The ignominious collapse of the Disarmament Conference, the denouncing by Japan of the Washington Treaty as an incident in her imperialistic campaign in the Far East, with many lesser indications of equal validity, are flaming signals along the road of the end that awaits the countries that travel that highway. And the signals have not been without effect—particularly upon public, as distinguished from official, opinion. Much the most encouraging aspect of 1934

has been the growing recognition by the peoples of the world—and this has been especially true of the English-speaking peoples—of the need for a return without delay to the philosophy of international relationships embodied in the Covenant of the League and in the terms of the Pact of Paris to which only lip service has been rendered in the period of storm and stress through which the world has been passing in recent years. The foundation-stone of these systems is the same—that no nation under any pretext whatever shall be the judge of its own cause and shall be free to resort, at its own instance, to force. The nations have subscribed to this principle and they have given it high praise in words; but they have not paid it the ultimate tribute of believing in it or acting upon it.

The peoples of the world know now, having been pretty well taught by the events of the past few years and especially by the lessons of 1934, that there are only two choices before them: the keeping of peace by collective action or the acceptance of the old idea of war as the ultimate and inevitable expression of policy. There is an undeniable movement everywhere towards a return to the ideals of the League. Of this there are many signs. One is the recent manifestation of power by the League in the dispute between Yugoslavia and Hungary;¹² others are the entrance into the League by Russia;¹³ the peace ballot campaign in Great Britain;¹⁴ the increasing interest in Canada in the question of

¹² In placing the responsibility on Hungary, December 10, 1934, for the conniving of certain of its authorities at the activities of terrorists on Hungarian soil.

¹³ September 18, 1934.

¹⁴ 1934-1935.

collective security and how it is to be obtained; and most significant of all, the appearance in the United States of demands in many influential quarters that the policies of rigid isolation and no liability whatever shall be replaced by policies of co-operation looking towards the discouragement of aggression and the maintenance (enforced if necessary) of peace.

Upon all these counts the year 1934, despite the grim and forbidding notations on its records, was a year of growing international understanding and of increasing readiness to accept responsibilities which go with living in a shrinking and interdependent world. The portents for 1935 are that these tendencies will continue to grow in strength. In fact, there are encouraging though far from conclusive indications that the world is beginning to think that there is something to be said after all for the much-flouted and much-derided policies of economic and political liberalism—which constitutes a message of hope and cheer for the coming year.

V

ABYSSINIA

*In 1933 and 1934 the world witnessed the re-orientation of the European powers about a resurgent Germany. This had been the fundamental question since Versailles: When would Germany, a potential great power even in defeat, resume its place as an actual great power in Europe and the world, and in what temper and with what motives? That it was doing so under Hitler was clear, and the portents of its temper were evil. Nonetheless, the shock of its initial resurgence had been weathered without war. What was required now was firmness on the part of the guarantor of peace, the League, to restrain the exuberant nationalism of liberated Germany. But the League had been mortally wounded by Manchuria. Only resolution, to the point of the application of sanctions, could uphold the Covenant and keep the peace. "I think the economic sanctions carry the possibility, from which we ought not to shrink, of military sanctions."*¹

Hence all proposals and actions of the members of the League must be judged by the promise they gave of effective action to maintain the peace. New pacts, such as the proposed Air Pact, were needed only if they implied immediate sanctions and left no diplomatic loopholes through which an aggressor nation

¹ "Canada's Interest in the World Crisis". Address to the Canadian Club, Montreal, November 7, 1935, p. 48.

might wriggle to threaten the peace.² In this light the manoeuvres of Nazi Germany must be watched. When on March 16, 1935, Hitler tore up the disarmament clauses of the Treaty of Versailles, it was apparent that an armament race was inevitable.³ This action of Germany's was certain in view of the failure of the victor powers to carry out their moral obligations under the Treaty and Article VIII of the Covenant to disarm.⁴ Yet Hitlerism itself is not excusable⁵ and Hitler's actions are alienating other countries and uniting them to some degree against him. The Stresa Conference of the Italian, French and British Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries of April 11-14, which called for "the collective maintenance of peace within the framework of the League of Nations,"⁶ and the indictment by the Council of the League on April 17 of Germany for her unilateral repudiation of international obligations,⁷ promised resolute action by the League.

² *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 16, 1935—"Sanctions and the Air Pact"—"a momentous change in British policy" from the rejection of the Geneva Protocol.

³ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 18, 1935—"Hitler's Bombshell".

⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 20, 1935—"Documents in the Case".

⁵ *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 23, 1935—"Hitler's Deliverance".

⁶ Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, I, 1935, p. 161.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 163-166.

THE LEAGUE IN ACTION

(April 19, 1935)

. . . GERMANY has shown herself as a threat to all Europe; and the nations of Europe, under the challenge, are drawing together for self-protection. What has happened in Geneva is that for the first time the League of Nations is functioning in keeping with the basic principle upon which it rests. That principle is that the nation which proposes to be a law to itself in its relation to other nations and to do as it pleases in keeping with its strength, is to find itself confronted by the linked power of all the members of the League. The League, which includes all the countries of Europe except Germany, is serving notice on Germany that if it persists in being an outlaw nation pursuing policies of aggrandisement, regardless of the rights of other countries, the weapons of the League will be turned against it—financial sanctions, economic sanctions and, if necessary, military sanctions. Germany denounces this as encirclement. It is nothing of the kind. It is defence of the world peace by the League strictly in keeping with the purposes for which it was brought into being.

[The test comes, however, not through any direct action of Germany, but through the attack of Italy on Ethiopia. This time there must be no equivocation, and no faltering. No other course is open

but to apply economic sanctions, followed, if necessary, by military sanctions.⁸ Even the incomplete economic sanctions of October, 1935, are to be welcomed. Yet the sincerity of the British Government in supporting the Covenant is open to doubt,⁹ doubts confirmed by the revelation of the Hoare-Laval plan, December 9, 1935.¹⁰ At year's end the issues are set out and summed up. By the outcome of this trial the League as an effective instrument of peace stands or falls.]

1935's OUTSTANDING EVENTS

(December 31, 1935)

THOUGH the year 1935 has seen many things happen of first-class historical importance it will take its significant place in history by virtue of the fact that it saw the League of Nations placed squarely across the highway along which the legions of Italy were pressing for the carrying out of a project of imperialist aggression of a type with which the world has been familiar since the dawn of time. The issue as the old year goes out and the new year comes in, is in the balance; and it will take a retrospective view covering a few years or perhaps decades to determine what the consequences to the world will be of these developments.

Whatever these consequences may be, 1935 must take rank as one of the crucial years of human history. By reason of causes arising within this twelve-months period, either the law of nations promulgated at Paris

⁸ *Winnipeg Free Press*, October 22, 1935—"Canada and Sanctions". "This contingency may as well be faced; it is implicit in the Covenant . . ."

⁹ *Winnipeg Free Press*, December 12, 1935—"Baldwin and the Peace Plan".

¹⁰ *Winnipeg Free Press*, December 26, 1935—"Defeat of a Conspiracy".

in 1919 becomes the governing principle of international relations, or everything Geneva stands for passes into the limbo of lost causes.

A decision, irrevocable in its nature, so far as this generation is concerned, must now be made; and under the pressure of the world-wide recognition that this is an hour big with fate, there have been developments disconcerting in the last degree to world powers and principalities.

For fifteen years the League of Nations has been in being and for fifteen years the great powers, who alone could make the League of Nations effective, have been refusing, each in its own way, to face up to the fundamental obligation of the Covenant which was to prevent, if necessary by the application of collective restraints, any nation pursuing aggressive purposes against its neighbours and being the judge in its own cause. President Wilson put the case with complete frankness when in submitting the Covenant to the plenary session of the Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, he said:

"Through this instrument we are depending primarily and chiefly upon one great force, and that is the moral force of the public opinion of the world . . . Armed Force is in the background of this programme, but it is in the background, and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, then physical force shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war."¹¹

¹¹ Wilson, Woodrow, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

It is this conception of the League which the public opinion of the world seeks to re-establish against the calculated and long-continued treason of governments and their officials. And by reason of the manner in which the question has been raised and the developments accompanying its raising, the issue is so clear that the governments and their officials have either to accept the original conception of the League or take the responsibility, in the eyes of their contemporaries and in the judgment of history, for destroying it—a responsibility which they are not willing, it seems, to take.

British public opinion has now intervened so decisively that the surrender planned by Sir Samuel Hoare has been repudiated, Sir Samuel himself has been ejected from office, and the British Government is now committed to policies which the League may adopt to discipline Italy for her breach of faith and to defeat her plans of conquest in Ethiopia. While officialdom has been pooh-poohing League engagements and the sophists have been reducing them to abstractions, the plain, honest, decent British public has been steadily strengthening its belief that the League offers the only road—albeit a dangerous one—to a future of collective peace. The Laval-Hoare-Mussolini plan for ending the trouble by giving Italy more than Mussolini in his most truculent pre-War mood demanded was received by the British people with stupefaction and amazement, to be followed by an outburst of wrath which made short work of the plan and of the planners so far as they could be reached by the British people.

An index to the popular indignation was furnished by motions to be made in Parliament to be moved upon the assembly. One by Vivyan Adams, a Conservative M.P., was in these terms:

"That this House will not assent to any settlement of the Italo-Abyssinian dispute which ignores our international obligations under the Covenant of the League of Nations by granting the aggressor State greater concessions after its unprovoked aggression than could have been obtained by peaceful negotiation."¹²

This outburst of British opinion with the prompt attainment of the objectives it demanded was much the most remarkable and significant event of 1935; and it will have consequences that will make 1936 a still more notable year in history. With Great Britain fully committed to co-operate with other nations which are ready to make Article XVI a principle of international law enforceable by collective action, applied to the point where it will be effective there will be a much needed show-down, first as to whether a sufficient number of League nations are willing to act collectively and secondly whether, if being willing, they can establish the fact that the writ of the League runs in the world. If there should be failure on either account, 1936 will be registered in history as the year when Western civilization began to crumble beneath the impact of our newly-bred scientific savages. The issue will depend upon France, which has for years been

¹² Tabled December 11, 1935. See Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs*, Vol. II, 1935, Oxford University Press, London, 1936, pp. 314-5.

playing a sorry role. All through the twenties France posed as the champion of collective security by the application of sanctions, but the claim of the cynics that she was only interested in maintaining the *status quo* in Europe was amply justified when she accepted Japan's brigandage in Manchuria almost without question; and by her course in the present emergency. But her undoubted regard for the preservation of peace in Europe by collective action may keep her in the common League front in the test that is coming; because it ought to be reasonably evident that if collective security goes, the most conspicuous victim of the new order of blood and iron will be France herself. These are great issues and they are upon the world—upon all of us—for immediate settlement.

[While the states members of the League are preoccupied with imposition of economic sanctions on Italy, military sanctions having been ruled out in advance, Germany on March 7, 1936, re-occupies the Rhineland in violation not only of the Treaty of Versailles, but also of the Locarno Pact. Deplorable as this violation of a solemn treaty is, it is not likely to start the guns going off until the violations are carried outside German territory.¹³ The responsibility for the mounting threat to peace is inescapably Hitler's,¹⁴ and an appeal to force is the end in view.¹⁵ Inevitably the armaments race quickens towards an end to be avoided only by the maintenance of the Covenant.]

¹³ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 9, 1936—"Background of Treaty Violations".

¹⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 14 and 16, 1936—"Responsibility for the Crisis" and "Inescapable Responsibility".

¹⁵ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 17, 1936—"While Thousands Cheer".

THE END OF REARMAMENT

(March 24, 1936)

... THE parallel between the pre-War tensions which ended in the Great War and the European situation today is a matter of almost universal observation. Why should not the processes which brought about war in 1914 operate to the same end in 1936? There is just one factor which may save the situation, and that is the conception of preserving peace by collective action which was given to the world by the Great War. Impotent as the League has been, flouted and repudiated as it has been, it has yet succeeded in putting into the minds of the people of the western nations the idea that national power should not be applied to the furthering of particular ends on national initiative but that it should be devoted, in conjunction with other nations, to keeping the peace. . . .

[Meantime the tragedy of Ethiopia moves to its climax in the incorporation of that country in the Italian Empire, May 9, 1936, and the League is left with the sorry task of picking up the fragments of inadequate sanctions shattered by Italian defiance. The responsibility for this debacle falls on the League members, but especially on France and Britain,¹⁶ and must even be shared by the aloof United States.¹⁷]

¹⁶ *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 5, 1936—"The Ethiopian Mess".

¹⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 16, 1936—"Why So Superior?"

ASSESSMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY

(June 8, 1936)

WITH the League of Nations on the point of disappearing, thus confronting the statesmen of the world with the alternatives which they have hitherto refused to face, it is of something more than academic interest to take note of the available record, with a view to moving towards a judgment, for the time being, of where the responsibility for this catastrophe is to be placed. For a century to come this question will be in controversy as the extent and the consequences of the disaster grow clearer in retrospect; and the final judgment of history may make a wide and charitable allotment of responsibility. On the known facts there can be contemporary short-range appraisements of the influences that have undermined the conception of world peace which was entertained at Paris in 1919 by a few forward-looking statesmen and offered by them to a world not willing to accept it. On the morrow of the definite admission that the League cannot guarantee security, assure peace and restrain aggression in every country there will be an effort to disown responsibility and to find the explanation in the waywardness and folly of other countries. It can be foreseen that among the English-speaking peoples there will be a disposition to put the responsibility upon European countries, France especially, and to charge the breakdown to the inveterate quarrelsomeness of the peoples of Europe.

While it is certain that France and her European allies will have to carry a heavy share of the burden of accountability, the English-speaking world, in the ultimate judgment, may be found to have been the chief wreckers of the League. The League is foundering on the rock of Sanctions. It is true that France and the succession states regarded the possible employment of sanctions as a guarantee that the Versailles peace settlement in Europe would forever be inviolate; but this was a view of sanctions not justified by the Covenant and not possible of application. But the English-speaking peoples rejected outright the idea of effective sanctions for any purpose; either for the underwriting of the peace territorial settlements or for the preservation of peace by the enforcement of international law. The Americans recognized that adoption of the Covenant meant the acceptance of sanctions as a means to enforcing peace; and they threw over the League as was, of course, their right. The British nations accepted the Covenant and joined the League of Nations, with, as is now only too apparent, a mental reservation that Articles X and XVI, as provisions of universal application, meant nothing to them. The argument that it was this mental reservation and the attitudes and policies resulting from it which have made the League the spineless thing it has been these last five or six years can very strongly be supported.

Insistence upon the idea that the League of Nations could not employ force, but must rely under all circumstances upon moral suasion and methods of conciliation, made the League the impotent thing which ag-

gressor nations have used as a stepping-stone for the enlargement of their prestige. The statement that the League, by its nature, excluded all idea of force, is made repeatedly; but it is quite inaccurate. Evidence to this end could be piled up; but the three statements herewith quoted will be sufficient to disprove this claim.

GENERAL SMUTS: "I do not think the League is likely to be a success unless in the last resort the maintenance of the moratorium is guaranteed by force."¹⁸

PRESIDENT WILSON: "Armed force is in the background in this programme; but it is in the background; and if the moral force of the world will not suffice, the physical force of the world shall. But that is the last resort, because this is intended as a constitution of peace, not as a league of war."¹⁹

These statements were made while the Covenant was being fashioned in Paris. After the adoption of the Covenant the representatives of the British nations on the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference, which drafted the Covenant—General Smuts and Lord Cecil—wrote a commentary on the Covenant which was given official recognition by the various British Governments. Canada published it as a state paper: Sessional Paper No. 41h, 1919. As this document appears to have dropped out of sight, quotations from it may be of interest:

¹⁸ Smuts, Rt. Hon. J. C., *The League of Nations; A Practical Suggestion*, Hodder & Stoughton Limited, London, New York and Toronto, 1918, p. 61.

¹⁹ Wilson, Woodrow, *op. cit.*, p. 125.

"It is important that this article (X) should be read with articles XI and XIX which make it plain that the Covenant is not intended to stamp the new territorial settlement as sacred and unalterable for all time but, on the contrary, to provide machinery for the progressive regulation of international affairs in accordance with the needs of the future . . . These articles may be said to inaugurate a new international order which should eliminate, so far as possible, one of the principal causes of war.

"Articles XII-XVI contain the machinery for the peaceful settlement of disputes and the requisite obligations and sanctions, the whole hinging on the cardinal agreement that a State which goes to war without submitting its ground of quarrel to arbitrators or to the Council, or without waiting till three months after the award of the former or the recommendation of the latter or which goes to war in defiance of such award or recommendation (if the latter is agreed to by all members of the Council not parties to the dispute), thereby commits an act of war against all the other members of the League, which will immediately break off all relations with it and resort, if necessary, to armed force. . .

" . . . Where, as in the case of the moratorium being observed the aggression is not sudden, it is certain that those Powers which suspect a breach of the Covenant will have consulted together unofficially to decide on precautionary measures and to concert plans to be immediately put into force if the breach of the Covenant takes place. In this event these meetings of the representatives of certain Powers will develop into the Supreme War Council of the League, advised by a joint staff. . . .

"Article XVII asserts the claim of the League that no State, whether a member of the League or

not, has the right to disturb the peace of the world till peaceful methods of settlement have been tried. As in early English law any act of violence, wherever committed, came to be regarded as a breach of the King's peace, so any sudden act of war is henceforward a breach of the peace of the League, which will exact due reparation."²⁰

This interpretation of the purposes of the League and the obligations of its members being accepted as authoritative, it becomes evident that the failure of the League of which so much is heard is due to the refusal of the members of the League to live up to the obligations imposed upon them by the Covenant. The British nations (Canada included) have denied the purposes and disowned the obligations as defined by General Smuts and Lord Cecil in the document noted, and to this extent they must take their share of the responsibility for the failure of the League and for the consequences of the failure. The consequences will include the alternatives which it will now be necessary for all nations (Canada included) to provide for the security of their territory and the lives of their people in the period of international anarchy upon which the world has now entered. Five years hence, and still more ten years hence, the nations will have plenty of material upon which to reach a judgment as to the wisdom of their actions in pulling out the foundation stone of the League structure: the enforcement of peace against international brigands.

²⁰ Sessional Papers (Canada), I, 1919, No. 41h.

[The commitments of the Covenant may be disowned, but they will be replaced by far more imperious and onerous obligations.]

IF THE LEAGUE GOES, WHAT THEN?

(June 12, 1936)

. . . THE disappearance of the League would be welcome in Great Britain to the Imperialists of all shades and to the pacifists who renounced the League the moment it gave promise of being something more than a mere talking shop. If the nations, which, by virtue of development to date, will have to take the lead at Geneva are for scuttling the ship, there will be protests from some of the smaller nations, but not from Canada. The Canadian Government will go along with the other nations if sanctions are continued; it will acquiesce in their abandonment if that is the decision of the major League powers. This prediction can be made with complete confidence that events will confirm it. This is not a heroic attitude but to those who understand how the currents of opinion are running in Canada it is understandable.

If the League is killed by the refusal of the British nations to give it the leadership that might save it, it will be the victim of a very cynical campaign. The correspondence columns of *The London Times* have been overloaded for weeks with letters from noble lords, ex-diplomats, retired pro-consuls and generals, etc., expressing their "horror and amaze" at the discovery that adherence to the League meant obligations

and commitments that might lead to a war in the defence of the Covenant. The League, they cry out with one voice, is a potential cause of war; therefore "let's get out of it". In Canada the same appeal is made by the isolationists and also by the Imperialists; we must not stay in the League because it involves us in obligations and commitments.

It can be assumed, we think, that the Imperialists and the pacifists in Great Britain, the Imperialists and isolationists in Canada are going to have their way. The League is to disappear and Great Britain and Canada will be free from the terrifying commitments. What then? Mr. Bennett has told us what in his opinion follows for Canada. "The task of the British Commonwealth", in preserving liberty and securing peace, must now "be taken up where the League of Nations laid it down."²¹ That is to say, the commitments which could not be faced by the British nations in company with forty other countries are now to be gaily assumed by the British nations alone. That is Mr. Bennett's project; it is also the plan of all the big guns in England who have been unceasing in their efforts to destroy the League. In place of a remote possibility that we might have to lend a hand in a single League war to vindicate once for all the validity of the Covenant, we are to commit ourselves to participation in the succession of wars that will mark the era of international anarchy which will come in as the League goes out. This does not look like a profitable exchange.

²¹ Bennett, Rt. Hon. R. B., H.C. (Canada) Debates, June 18, 1936, IV, p. 3896.

The Canadian isolationists—whose name is legion just at present—would laugh the plans of Mr. Bennett and his Imperialist friends to scorn. Canada, in their view, will take part in no wars whatever. An attitude of detachment in a warring and dissolving world may be obtainable but only if we arm ourselves to the point where the predatory powers of the world will think it advisable to leave us alone. Under either the Imperialist or the isolationist policy Canada will have an annual bill for defence beside which our yearly losses on the state railways—which we are told are destroying the country—will be but a drop in the bucket. It is ominous that in the recent Victoria by-election the necessity for fortification on the Pacific coast was made an issue by both the Liberal and Conservative candidates. When the League disappears and with it for half a century all hope of “collective security”, Canadians will find that armaments, fortifications, defence forces and bombing squadrons—and, perhaps, gas masks—will become commonplaces of our national life.

The League will go if the British nations do not uphold it. What then? What then indeed?

[In assessing responsibility for the breakdown of collective security, the beginning of appeasement is revealed. “The League has been destroyed by the Baldwin Government at the instance of a caste.”²² A League without sanctions, economic and military, is no League.]

²² *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 20, 1936—“The League Is Torpedoed”.

THE END OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

(June 30, 1936)

A CANADIAN NEWSPAPER which has been for months playing "the sedulous ape" to J. L. Garvin in his assaults in *The Observer* upon the League of Nations, makes angry comment upon the statement that the alternative before the world is the League of Nations or international anarchy ending in war. Its indignation is a good sign, indicating that its conscience is not yet completely brutalized. But in its attempt to reply to the statement—which is as true as it is arresting—it inadvertently establishes the case it attacks. It points to the decrepit useless League and wants to know whether experience to date has shown it capable of saving the world.

When people speak of the League as the only safeguard against anarchy and war, they mean by the League, in de Madariaga's words, "the spirit and the method of international order, law and co-operation as opposed to the spirit of national anarchy, caprice, isolation and unrestricted power".²³ They do not regard the present League as the embodiment of the spirit thus described, but instead as a preliminary exhibit of what happens when the forces of aggression are given play in the world.

The one virtue of the present situation is that it has, it is to be hoped, made things clear beyond the power of the ablest practitioners of the art of saying one

²³ Madariaga, Salvador de, *Disarmament*, Oxford University Press, London, 1929, p. 213.

thing and meaning something else to again induce confusion and doubt.

The League of Nations, as it was conceived and for the purposes for which it was brought into being, is dead. But the cause which it represented, however inadequately, is not dead; and the chances of its revival in time to be of use to the world will depend very largely upon whether the governments which have destroyed the League will hereafter be honest enough not to clothe themselves in bogus garments and not to continue to profess themselves upholders of principles they have betrayed because they do not believe in them.

If they will be kind enough to say in contradiction of what they have been saying for years that the League — the real League — is not the corner-stone of their policy and that they have no faith in collective security it will be possible to get an honest issue before the peoples of these nations for their judgment.

The League was built upon a simple and easily understandable principle: that nations should not be the judges of their own causes and should not make aggressive war to further them. Most of the stock charges against the Covenant are not true. It did not, for instance, underwrite the follies of the Treaty of Versailles; it did not stereotype world conditions.

"The Covenant," said Wilson at Paris, "is not a strait-jacket but a vehicle of life."²⁴ It did not even forbid war, under certain circumstances involving preliminaries which provided for time for an investigation and a report by League authorities. A League writer (de Madariaga)²⁵ some years ago tersely summarized

²⁴ Wilson, Woodrow, *op. cit.*, p. 126.

²⁵ Madariaga, Salvador de, *op. cit.* p. 268.

“the economy of the League” in these terms:

(a) All conflicts to be submitted to pacific settlement and meanwhile, no wars;

(b) The Council to watch all movements of a disquieting nature and to step in with discretionary powers of negotiation. No wars with parties that submit to the award under (a); no wars in any case till three months after (a) has failed; yet the power and duty of the Council to take up the matter under (b) even during three months after the failure of (a).

We submit that this system is statesmanlike and of a nature to prove efficient in the immense majority of cases. War under the Covenant system is a most unlikely event indeed. Why? Because all the obstacles and precautions have been accumulated in the period which precedes war, a period during which public opinion is still undecided and moral factors can exert a powerful influence over it.

What the Covenant did was to forbid aggressive war (as in the recent case of Italy) carried on with a view to presenting the League with an accomplished fact (as in the case of Ethiopia). It was a proposition, in Mr. Zimmern's words: “That the nations should co-operate in order to put down common nuisances. Slavery was a common nuisance a hundred years ago; aggressive war is a common nuisance today.”²⁶ But there was nothing in the Covenant to prevent a country which had a case against another country, from demanding and securing an adjustment, either by the

²⁶ It has not been possible to trace these words of (Sir) Alfred Zimmern's. They are presumably from a contemporary article or address, though those listed have been searched. They do not, to the best of the editor's knowledge, appear in Sir Alfred's books on international affairs.

finding of the League or by an ultimate resort to war. These facts should be borne in mind since they supply the answer to many ignorant criticisms of the League.

The purpose of the League was to prevent war and induce peace—and ten years after it began functioning it seemed to be accepted that no nation member of the League, in view of the opportunities afforded for adjusting grievances and disputes, would ever challenge the judgment of the world by resorting to force. In 1929 T. P. Conwell-Evans wrote a book to prove that Article XI had replaced Article XVI and “had become the sheet anchor of the Covenant and the bulwark of the world’s peace”. This was the article which provided for adjustment and conciliation removing the cause of war. “It is enough,” wrote the hopeful Mr. Conwell-Evans, “to be convinced that a threat of war exists in order to bring about the ‘cease fire’ or to take preventive measures. . . . When the provisional peace has been achieved the Council can proceed to ascertain the responsibility for the aggression.”²⁷ Mr. Conwell-Evans was able to show, to his own satisfaction, that the supposition of a wanton aggressor stubbornly continuing to fight in defiance of the whole League was quite unwarranted.

The League under the leadership of France and Great Britain tested the efficacy of conciliation and “cease fire” under Article XI in Manchuria in 1931. The theory so ardently put forward in the present crisis, that the League must never go beyond conciliation, was

²⁷ Conwell-Evans, T. P., *The League Council in Action: A Study of the Methods Employed by the Council of the League of Nations to Prevent War and to Settle International Disputes*, Oxford University Press, London, 1929, *passim*.

thoroughly tried out. Japan knew from the onset that nothing but conciliation would be attempted because Sir John Simon, the British Foreign Minister, proclaimed this from the house-tops.

Ever since the Manchurian episode the League has been dying from a mortal wound. Direct consequences of this demonstration that collective security, the foundation-stone of the League, was a sham were the failure of the disarmament conference; the Nazi defiance of the League, and the determination of Italy to attack Ethiopia (as the apologists for Italy have made clear). When Italy invaded Ethiopia last autumn there was not much expectation in inside circles that the League would survive the anticipated repudiation of their pledges by the great nations of the League.

Some of the results of this return to pre-War ideas and policies can already be noted; others impending can be foreseen; more can be foretold.

The race of armaments has been resumed. Great Britain, because of the failure of collective security, will pay out for insurance a billion and a half in armaments; and after it is paid out she will not be one-tenth as secure as she would have been if the League of Nations had been enabled to get itself established.

There is no longer the deterrent of possible collective action to give dictators like Hitler pause as they look abroad for pretext for adventures.

The fear of impending war not only drives nations to rearmament, but it increases to the point of frenzy the determination of threatened nations to be economically self-sufficient, thus strangling trade and destroying all prospects of a return of prosperity.

And down the road, not far away in point of time, will be the world's greatest war, the hyperbolic war, the war that will never stop until the structure of society, as we know it, will sink into the slime.*

Our esteemed contemporary, which is so pleased and so happy that all this hope for a world made free from the terror and the ruin of war has been shown, as the cynics all along have declared, to be just idealistic nonsense, is not quite so happy about these prospects and tries to shut them from sight by asserting that these things will not come to pass. Of course they will come to pass, and within a period which will enable the vast majority of Canadians who are living today to take in the show or to be taken in by it.

In closing a word might be said to another contemporary which was quite horrified to find that sanctions mean commitments. That had never occurred to it; and it can not restrain its joy that, in view of this horrid circumstance, sanctions are to go and Canada is to be freed from all obligations.

We wonder if our contemporary and those who agree with it ever give any thought to this phase of the problem: What are the obligations and commitments which Canada will have to get under if this country is going to continue to exist in this happy world which has rejected the fad that peace should be kept by international law and joyfully put itself under the rule of force, the law of the jungle? This thought which they have resolutely put aside they will not be

* See Introduction, p. xvii.

able to dodge much longer. Notwithstanding Mr. King's comfortable words the other day²⁸ time will show that, taking the long view, Canada had a much greater interest in collective security than the Government of this country had any idea of when it fell in with the grand idea that the time had come to put the League out of business.

[England and France, it is clear, were not prepared to fight. Their attitude is reminiscent of that of other custodians of the peace.]

SOME THINGS ARE CLEAR

(July 14, 1936)

. . . AS J. A. Spender has said in a letter to *The Times*, Mussolini knew that he was dealing with two nations, France and England, who, from the beginning of the trouble let all the world know that they did not intend to fight, whatever might happen. Thus, M. Laval, Premier of France, in a broadcast made on November 27, said: "From the beginning we (France and Great Britain) were in agreement over the avoidance of military sanctions as well as any measures likely to lead to a naval blockade."²⁹

In fact, these gallant nations went to Shakespeare for their policy of enforcing League law:

DOGBERRY (to the watch)—This is your charge;

²⁸ H.C. (Canada) Debates, IV, 1936, June 18, pp. 3862-73.

²⁹ *Documents on International Affairs, 1935*, Vol. I, eds. Wheeler-Bennett, John W., and Heald, Stephen, Oxford University Press, London, 1936. Broadcast address of M. Laval, p. 215.

you shall comprehend all vagrom men; you are to bid any man stand, in the Prince's name.

SECOND WATCH—How if a' will not stand?

DOGBERRY—Why then, take no note of him, but let him go; and presently call the rest of the watch together and thank God you are rid of a knave.

VERGES—If he will not stand when he is bidden, he is none of the Prince's subjects.³⁰

[The root of the trouble is clear. Governments have refused to consider the maintenance of the Covenant by collective action a "vital national interest". They have instead returned, in disregard of many pledges, to the traditional definition of "vital interests". It is this which has destroyed the League. But will their peoples be content with this?]

THE ISSUE IS VERY SIMPLE

(July 22, 1936)

THE issue is very simple. The point of essential difference between those who welcome the abandonment of sanctions and those who regard it as a catastrophe to civilization can be very easily stated. Those who hold the latter view believe that the maintenance of peace in the world should be a matter of vital concern to every member nation of the League. Every country accepting this view would defend the principle of collective security when threatened, just as it would defend any other vital interest, as, for instance, the integrity of its soil.

³⁰ *Much Ado about Nothing*, Act III, Scene iii, 11. 25-33.

Now what has happened in the matter of sanctions is the revelation that the nations of the world, at least as they are represented by their present governments, do not feel that way about the principle of collective security. It is not a "vital interest" for any of the member nations of the League (excepting South Africa). It is something that is desirable if it can be got by wishing for it, but it is not to be mentioned in the same class as the interests which a nation will readily defend if necessary—such as an attack on its territory, or an insult to its flag, or an interference with the just rights of its nationals, or any one of a dozen things of like effect.

The renouncement of the view that vindication of the Covenant is a prime interest of Great Britain has been thorough and emphatic. This has involved the sponging out of a thousand declarations by successive Premiers and Foreign Secretaries that peace was the first concern of the British people and that the League was the corner-stone of British policy; but the repudiation has been very clear and explicit.

We have already quoted statements by Mr. Baldwin and Mr. Eden to the effect that the enforcement of the League principle of security by collective action was not a British interest to the extent that it should be defended by force if that should be necessary. A quotation from Neville Chamberlain—who it appears is the real power in the British Government—is also enlightening. It is from his "calculated indiscretion" on June 10:

"Is it not apparent that the policy of sanctions involves—I do not say war, but a risk of war? Is it not apparent that that risk must increase in proportion to the effectiveness of sanctions? Is it not also apparent from what has happened that in the presence of such a risk nations cannot be relied upon to proceed to the extremity of war *unless in fact their vital interests are threatened.*"⁸¹

Mr. Chamberlain in these remarks was, it is clear, envisaging not the application of military sanctions by the League against Italy (as to the wisdom of which, had the question come up, there would be ground for divergence of opinion) but the possibility of Italy making war on the League members owing to the effectiveness of economic sanctions. This would have been a defensive war by the League nations against aggression by an outlaw nation. But Mr. Chamberlain was not prepared to face even this.

All this talk about sanctions (in the Italo-Abyssinian incident) meaning war centred about the apprehension that Italy would attack the League members, not that the League would apply military sanctions to Italy. This must always be borne in mind or the degree of abjectness reached by Mr. Chamberlain before he made the statement quoted above will not be fully appreciated.

If the facts are, as suggested by what has taken place at Geneva—that the so-called League nations do not regard the maintenance of collective security or the

⁸¹ Speech at 1900 Club. *The Times*, Thursday, June 11, 1936, p. 10. The italics are those of the *Winnipeg Free Press*. This is the "Midsummer of Madness" speech.

discouragement of aggressive war as matters of national concern—there is nothing more to say, nothing more to do. The stream cannot rise higher than its source. Since this dry rot set in among the League there has been no League, within the meaning and intent of its founders. The League, of course, has no existence by itself. When it existed—if indeed it ever did—it was an association of nations with courage and foresight; when it became an aggregation of nations with neither vision nor courage the League spirit disappeared, leaving behind its lifeless and decaying structure.

But perhaps this is not the end of the story. Do these governments speak for their peoples? Do the people of Great Britain think that it is not a matter of national concern whether collective security is vindicated, or washed out? Do the people of Canada think the question of no concern to them? Are they as indifferent as their governments to the alternatives? Among the alternatives: The necessity of squandering an increasing percentage of national income on armaments; the certainty of recurrent wars with their toll of treasure and life; the extensions under the fear of war of economic nationalism in a frantic search for unattainable national self-sufficiency; with everything that will be in the train of these evils.

These are certainly matters of national interest and one would hope that the peoples of the nations would say — if they were given an opportunity — that their prevention should be the first concern of national policy.

[In the hope that support may yet be rallied to the League against some even more flagrant rupture of the peace, the Covenant should be left pretty much as it is,³² and the League kept in being.]

THE COVENANT STANDS

(September 29, 1936)

.... It will doubtless be asked: What is the advantage of keeping in the Covenant a principle which the League members have twice refused to support? But there is a very decided advantage in keeping the Covenant, in this respect, intact. The president of the League last June, in announcing the abandonment of sanctions, said in effect:³³ "We have failed this time; but perhaps next time we shall not fail." While the nations keep Articles X to XVI in the Covenant they announce to the world, and particularly to the nations outside the League, that while they are not ready as yet to make the sacrifices necessary to enforce them, they believe they embody the principle which alone can provide a future of peace and security.

While the League lasts the principle of collective defence remains the ideal; and there is always the possibility—which may well oblige a nation meditating aggression to think twice—that the League combination might, under provocation, become a fact and not a theory. It is still a fact, by a substantial margin, that the League nations which give at least nominal adhesion to the doctrine of collective defence could put an

³² *Winnipeg Free Press*, August 7, 1936—"Reforming the League".

³³ M. Van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium, July 4, 1936.

aggressive Germany or an aggressive Italy—or both of them together—in their place in short order if they pooled their economic and military power. There is always the possibility of this while the League lives; but if it disappears, the old idea of war will necessarily again be given universal acceptance.

That idea was that if a nation or a combination of nations had the military power to successfully wage aggressive war the motives in waging it, however despicable or brutal they might be, were justified and validated by success. The disintegration of the civilized world would follow hard on the re-enthronement of that principle. It is not surprising that no nation member of the League is prepared to make a proposal to this end.

VI

CANADA, THE COMMONWEALTH, AND THE LEAGUE

*With the defeat of sanctions the League could no longer be regarded as an effective barrier to war. Each nation must henceforth look to its own defence as best it might. This applied no less to the nations of the British Commonwealth. The League and the Commonwealth had risen together. In a League the Commonwealth nations had found a co-ordinator of national policies. "It seems clear to us that in perhaps every case that can be imagined the machinery of the League or the obligations assumed under the Kellogg Pact will make clear to the nations of the Commonwealth the course that they should all pursue."*¹ *The League thus laid to rest all those questions of Imperial defence and of participation in Imperial wars which had vexed Imperial, and especially Canadian, politics since the beginning of the century. "These questions, so politely retired to the wings, are now in the centre of the Canadian stage to which they returned the moment the League of Nations, with assurances of the most distinguished consideration, was ushered out into the darkness by Mr. Mackenzie King."*² *Mr. King (at Geneva) "had led Canada out of the League", and*

¹ Toynbee, A. J., (ed.) *British Commonwealth Relations: Proceedings of the First Unofficial Conference at Toronto, 11-21 September, 1933.* Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1933, pp. 180-1.

² *Conference on Canadian-American Affairs*, Queen's University, Kingston, Ont., 1937. Ginn and Co., Boston, 1937. "Canadian Foreign Policy", by John W. Dafoe, p. 244. Published in *Winnipeg Free Press*, June 18, 1937.

his claim that a League of conciliation was as good as a League with sanctions was baseless. Canada, in the welter of isolationist, collectivist, nationalist and Imperialist opinion, must now find a foreign policy.³ Isolationism might prevail. Imperialist sentiment might lead to a drive for a recentralized Empire. The policy of the Canadian Government, "no commitments" and moderate rearmament, was "fast losing its value",⁴ for the country might be forced into war,⁵ which would confront Canada with "the most dangerous issue in her history".⁶

The sound course was to accept no commitments except to the League, place a rearmed Canada squarely behind the League and support Great Britain in so far as that country returned to a similar policy.

³ *Winnipeg Free Press*, November 14, 1936—"The Commonwealth and the League".

⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, July 21, 1937—"Mr. King Admits Danger".

⁵ *Winnipeg Free Press*, October 21, 1936—"Mr. Bourassa on War Policy".

⁶ *Conference on Canadian-American Affairs*, 1937, p. 230.

[The failure of such sanctions as were imposed to halt Italy in Ethiopia makes it necessary to consider what shall be done with the League in the future. It is not the simple matter of treating the League as merely an instrument of conciliation and removing sanctions from the Covenant.]

CONSEQUENCES FOR CANADA

(September 18, 1936)

IN a quotation made recently in this column from a speech by Mr. Neville Chamberlain suggesting that the functions of the League should be equated with its sorry performance in the Ethiopian matter, there was an admission that such a League could no longer be relied upon to secure the peace of the world.⁷

It is to this observation that the *Free Press* desires to draw the attention of its readers.

When Mr. Chamberlain and those who think with him get the League remoulded to their heart's desire it may have its uses, but stopping wars will not be one of them. Mr. Chamberlain admits this; and the thing is self-evident.

⁷ The quotation referred to was made in the leading editorial of September 16, 1936. The quotation is from the speech to the 1900 Club, reported in *The Times*, June 11, 1936. Mr. Chamberlain said "Surely it is time the nations who compose the League should review the situation and should decide so to limit the functions of the League in future that they may accord with its real powers. If that policy were to be pursued and were to be courageously carried out, I believe that it might go far to restore the prestige of the League and the moral influence which it ought to exert in the world. But if the League be limited in that sort of way it must be admitted that it could no longer be relied upon by itself to secure the peace of the world."

The present impotence of the League, which is due not to any defect in the Covenant but to a repudiation of their obligations by the League members, will then become static; the League will be under permanent instructions not to trouble itself with matters too high for it.

A number of nations which have been quite worried about their commitments under the Covenant will then be much happier than they now are; or so they think at the moment. There will then be no Article X calling upon them to defend the integrity of other nations against aggression; no Article XVI with its provision for economic and, if necessary, military sanctions for the suppression of aggressors.

Free from the incubus of their pledged obligations their statesmen will be able to say that they will fight only for vital interests and that the preservation of world peace is not for them a vital interest.

If the rejection of the League meant simply this, the case for pulling out would be unanswerable. Why put limits to national freedom of action and make commitments with serious implications, if there is no need for these sacrifices?

Here is where the catch comes in. The whole case for the League is that these limitations in freedom of action and this acceptance of obligations are necessary; and that if the nations forego them, regaining their complete liberty of action, they will pay a terrible price for reverting to the methods, practices and objectives of the pre-War world.

The argument that there is something in these forebodings could be illustrated by a reference to events

in any country one chooses to pick—England for instance—where the individual sense of insecurity is ten times greater than it was before Mr. Baldwin, Mr. Chamberlain and others demonstrated the fact that the League as at present controlled is a sham and a humbug. The inescapable mark of the Englishman's home is hereafter to be the gas mask on the wall of the entrance hall.

Further, the security of unilateral defence appears to be a bit more expensive as well as much less satisfactory than the security which a very few years ago was supplied by the League before the Covenant was transformed into just a collection of fine-sounding words. Great Britain is spending this very year an additional sum of £300,000,000 for a defence policy which gives a sense of security which appears to be principally notable for its minus quality.

But we need not go beyond Canada to note the consequences of the League collapse.

From 1919 until this very year the word "defence" meant little or nothing to the average Canadian. He assumed that the nations had had enough of war and that all future disputes of a serious nature would be settled—in the words of the Kellogg Pact—by "pacific means". The whole country accepted the League of Nations as part of the permanent machinery of the world. And in the security of that belief Canadians gave no thought to the future of their country in terms of protection against aggression.

This is not the case today. The old controversies about defence are breaking out anew and with all their old-time vigour and passion. "Peregrinating Imperial-

ists" re-appear to tell us, as they did twenty-five years ago, that we must become an integral part of a vast co-ordinated naval and military system for the protection of Imperial interests and the defence of Empire territories scattered over the seven seas in whatever series of wars may ensue, now that the world has happily escaped from the idiocy of the League ideal of permanent and enforced peace.

These lecturings are not being as patiently accepted as in former times; it is very evident that the idea of arming for another world war or for a succession of wars is repugnant to large numbers of Canadians. Their alarm and indignation find expression in statements such as this, which we quote from a recent issue of *The Ottawa Evening Citizen*, one of the Southam papers:

"There are possibilities of profound mischief in the missionary zeal of crusaders like the commercial viscount (Lord Elibank). He is doubtless deeply imbued with the belief that another war is inevitable, in which British interests would be vitally involved. In Toronto, he expressed the opinion that the United States would become likewise involved—apparently in the defence of American commercial interests in foreign countries. He predicted that Canada would be no more able than the United States to keep out—without giving any very impressive reason for it. In Vancouver, however, Lord Elibank's declaration would imply that Canada must be prepared to take part in the next war for the privilege of remaining within the British Empire. Stated in this manner, the Canadian people may be confronted with the

necessity of considering whether 'the Empire' would be worth the sacrifice."⁸

But whatever the reaction against propositions such as those which have evoked this comment from *The Citizen*, the question of the adequate defence of Canada in a world which, by almost universal agreement, is within measurable distance of war, is already in the public mind, and will become in rapidly increasing measure a divisive and explosive issue. The question has blown up overnight; but most certainly it is here to stay now that powerful and predatory nations arm and proclaim anew "the good old rule, the simple plan, that they shall take who have the power, and they shall keep who can."

These developments, which must be a matter of concern to every thinking Canadian, are the direct consequences of the collapse of the League.

Canada, like a good many other countries, has been a fair-weather member of the League. As long as it seemed to work automatically, Canadians were all for the League. But when it began to be apparent that devotion to the League might call for exertion and sacrifice, Canada lined up with other nations in finding excuses for a refusal to face her responsibilities. Canada wanted to be free from these obligations just as other members of the League desired release.

They all have had their way. Is any country happier, safer and more certain of its future because it has escaped from the League collar? Certainly not Canada. We have in effect got rid of commitments, not specially

⁸ *The Ottawa Evening Citizen*, September 8, 1936, p. 16.

onerous, to which we put our name; but we find in their place the obligations of grim necessity—that of preserving the integrity of this country in a world of brigands. These obligations we cannot so lightly escape.

[There are hard questions indeed to be met, and Canada will have to consider only her national interests in a world in which the League is ineffective.]

QUESTIONS TO BE MET

(September 22, 1936)

. . . . THE GOVERNMENT OF CANADA for the past seventeen years—whatever its political colour—has acted upon two assumptions: that our foreign policy as it affected political relations with other countries would be determined by our membership in the League of Nations; and that this gave such an assurance of the peaceful settlement of difficulties that there was no necessity to add to our national troubles the outlay of large sums of money for defence against the day when the country would again have to go to war.

Canadians the more readily accepted this view because the war left them with very serious problems—a public debt multiplied tenfold, the necessity to re-establish the returned soldiers, the burden of pensions. To these were added our domestic difficulties, relating to railways, markets and so forth, which were aggravated and made almost insoluble by post-War condi-

tions throughout the world. Canada is still struggling with these problems, staggering under these burdens, trying to find a road through the night and the storm to some kind of a stable world beyond. Canadians, keenly conscious of these conditions, are not very patient with wild war-whoops from frenzied Imperialists calling upon them to rush headlong into the armaments race and into large preparations for defence.

Certainly this country is not going to be stampeded into policies suggested by *The Mail and Empire* and seconded by other newspapers. It is, of course, the case that Canada cannot proceed in the old carefree manner. The comfortable assumptions noted above have become doubtful. If the League is to be deprived of all power of preventing aggressive war, it will be necessary to reconsider many things. There will be no relationship between the foreign policy of Great Britain and the League, nor between the foreign policy of Canada and the League. The declaration by the British Commonwealth Relations Conference of 1933, which has been widely accepted as an accurate statement of the relations between the Commonwealth and the League would, of course, go by the board. That declaration was in these terms:

“This survey, based on the realities of the modern world, makes it clear that old conceptions as to declaration of war and as to neutrality can have little if any place in the policies of the law-abiding nations. It seems clear to us that in perhaps every case that can be imagined the machinery of the League or the obligations assumed under the Kellogg Pact will make clear to the nations of the Commonwealth

the course that they should all pursue.

"It seems to us academic and unprofitable to consider legal constitutional difficulties which might arise if there were no Covenant and no Kellogg Pact. The principles of freedom and co-operation and the 'agreed anomalies' on which the Commonwealth is based may create difficulties in many fields; and we feel, therefore, that it would serve no useful purpose to try and foresee problems in one field, that of war, which we are entitled to hope are never likely to arise, and to seek to apply to them legal conceptions as to war and neutrality appropriate to the pre-League world."⁹

This declaration rested upon the assumption that the only possibility of war in the future was that of a war by the League nations in suppression of an outlaw nation, in which war the members of the Commonwealth would take part as members of the League. Since a war of this kind was unlikely, or if one came it would be the first and last of its kind, assuming that it was pushed to its right conclusion, the Conference swept into the limbo of dead causes questions about which the constitutional pundits were puzzling their brains, such as: Does a declaration of war by Great Britain automatically commit the Dominions to war? If so, can the Dominions reciprocally carry Great Britain into wars begun by themselves? If the answers to these questions were in the negative, what would be the relations of the British nations to one another in war-time? And so on. There were endless questions like this with which the dialecticians and the hair-splitters could do battle. But they were all resolved if

⁹ Toynbee, A. J. (ed.) *British Commonwealth Relations*, *supra*, p. 90.

the situation defined by the British Commonwealth Relations declaration existed. In the words of Dr. Arnold Toynbee, this was the situation as recognized by the declaration:

"The Commonwealth and the Collective System, so far from being antithetical to one another, were manifestly interdependent. On this view, the special relation between those states members of the League of Nations and the signatories of the Kellogg-Briand Pact who were also members of the British Commonwealth, was one of the most valuable assets which the Collective System possessed—partly because the Commonwealth relation which actually existed in the contemporary world between half-a-dozen fully self-governing states offered an ideal of what the relation between all the sixty or seventy such states in this world ought eventually to be; and partly because this happily associated Commonwealth group of states members of the League and signatories of the Pact was capable, through practical co-operative action, of doing more than any equivalent number of judicially sovereign independent political atoms to ensure that the Collective System should be an effective and abiding reality in a Society for whose well-being, and perhaps even existence, a Collective System of international relations had now become indispensable. Conversely, the effective and permanent establishment of a world-wide Collective System was regarded, on this same view, as a valuable and perhaps indispensable security for the preservation of the British Commonwealth in the new world that had emerged from the Great War."¹⁰

This situation, if it ever existed, exists no longer. The nations of the British Commonwealth have not

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 43-4.

co-operated to make the League an effective agent for the enforcement of peace. The British Government has expressly repudiated the view that preserving League peace in the world is a vital interest of Great Britain and therefore to be upheld if necessary by sacrifices; and most of the Dominions, including Canada, have confirmed this view by their acts, if not by official pronouncement. It is therefore no longer true that our policies have any relation whatever to an international situation supposed to have been brought into being by the League of Nations.

The old questions thus come to life again; and under conditions of special difficulty, owing to the frantic race in preparations for war in which all the great powers have now embarked. During the long years in which the Disarmament Conference fiddled with the question there were warnings without number that if the powers did not agree to disarm in the spirit of the Covenant and in keeping with the engagements of the victors to disarm Germany, the latter country would upset the arrangement and begin a race in armaments which would put all similar absurdities of the past to shame. This has now come to pass.

It is in such a world—with collective security reduced to the proportions of an idle dream, and the nations arming with frantic haste, with force again accepted as the most effective agent of policy—that Canada has to take stock of her position and decide what course is best to pursue. That policy will be decided, it is safe to prophesy, in the light of the coldest realism with a single view to the greatest security for Canada and Canadians at the least possible cost. It

will be regarded as a purely Canadian question and its settlement will involve no commitments that can be made operative by external developments of any kind whatever. If it be said that this attitude is selfish and short-sighted we should not feel it necessary to question the criticism. All that could be said would be that Canada in this case was following the example set her by the nations of the world and that, this being the case, it would be folly for her to be quixotic.

[Though no proposals have been made to alter the Covenant, Mr. King's speech at Geneva amounts to the rejection of the League by Canada.

While Canada may make her own decisions as a member of the Commonwealth, she cannot honourably shake off the obligations assumed under the Covenant. Mr. King's stand as a representative of Canada in the Assembly of the League is "the most discreditable" of all the many such attempts.]

MR. KING AT GENEVA

(October 1, 1936)

THE most accurate comment upon the deliverance by Mr. King, on behalf of Canada, at Geneva,¹¹ is that made by *The London Daily Express*, the newspaper which expresses Lord Beaverbrook's views. "Canada leads the way out of the League," says the noble lord,

¹¹ Before the Assembly of the League, September 29, 1936. The speech is given in full in MacKay, R. A., and Rogers, E. B., *Canada Looks Abroad*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1938, Appendix E. I.

who adds that the only policy left for Canada is one of isolation.

Technically a denial of this summing-up of Mr. King's attitude could be made. Canada is still, Mr. King says, to be a member of the League and the Covenant is to remain unimpaired. Nothing could seem fairer than that. But Mr. King added conditions to his gracious admission that Canada would remain within the League. It is that by the simple procedure of its members repudiating any obligations under the Covenant which appear onerous to them and by acceptance of the rule that each article in the Covenant means nothing to any nation which desires to ignore it, the League will be transformed into something to which Canada can belong without on the one hand incurring the censure which would attach to an ignominious abandonment of the League or, on the other, taking any part in the labours and responsibilities which will be necessary if the League is not to be the most pitiable and transparent humbug of all time. This is the last in a long series of acts by successive Canadian Governments intended to circumscribe the League's powers; and it is the most discreditable of them all because it amounts to the rejection by Canada of the League.

Mr. King put forward in support of his contention certain considerations which do not stand up very well under examination. He seems to suggest that as matters stand it is necessary to rescue Canada from the danger of "automatic sanctions". There is no League machinery which calls for automatic sanctions. An attempt was made to supply these by the Geneva protocol, but

it was rejected on grounds that do not now look nearly as sound as they did in 1925.

Last autumn economic sanctions of a very limited character were applied to Italy by the League. Mr. King might tell us whether they were applied automatically. Our recollection is that the Canadian Government, then headed by Mr. Bennett, was a party to the successive steps that led up to the application of sanctions. Mr. King, upon acceding to office, confirmed the sanctions of the preceding Government, which at least suggests that he thought the Canadian Government could retreat from the position it had taken—as it undoubtedly could have done had it been willing to take the odium of quitting.

There was here no case of automatic sanctions. Still less are there automatic sanctions in the case of a resort by the League to military operations. It is quite unnecessary for Mr. King to rescue Canada at this time from the threat of automatic military sanctions because he did the rescuing—if it was necessary, which we doubt—in 1923, when the League Assembly, at the instance of the Canadian Government, adopted an interpretation of Article X to which the League procedure has since conformed. That interpretation was in these terms:

“It is in conformity with the spirit of Article X that, in the event of the Council considering it to be its duty to recommend the application of military measures in consequence of an aggression or danger or threat of an aggression, the Council shall be bound to take into account, more particularly, of the

geographical situation and of the special condition of each state.

"It is for the constitutional authorities of each member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of members in what degree the member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by the employment of its military forces.

"The recommendation made by the Council shall be regarded as being of the highest importance and shall be taken into consideration by all the members of the League with the desire to execute their engagements in good faith."¹²

This reservation gives the Canadian authorities the right to judge for themselves the time and the degree of intervention but it stipulates that in exercising their judgment they shall not forget the obligations to which their good faith is pledged. Is Mr. King's elaborate assertion of the right of Canada to make her own decisions an attempt to disown the moral obligations set forth above? If so, he has failed. The moral obligations can only be escaped by the withdrawal of Canada from the League—a course which Mr. King will long hesitate to recommend.

Mr. King's other expedient is an attempt to assure the public that the mutilated and emasculated League which he favours is "just as good" if not better than the League which was brought into being in Paris in 1919. In this connection the blessed word "conciliation" is overworked. The League, of course, is not an

¹² Dawson, R. MacG., *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1937, pp. 251-4.

instrument of force or an agency for war, though its enemies continually libel it by asserting that it is. The whole structure of the League is based upon the principle that difficulties between nations shall be adjusted by conciliation and arbitration, or by reference to international courts of justice. It is only when an aggressor nation refuses to submit its case to these processes and resorts to force that the League of Nations becomes a defensive League for the protection of the member against which the aggression is directed. The League has many notable achievements by methods of conciliation to its credit because it had behind its efforts in this direction the right to intervene.

The League is not necessary to keep the peace between nations that are willing to arbitrate their difficulties; and with the repudiation of the right to restrain aggression, it is useless when grandiose schemes of conquest are afoot. In the light of Japan's action in 1931 and Italy's within the last twelve months, how can Mr. King think that the League can keep the peace by methods of conciliation?

Mr. King in his speech to the Assembly, sought to commit Canada to the acceptance of certain propositions:

That the League should be permitted to continue in existence provided it agrees not to recognize or act upon the principle that is its reason for existence.

That Canada will continue to subscribe to the obligations of the Covenant provided it is understood that she can repudiate them without moral obliquity.

These propositions are unworthy of Mr. King and if adopted as governing principles of policy would be discreditable to Canada, and, in the long run, ruinous to the peace and prosperity of this country.

But there is at least a reasonable probability that these propositions will remain inoperative. While the League of Nations remains in existence with the Covenant intact, there is the possibility and even the likelihood that in the moment of crisis there will be leadership in Geneva that will rally the nations of the League to the duty of saving the world from slumping down ignominiously into the anarchy and savagery of the pre-War world. That leadership might come from a British nation. Quite possibly from South Africa; perhaps even from New Zealand; conceivably from Great Britain, if the people of that country should, for their own preservation, decide to sack the so-called statesmen who think that defence of world peace is not a vital interest for that country.

From Canada no such leadership can be looked for. But one prediction can, we believe, be made if the League ever acts in keeping with the spirit which called it into being for the preservation of human freedom and the vindication of the principle that nations shall not make war in the mood of world conquest. Canada will reject the suggestion that she should deny her obligations and stand aside. Under these conditions both her honour and her interests, both immediate and future, would require from Canada that degree of participation which is implicit in her signature to the membership roll of the League of Nations.

[Mr. King's policy of "no commitments" either to League or Empire involves him in difficulties with the Imperialists. They assume that no commitments to the League imply commitments to the Empire. The League, however, was never a rival of the Empire.]

COMPARATIVE COMMITMENTS

(November 20, 1936)

AMONG the voices raised in the discussion now going forward in Canada over foreign policy and external relations are those of a not very large but highly vocal group which both applaud and denounce Mr. King for his Geneva speech. In so far as he denied Canadian obligations under the Covenant they are with him one hundred per cent; but they do not disguise their anger at his refusal to declare, after repudiating the League, that with the League washed out Canada must forthwith take her place as an armed unit in an armed Empire. Their grievance is that Mr. King was as careful in safeguarding Canada from commitments to the Empire—actually to Great Britain—as he was to the League. This is an accurate statement of Mr. King's position. The Canadian attitude as defined by Mr. King is one of isolation against implied, and still more against automatic commitments of all kinds subject of course to the sovereign right of Canada to go into any kind of war in which she wants to play a part.

This outcry reveals anew the existence in Canada of the die-hard, anti-League, Tory Imperialist—the man who thinks of the League as an upstart rival of the Empire, who talks darkly about Geneva supplanting

Westminster, and who regards the disaster of the League as a crowning blessing, thus clearing the way for the consolidation of the Commonwealth into a centralized militaristic Empire with common policies made in London (however this fact might be disguised by some formula of consultation) and under direction from a centre—London again. People of this way of thinking are numerous in Great Britain and may have played a greater part than is known in furthering the British policies which have been so disastrous to the League. Their counterparts in Canada have seized the opportunity to avow their hatred of the League and their ardent desire to see this country, in lieu of the renounced Geneva commitments, take on obligations specific and automatic to Great Britain. We say Great Britain—and not the Empire—advisedly because the discussion has now got down to realities and verbal circumlocutions can be discarded. The loudest and most persistent of the voices in advocacy of such a policy has been the *Toronto Mail and Empire*, which in a recent issue revealed its state of mind by this exclamatory outburst: "Now that Mr. King has shown his preference for the evanescent and discredited League of Nations over the tangible and powerful British Commonwealth of Nations!"

Those who hold these views are wilfully blind to the fact which is none the less the fact because they hate it like poison, that so far from being a rival of the British Empire and an undermining influence, the League is a defence and a support—probably indispensable—to the Empire. There is no life to the complaint, so often plaintively made, that there are Canadians who give a

devotion to the League that they do not give to Great Britain, since the commitment to the League, which is objected to, excluded any need of a similar commitment to Great Britain, assuming of course that the League was a reality and not a sham. The League, if established, powerful and successful, would give a guarantee of peace to the members of the Commonwealth that would remove grave difficulties and problems in relationships that will have to be faced if the protection of the League is illusory. These problems, if they have to be tackled, may prove insoluble.

Die-hard Imperialists would have a ready word in answer to all this. They would say: "Now that the League is sunk, transfer your commitment to Great Britain and all will be well." But the matter is not so simple as this. The now suspended commitment to Geneva which involved the possibility of force and the suggested commitment to London are very different things. The former was shared with over fifty nations and was directed towards a single defined objective: the forbidding of aggressive war and the stopping of it, if attempted. If it had to be fulfilled it would be in co-operation with a great company ensuring success with the certainty that, following success, the obligation, while continuing, would not have to be again vindicated. The other commitment would be unlimited as to time, frequency and the extent of the contribution. When the answer to the asserted need for this engagement has to be faced, it will be the right of Canada to give it careful consideration in a mood primarily con-

cerned with the survival of this country in a world of recurring wars. Canada is not to be stampeded into binding decisions on an issue of such moment.

Notwithstanding the urgency of the situation this question does not call for an answer at this moment. The decision as to whether the question has to be answered will be largely determined by the course of the British Government in the immediate future. Desperate and seemingly hopeless as the League's condition is, a determined lead by Great Britain could change it mightily for the better overnight. If even Anthony Eden's speech of a week ago¹³ could be taken without question as representing a determined policy to which Great Britain will adhere, come what may, the League would no longer be prostrate in powerlessness. The policies, boldly avowed by Winston Churchill, if they were those of Great Britain, would make the League immediately a factor to be reckoned with in world affairs.

The fight for the League is not over yet. If the Imperialists of Great Britain, of Canada and of the other British nations could cast away their blinkers and see the true relationship of the League and the Empire—that they are reciprocally necessary to each other—the League would find its feet again. This kind of leadership by Great Britain would get prompt acknowledgment and support in the British Dominions, Canada included, of course. But if the League is allowed to die, with various British Governments look-

¹³ Presumably Mr. Eden's outline of the international situation during the debate on the Address, November 5, 1936. Eden, Anthony, *Foreign Affairs*, Faber and Faber, London, 1939, pp. 150-62.

ing on, indifferent or consenting, the resulting situation in the Commonwealth will be one that will not yield to the simple formulas now being put forward by League-hating Imperialists. The British Government has said a dozen times in the past few years that its whole foreign policy falls within the ambit of the preservation of peace by the agency of the League. It would mean much to the future of the British Commonwealth and the world as well if it were to take its tongue out of its cheek and say it again—this time meaning it. But the margin of time for rescuing the League is very narrow.

[The British nations need have no fear of the League involving them in concerns not theirs. The League and the Commonwealth are complementary. What is wanted is vigorous rearmament and a League policy. This would bring the Commonwealth together in defence of the League and its members' own best interests. Any attempt to arrive at a common Empire foreign policy during the Imperial Conference (May, 1937), as has been foreshadowed in Mr. Eden's speech at Aberdeen, March 8, 1937,¹⁴ would be folly and must be resisted.]

UNITY AND LEADERSHIP

(Unity in the Empire, Leadership in the World)

(May 13, 1937)

. . . . NOT less but more important is the opportunity supplied by the meeting of the British nations to give

¹⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 30, 1937—"Looking to a Common Policy".

a distracted world leadership in the field of international order. It has been quite apparent that the failure of the League has been welcomed by powerful influences in Great Britain (and in the Dominions as well) as giving an opening for the transformation of the Commonwealth into a closely co-ordinated organization with a common foreign policy which of necessity would be determined, with a minimum of consultation with the Dominions, by the British Government. In any such combination it would be in order for Great Britain to call the tune because she would do most of the paying of the piper. There have been abundant signs that there are in some quarters hopes that the existing circumstances will make this combination attainable; and a definite intention to see that this is brought about. This is the other side of the traditional Chamberlain policy, to the revival of which a good deal of energy and planning has gone in the last half-dozen years. Its success in the field of defence and foreign policy would be more disastrous even than victory for it in the field of trade.

If the suggestion is made for the making of commitments in furtherance of this plan, it is to be expected that it will be pointed out that the British nations have already put their names to formal commitments which, if lived up to, would enable them to work in close co-operation in the very useful and necessary task of establishing peace throughout the world. Full acceptance of the obligations of the Covenant under a League which functions opens a way to joint action and com-

mon policy to which perhaps there is no alternative, as will possibly be found to be the case if one is sought. A repudiation of obligations, not in fact extensive, on the ground that they are too onerous might provide a poor foundation upon which to rest new engagements of loyalty and obligation. To be consenting parties to the destruction of the League of Nations would certainly not be an auspicious prelude to a smaller and weaker combination with more specific duties, more hazardous risks, and with at best contingent and temporary guarantees of security. These are things that the peoples of the British nations are beginning to think about; and it might be profitable for their representatives in conference in London at this time to think about them too.

There has just been an amazing demonstration¹⁵—of which the outside world, especially the non-democratic elements in it, have taken full notice—of the essential unity of the British Commonwealth of Nations, an association of free and equal sovereignties. Co-operation between them is easy because the willingness to co-operate exists; and because there are not only no means of compulsion, but no feeling anywhere that there should be machinery of control.

The revelation of this unity and this strength would be of incalculable worth to the world should it be further demonstrated that it is to be devoted not to ends that are limited and particular, but to leadership in the cause of human brotherhood and world unity.

. ¹⁵ The coronation of Their Majesties, May 12, 1937.

[Failing any such leadership of the League by the Commonwealth, Mr. King may be depended on to adhere to his policy of "no commitments" even to the extent of refusing to give a commitment not to act.]

THE POLICY OF NO COMMITMENTS

(May 26, 1937)

THE present Imperial Conference, like all its predecessors, is marked by a drive for what is called a co-ordinated Empire defence policy—that is, an agreement that each unit in the Commonwealth will undertake, when certain conditions develop, to do specified things, the sum of which will constitute a maximum application of combined power to achieve agreed-upon ends. It is not clear as yet that any formal proposition to this end will be officially made in the Imperial Conference; but the Imperialist press in England, in Canada, and elsewhere, and public men favourable to a development of this nature, have been in full cry for it for some time. Any such project implies a central directing and deciding power capable on the shortest notice of giving the signal of action and setting the machinery of common action in motion. The only point at which this power of decision could be exercised is London; and the proposition is, simply, that the British Government shall be put in charge of a common defence policy for the whole Commonwealth. The parallel with the past in this respect is close; and

doubtless the reaction to the suggestion, at least on the part of some of the Dominions, including Canada, will be in keeping with precedent.

The traditional strategy of Great Britain in her foreign policy has been to avoid definite commitments outside that area where they can be safely proclaimed because they are inevitable. This is called an "elastic foreign policy" by Mr. Harold Nicolson (in his life of Curzon)¹⁶. While, he adds, certitude is the essence of a good foreign policy and uncertainty the mark of a bad policy, a Foreign Minister under the democratic system prefers the latter as being less open to popular attack. Mr. Nicolson, however, need not have put in the limiting words "under the democratic system"; the time-honoured method of British diplomacy has been that which was thus expressed by Castlereagh long ago: "We shall be found in our place when actual danger menaces the system of Europe; but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution."¹⁷

This has long been the British formula: "Our heart is in the right place; trust us; it will be all right on the night." Applied to the League it has been the foremost agency in its destruction. The Americans have never shown themselves so truly British at heart as in their preference, to quote Nicolson again, for "idealistic formulas which raise only intellectual criticism"¹⁸ in presenting their statements of foreign policy for the

¹⁶ Nicolson, Harold, *Curzon: The Last Phase, 1919-1925. A Study in Post-War Diplomacy*, Constable & Co. Ltd., London, 1934, pp. 394-5

¹⁷ Webster, C. K., *The Foreign Policy of Castlereagh, 1815-1822*, G. Bell & Sons, London, p. 240. The State Paper of May 5, 1820, *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, p. 622.

¹⁸ Nicolson, Harold, *op. cit.*, p. 395.

guidance of the outside world. With such distinguished exemplars of the art of evading definite responsibilities as models it is not surprising that Mr. King should himself become a practitioner—especially as this is agreeable to his temperament. Further, these were the very tactics employed by Laurier to break the force of the Imperialistic onset in his day.

Mr. King, in his assertion of Canada's freedom to decide whether or not she will be there "on the night" has been thorough-going. At the League Assembly last September he renounced obligations of every kind under the Covenant, a declaration very agreeable to those—and they are many—who thought the League blocked the way to the consolidation of the Commonwealth into an Empire. But he went on to deny as well any obligation towards the defence of any part of the Commonwealth, which was not so popular in these quarters. But, having thus rejected all commitments involving action, he was equally emphatic, in the discussions in Parliament last session, in refusing to give definite engagements not to act. Mr. Woodsworth,¹⁹ on behalf of the C.C.F., invited him to accept this proposition: "That under existing international relations, in the event of war, Canada should remain strictly neutral regardless of who the belligerents may be."²⁰ Mr. King's reception of this invitation was very disconcerting to the hundred per cent. isolationists. His

¹⁹ The late Mr. J. S. Woodsworth, national leader of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation.

²⁰ H.C. (Canada) Debates, 1, 1937, January 25, p. 237. Section 1 of the resolution is quoted. Sections 2 and 3 require that Canadian citizens be not permitted to profit out of supplying munitions, and that the Canadian government make every effort to discover and remove the causes of international friction and social injustice.

speech, in the opinion of Professor Underhill, "represented a distinct retrogression from the position which he took up in his two carefully-prepared speeches of last June in Parliament, and last September.²¹ But this is not confirmed by a careful reading of Mr. King's two important speeches on Mr. Woodsworth's resolution and on the defence estimates. All his cautious reservations of 1936 are re-stated; he denies any obligation to either League or Commonwealth. But on the other hand he does not prejudge issues which may arise. He will not engage himself to oppose under all conceivable circumstances participation in world affairs, saying:

"It does not matter in the least to my honourable friend what the circumstances of a great world conflict may be. It does not matter what other countries are involved, or what their attitude may be. It does not matter what other considerations may be involved . . . It will be for this Parliament to say in any given situation whether or not Canada shall remain neutral."²²

To people of suspicious temperament — and they abound in certain quarters — this was a plain indication that the Canadian Government was preparing to adopt what they considered ultra-Imperialist policies; but upon any reasonable interpretation these words meant nothing more than that Mr. King was keeping the stage clear for playing out his policy of no commitments anywhere or of any kind with the retention of entire

²¹ Underhill, F. H. "The Debate on Foreign Policy", *Canadian Forum*, March, 1937, p. 8.

²² H.C. (Canada) Debates, 1, 1937, January 25, p. 249. A full discussion is to be found in Soward, F. H., *et al*, *Canada in World Affairs: The Pre-War Years*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1941.

freedom of action in the presence of any emergency, whatever its nature. That was the policy avowed on many occasions by Mr. King during the past year in language from which the vagueness of phrasing in which he often indulges was entirely lacking.

This policy could not be reconciled with the adoption of any such programme of consolidation and co-ordination as that which is being recommended to the Conference by the British newspapers which are saying, as the cables report, that it is about time the generalities gave way to some practical consideration of the defence problem. Mr. King could not in any case commit Canada; but there is, of course, nothing to prevent him agreeing to any scheme that might be submitted, subject to the approval of the Canadian Parliament. But to anyone familiar with the debates on defence and foreign policy and with the position so carefully taken and so skilfully defended by Mr. King and his colleagues, the impossibility of the Canadian delegation falling in with any such programme—if one is submitted, which is by no means assured—is apparent. The course decided upon with deliberation by the Canadian Government is stoutly defended by Mr. King as the only possible one if there is not to be marked disruption of “national unity”. This policy of no commitments and the assertion of the right to reserve judgment as to action until the hour has struck ought to be understandable to other governments which themselves adhere closely to this formula in dealing with external matters affecting their interests.

There may be a good deal of wisdom in the view now being put forward with some vigour that certitude

in policy, in the pass to which world affairs have come, is essential to the maintenance of peace; but there will be no government present at the Imperial Conference which will be entitled to preach this doctrine to the other members of that body as indicating the road of duty and obligation.

[Plainly, Mr. King will see to it that Canadians make their own decisions in foreign policy, but only the event can tell what decision will be made. Meantime, re-arm.]

FOREIGN POLICY REALITIES

CANADA'S FREEDOM OF DECISION

(July 22, 1938)

THE fact, newly demonstrated by the action of the Conservative Convention,²³ that the great majority of Canadians do not support the principle of automatic immediate participation in any kind of war that any kind of British Government may embark upon, affords firm ground from which explorations can be made in the field of Canadian responsibility in matters of war and defence.

What is the situation that would be created in Canada by the breaking out of war, involving Great Britain? This is not an academic question but one of high probability; and therefore of great concern to

²³ At Ottawa, July 7, 1938. The platform drawn up affirmed. "We believe that the defence of Canada and the preservation of our liberties can best be promoted by consultation and co-operation between all the members of the British Commonwealth."

every Canadian. It is not possible to reach definite judgments on this point until the present Canadian Government makes plain what it means when it says that Canada has made no commitments of any kind and that Parliament will decide what Canada will do.

If Mr. King means that Canada at this moment has "no commitments" of any kind in the event of war involving Britain, he must hold that by the development of constitutional conventions this country has already attained the status of a neutral if it cares to declare it.

If Mr. King does not take this position, speculation as to what he thinks the powers are that Parliament can exercise is in order.

He may hold that Parliament's power runs to the point where, in its discretion, it could declare Canada's neutrality, which would mean complete abstention from war.

Or he may agree with the opinion widely held by constitutional authorities that Canada cannot be neutral in a war in which the King of Canada is involved as King of Great Britain—that Canada under these conditions would be at war.

In that case Parliament would be limited to deciding between passive belligerency and active participation. It would then be revealed that the declarations in recent years by Mr. King at Ottawa, Geneva, London and elsewhere against commitments meant only that Canada would take no action which would commit this country to active participation in war.

Mr. King has been sharply attacked for not being more definite in his statements on this point. The explanation of his indefiniteness is undoubtedly that he

is well aware that a declaration of policy on any of these points would be the signal for a violent clash of opinions. He therefore marks time in the hope that he will not have to show his hand. Upon the wisdom of this there is plenty of room for a difference of opinion.

Mr. King's views are very important because if the present tension in Europe is to end in war it will come with no great delay in time; and it will find Mr. King Prime Minister of Canada.

When Mr. King says that Parliament will meet, upon the outbreak of war, to settle the question, he knows that the starting point of the discussions must be a statement of Government policy. Mr. King and his colleagues will have to declare for one of these courses: Neutrality and complete isolation; passive belligerency; participation in the war to the extent that is acceptable to Parliament and the people of Canada.

Thus freedom of decision, either complete or in large measure, rests with the people of Canada. They might conceivably declare both their right to neutrality and their intention to take part in war to the limit of their strength.

What they will not do in the exercise of their freedom of choice is to accept the Bennett-Meighen policy: a blind, unhesitating acceptance of an obligation to jump into any war into which a government of Great Britain may be drawn, or into which it may tumble, or upon which it may embark as an incident of its European entanglements.

Those Canadians who take the line that Canada must automatically, instantly and to the full extent of her power plunge into war the moment Great Britain is

engaged are also the Canadians who tell their fellow-Canadians that it is none of their business what the Government of Great Britain does in relation to international matters. Public opinion in Great Britain may be deeply divided about British foreign policy; half the people may believe and say that the Government's courses are making not for peace but for certain war, and that they are destructive of the principles which alone could insure permanent peace. But in Canada, if you please, the doctrine of the infallibility, the complete wisdom of the British Government of the day, whatever its leadership, membership or policy may be, is to be accepted, according to this view, without question; and in this faith Canada must pledge its future, its treasure, and the lives of its citizens.

This doctrine never has been accepted by Canadians, though it has been offered to them more or less continuously, in a variety of forms, for the past sixty or seventy years. It was rejected by Sir John Macdonald over fifty years ago.²⁴ The participation of Canada in the Great War was not on this basis. Mr. King formally repudiated it in 1922.²⁵ In 1925 Mr. Meighen backed away from his earlier advocacy of the theory.²⁶

²⁴ Pope, Sir Joseph, *Correspondence of Sir John Macdonald*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, n.d., p. 338, Macdonald to Tupper, March 12, 1885; pp. 467-8, Macdonald to Rev. C. H. Machin, April 4, 1890. "I am very desirous that the connection between the mother country and the colonies should assume by degrees a position less of dependence and more of alliance. I think this can only be done however by treaty or convention, and I am a total disbeliever in the practicability of colonial representation in the Imperial Parliament."

²⁵ In declining, as Prime Minister, the invitation of the government of the United Kingdom to participate in war with Turkey. Dawson, R. MacG., *The Development of Dominion Status, 1900-1936*, Oxford University Press, Toronto, 1937, "The Chanak Incident", pp. 234-50.

²⁶ In the Hamilton speech, November 16, 1925, Dawson, R. MacG., *Constitutional Issues in Canada, 1900-1931*, Oxford University Press, London, 1933, pp. 411-12.

Mr. Bennett said and did nothing in support of it during his premiership.

Canadians in the next war—and there is likely to be a next war as things are now going—will thus make their own decision as to whether they will step into it or not. Their decision will depend upon considerations such as these: What the war is about; by whom it has been started to what end; what the consequences of defeat will be; what purpose will be served by victory; above all, what the relationship will be between victory and the establishment of permanent world peace. If it is merely one more of a never-ending succession of wars in a world of power politics, it will make no such appeal to the Canadian people as it will if it is an alliance of democracies defending the cause of freedom and civilization, with a believable promise that victory will mean a good deal more than a lull in a continuing war. It was because the Great War took on this guise that the Canadian people made for it the sacrifices that they did, a fact which is none the less true because it has been conveniently forgotten. But there will have to be no question about it next time; and how the bonafides of purpose and intention can be established to the satisfaction of the Canadian people in the light of the past will be a supreme difficulty.

Into what has here been said the question of Canadian defence or rearmament does not directly enter. This is a discussion of what Canada ought to do with such power as she can command in the event of war.

Canada, of course, must arm swiftly, efficiently and with thoroughness, and upon the largest scale that is practicable. This country is a treasure-house, lying

open and almost undefended in a world of robber nations. We must count on having to defend ourselves in a world where international morality has not been so minus a quantity for centuries. The sudden emergence of these conditions in a world which only ten years ago thought that the standards of the future would be those of the Covenant is like the parable where seven devils entered in and took possession of the room which had been swept and garnished.

In such a world Canada must equip herself with strength to defend herself; and, if circumstances enlarge the field of duty and responsibility, to make a contribution that will count on the day when the issue is put to trial.

It is a shocking thing that Canada is confronted, twenty years after the end of the last war, with this inescapable responsibility; but this is the price we shall have to pay for the loss of security due to the rejection by the democratic countries of the League which, had it been honourably supported, would today be their sure defence. This too, is a reality not to be blinked.

VII

THE FAR EAST AGAIN

The attempts of Japan since 1931 to extend military control over, and develop economic co-operation with, a decentralized China were threatened with defeat by the growing strength of the central Chinese Government at Nanking. This led to the outbreak of hostilities on July 7, 1937, beginning what the Japanese called "the China Incident" and what Chinese resistance has made a prolonged war still at issue and now merged in the general war of today.

On these matters the League had no longer any bearing. But this outbreak might be the first proof that "both war and peace are indivisible",¹ particularly as the German-Japanese Pact of November, 1936, was to become, on the adhesion of Italy, the Anti-Comintern Pact in November, 1937. Moreover, it was a mournful comment on the initial failure of the League, the failure to halt Japan in Manchuria in 1932. That tragedy at bottom was caused by the refusal of the League powers to apply sanctions to Japan, and the inability of the League and the United States to take joint or parallel action. As the Tientsin incident showed, Britain was now powerless in the Far East. The League, upheld by Anglo-American collaboration, might have been the defence of the Empire.² The United States,

¹ *Winnipeg Free Press*, August 16, 1937—"War in the Orient".

² *Winnipeg Free Press*, July 8, 1939—"Time and Nemesis".

as the principal non-Asiatic power in the Far East, should not shirk its responsibility now, nor remain indifferent to the establishment of Japanese hegemony in Asia.

SHANGHAI AS SIGNPOST

(August 31, 1937)

Is imagination a lost human faculty? If there are any who still have it let them exercise it by trying to translate the cold words which appear in the news dispatches from Shanghai⁸ into the realities as seen, felt and experienced on the ground. One of the most populous cities of the world, with densely crowded quarters, narrow streets and flimsy buildings bombed relentlessly from the air, night after night, day after day—following each bombardment, panic, fires, stampedes, death, by bombs, by mutilation, by falling walls, by fire; homelessness, hunger. It is reported that a million Chinese have been driven from their homes; the casualties among civilians—a term which includes men and women, young and old, little children and babes in arms—are numbered by the thousand.

The people thus afflicted do not know what it is all about. All they know is that while everything was proceeding as before the heavens opened and hell belched forth. When they make enquiries the best information they will be able to get is that the Japanese are taking these means of getting them to love them and to teach them to be obedient. There is no declaration of war and the world looks on indifferent.

If their imagination has carried our readers thus far, perhaps it will carry them further. "There, but for the

⁸ The fighting at Shanghai began with the landing of Japanese naval forces, August 13, 1937.

grace of God, goes John Bradford", said the divine as the condemned man rattled by him on his way to Tyburn. What is happening in Shanghai might be happening in any European capital; will happen inevitably and with no great loss of time with things proceeding as they are. There is nothing to stop it except the fear of reprisal upon those who weigh the possibilities of an adventure of this kind. For months past the world has been hearing the story from the Orient that Japan was changing her policy towards China and would no longer resort to measures of force which had hitherto been her preferred method of approach; but it only needed an accentuation of tension in Europe (which is the actual state of affairs although official "hand-outs" claiming betterment abound) and the evidence that Russia is fully occupied at home, to send the bombing planes droning over Shanghai. Similarly, a calculation of an estimated margin of advantage (which of course in the sequel might prove to be a miscalculation) may send the planes over Prague, or Paris, or London—just try to think of a rain of bombs on London and what it would mean!

Against this there is no protection except the possession of an air force that could retaliate in kind. Engagements mean nothing; assurances are worthless; signatures on treaties are mere words on a scrap of paper; professions of friendship are liable to immediate renouncement. If a moment of definite advantage arises it will not likely be allowed to pass. The world today, with respect to deadliness of available weapons, the will to use them on the part of gangster nations, and the contempt in which international engagements

are held, is at a lower level than has been known in modern times. And there is no longer a stigma attached to aggression that creates even a presumption that the most wanton exercise of it will bring assistance or even sympathy (except on the part of individuals) for the victim. And this state of affairs has come about in just six years; and it has been absolute for less than two years.

When the historians of the future come to tell the story of how the League of Nations was destroyed and the world happily restored to the time-honoured and blood-encrusted system of power politics—"they shall take who have the power and they shall keep who can"—they will marvel at the simplicity and effectiveness of the tactics employed. The enemies of the League had only to say in November, 1935, that whereas the term "League" was supposed to connote peace, adherence to its principles at that time carried with it the possibility of war (which was true, but the war had it come would have been a war for the vindication of League principles and it would have been the first and last of its kind). By a skilful and unscrupulous twist to the argument the public was led to believe that the danger of war was tied up with the League, while the rejection of its principle of sanctions (without which there is no League) meant the assurance of peace, continuing and permanent. For that harsh word "sanctions" the blessed word "conciliation" would be substituted; after which all would be well. There has been a good deal of disillusion since that time; and it is probable that many who took this bait now understand that while the League might mean war, where it was

necessary for collective defence, the system of power politics means a succession of wars fought for the old causes: ambition, revenge, plunder, gratification of the blood lust and all the other devilish excuses for mass murder which have done duty for thousands of years. Shanghai is just a burning signpost on the highway along which the nations press.

[These issues are pointed by American participation in the Brussels Conference of the signatories of the Nine-Power Treaty, November 3-24, 1937. The Stimson-Simon controversy over the failure of Great Britain and the United States to act jointly in the Manchurian affair cannot be construed so as to rid the United States of responsibility for a definite stand in the Far East, however disastrous Simon's decision to rely on conciliation alone may have been.⁴ On the other hand, Canada should be ready to participate in joint measures to restore peace in the Far East. But "the United States will have to go along if anything is to be done."⁵]

U.S. LEADERSHIP AND THE EASTERN CRISIS

(November 22, 1937)

AT the conference in Brussels of the signatories of the Nine-Power Pact there was an obvious attitude of expectancy that the United States would offer some degree of leadership. And apparently there was a disposition on all hands to accept and follow this leader-

⁴ *Winnipeg Free Press*, December 23, 1938—"Simon versus Stimson".

⁵ *Winnipeg Free Press*, October 21, 1937—"A Policy for Canada".

ship. The stage was thus set and the times were opportune for the United States to step out and display a bit of initiative in a situation which, failing this, could not be dealt with, as must have been evident to all present.

The intimation that action of this kind by the United States was looked for has been received in the United States with a nation-wide shrinking of horror coupled with amazement that it should occur to anybody that America could, would or should play such a role. But why should the United States back away from a course which, we have been told many times, that country was eager to take some five years ago?

It has become a matter of almost universal belief in the United States that that country was prepared and ready to give leadership in the Manchuria affair in February, 1932, but was held back by the refusal of Great Britain to co-operate. This rests upon statements of fact to be found in *The Far Eastern Crisis* by Henry L. Stimson,⁶ who was Secretary of State for the United States from 1928 to 1932 and thus writes with knowledge and authority.

What Mr. Stimson tried unavailingly to do in February, 1932, against the passive resistance of the British Government was to get together a conference of the powers that had signed the Nine-Power Treaty, for a purpose that he frankly states:

“If a situation should ultimately arise when the American Government felt it necessary to recommend the imposition, in co-operation with the rest of the world, of an embargo upon Japanese goods,

⁶ Stimson, Henry L., *The Far Eastern Crisis—Recollections and Observations*, Harper & Brothers, New York and London, 1936.

I believed that such a measure would have more chance of being adopted by Congress if it were recommended following the invocation of the Nine-Power Treaty than if it had been recommended solely by the League of Nations.”⁷

On February 8, Mr. Stimson got President Hoover’s consent to his plan; on February 9, he advised the British Ambassador about the American intention. On February 11, he talked over the telephone with Sir John Simon (the British Foreign Secretary) at Geneva, “explaining at length the main reasons which actuated him in desiring to make such a demarche under the Nine-Power Treaty”; on February 12, he talked again to Sir John Simon and cabled him a draft of a joint statement which it was proposed Great Britain and United States should make in calling the conference. “As I explained to the British Foreign Minister,” writes Mr. Stimson, “its main purpose was to make clear our faith in and intention to live up to the covenants of the Nine-Power Treaty respecting the future sovereignty and integrity of China.”⁸ Further conversation over the telephone with Sir John Simon on February 13 and February 15 brought neither acceptance nor definite refusal. At that point Mr. Stimson gave up. “My plan,” he writes, “was therefore blocked.”⁹

It is on the strength of these facts that Americans have been rather pluming themselves on having been ready to go farther in 1932 than Great Britain in pro-

⁷ Stimson, *op. cit.*, p. 161.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 163-4.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 164.

tecting China against Japanese aggression. There is nothing to suggest that Mr. Stimson was not in earnest. The failure of the British Government to go along with the American Government at that time was a mistake of the first order. The British defence for this failure is understood to be that it was thought better to leave the matter in the hands of the League. Whatever the reasons, Great Britain refused to act, to the complete destruction of the American plan.

But if the United States was prepared to take action in defence of China in February, 1932, against aggression in Manchuria, provided she could command the co-operation of the other signatories, why does that country, in the much more serious situation of November, 1937, decline to give a lead when the conference of the signatories to the treaty is in actual being? The restrictions that held back the United States in 1932 are not now present; but what has become of the American will, once evident, to see that the engagements of the treaty are respected?

The present attitude of the American people, as reflected in their press and in statements by the politicians in Washington, is one of amazement at what they seem to regard as the impudence of other nations in assuming that the United States is called upon to do anything more than to put in an appearance at Brussels and wish hopefully that something will happen that will solve the difficulty without any involvement of them in responsibility.

There is in this a return to the defensive strategy to which American publicists and politicians are addicted when a dangerous international situation arises. This

is to assume that the United States has no interests and no responsibility and to interpret every suggestion that their country should take part as an attempt to trap generous, noble, simple-minded Uncle Sam into pulling other peoples' chestnuts out of the fire. So far as European troubles are concerned, there might be elements of plausibility in such an argument; but with respect to the Orient, intelligent Americans, who are familiar with the facts and with the long series of moral commitments by the American people to the people of China, cannot but be humiliated by such an attitude toward an issue which, when it is viewed in retrospect, will be seen to have been one which affected the future of mankind.

The case for the acceptance by the United States of responsibility for leadership in dealing with the crisis in the Orient cannot be met by the most ingenious apologist for a policy of inaction. America's interests in China, present and prospective, outrank those of any other power. This is not to be answered by putting forth a statistical contrast between British and United States investments in China. We are not talking about material interests—though the trade figures show that as a market China is more valuable to the United States than to Great Britain—but of moral values. Modern China is the child of the United States; and that country cannot afford, without present dishonour and continuing shame, to look on with indifference while it is being destroyed. References to the United States special relation to China abound in Mr. Stimson's book. Some may profitably be quoted:

"Several European powers have far larger commercial and territorial interests in China than we, but geographically they are remote. We are adjacent. They are in a sense absentee landlords; we a neighbour. The repercussions which are possible in a modernization of the Far East can directly affect us in ways which would not affect them."¹⁰

"Japan's attack upon China in September, 1931, was of interest to the American people not only because it was an attack upon the fundamental basis of collective action in the modern world—fidelity to treaty obligations—but because it was also a destructive assault upon the good relations which must exist between neighbour nations if order and stability are to be preserved in the North Pacific. In other words, the shock to our interest in collective fidelity was much accentuated because the trouble was in our part of the world."¹¹

"The essentially peaceful character of China's domestic and internal culture is now the main stabilizing factor of Asia. Its loss would be a blow which would directly affect the peace of her neighbours, including America. It would be a very shortsighted policy if that loss should come through a disregard of its treaty obligations by the American government."¹²

"The most widespread interest of our people in China is not commercial, although our commerce with that country is of long standing and of late years has been rapidly growing . . . It came through the great missionary movement—religious, educational and medical—which had been carried on for nearly a century by the churches and humanitarian organizations of this country."¹³

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 234.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 235.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 236.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 153.

"By virtue of our propinquity and of our historic interest in the opening up of both China and Japan to the modern world we had in some ways a greater direct interest than any other nation in the world."¹⁴

"Roughly speaking, the United States possessed one-third of the world's trade with Japan; all the other nations combined, two-thirds."¹⁵

These quotations are conclusive as showing the very special relationships of the United States with China, both moral and material. These called for American leadership at Brussels; and there were other sound reasons why the chief responsibility for framing an active policy rested at Brussels on the United States. The United States is much the most powerful country in the world. It is not beset with enemies waiting for an opportunity to strike which is the case with the other great civilized powers. It is the only country which, in the present state of the world, could command the support of enough other countries to make it dangerous for Japan to persist in her present course. The British countries certainly would go the whole way with the United States.

For lack of American leadership the Brussels Conference gives promise of being the most contemptibly futile of all the conferences looking towards peace which have been held in the post-War period. There was in this conference not a trace of the American spirit of 1932 as expressed by Mr. Stimson. The forcibly-feeble representations to Japan have apparently been a source of amusement to the Japanese authori-

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 83.

ties. The official comment upon these representations with its cheap insults and studied insolence marks new low levels in international communications. All of which the countries in conference at Brussels take with unruffled calm. Presumably they hope that despite their inaction the situation will be saved for them by the valour and sacrifice of the Chinese.

This is becoming increasingly a vain hope. It is now pretty evident that Japan is nearing her objective; the beating of China to her knees. China will then become a vassal state of a Fascist Oriental power and the Orient will be closed alike to the trade and the civilization of the West. This will be a considerable responsibility for the United States to assume before posterity, in addition to the responsibility for other defaults since 1919 which have played a large, if not a dominant part, in creating the anarchic world situation of today.

VIII

MUNICH

"Appeasement" in essence was the recognition by the British Government of the re-emergence of Germany as chief power in Europe. The hope behind this policy was that a Germany so recognized as preponderant in Central Europe would become a reconciled and satisfied power.

This, however, was a misreading of the nature of Naziism. It involved, moreover, over-riding the French policy, which the British nations in fact had never accepted, of defending the status quo of 1919. It therefore implied a re-adjustment of frontiers in eastern and central Europe by threat of German force. Behind it was the assumption that German policy was limited in its objectives, and this further implied that if German policy were not so limited, Great Britain must intervene to impose restraints. The inarticulate premise of the whole was that Germany and Russia would somehow offset one another.

That Germany must be restrained, by whatever means, conciliatory if possible, forceful if necessary, from breaking the peace was clear. This might be done by collective action through the League, or by an anti-German coalition. "Appeasement", however, was the definite attempt to deal with the problem of resurgent Germany by direct negotiation, without recourse to the League, or the threat of a counter-alliance.

This was the fateful blunder of "appeasement". It not only confirmed the defeat of the League in Manchuria and in Ethiopia, the consequences of which could be seen in China and in Spain. It also threw away deliberately that chance of making the League a centre around which the peace-loving nations might yet be rallied for a stand against the aggressors. It put peace at the mercy of the slippery play of power politics, and refused to confront the "Counter-League" of the Anti-Comintern nations with the "grand defensive alliance" of the League powers.

The root of "appeasement" was the decision made in 1936 by the Government of Great Britain that the military power of Great Britain should not be placed behind a League employing sanctions, but that the League should be relegated to the background as an international agency dealing with matters not involving war and peace. High policy should be conducted directly between governments. This was the method of "appeasement", which produced Munich.

[Collective security indeed implies going to war, but it would have been a last war, not the spreading conflict of 1939-1941.]

IN THE LIGHT OF TODAY

(November 16, 1937)

THE future historian of these dolorous years, and of the issues to which they bore the world, will see with clearness that the cause of the disasters they will have to record was the collapse of the post-War conception of a League of Nations pledged to forego war as an agency of policy and equally pledged to defend with their collective power any member nation attacked by a country bent on aggression.

In the clearer light of the day after, it will be plain to the historian that the nations, thus leagued together for common defence should have drawn closer together and been more resolute in their determination to adhere to this policy of collective security as nations broke away and began to arm for the avowed purpose of advancing their particular national interests by the use of force.

The plausible excuses and apologies which have been doing duty the past two years for the failure of these nations to follow this course—the course of safety and of honour, as well—will be revealed for what they are in the illumination thrown upon them by the con-

sequences, the opening instalments of which the world is now experiencing.

The historian will note that in 1935, following an act of wanton aggression by a powerful nation upon a League member, the first short step towards vindication of the principle of collective security was taken; but that there was then a paralysis of purpose which blocked further action and brought the structure of the League, as a safeguard against aggression, crashing to the ground.

Perhaps the historian of, let us say, 1955, will be able, from documents then available, to explain the reasons for that paralysis. Why did the government that first offered leadership to the League embark upon this course if it did not intend to see it through? If this was its first purpose, what were the influences that changed it to a policy of retreat and defeatism?

Incontrovertible answers to these questions cannot be given from present information; but it is not necessary to leave to the historian of tomorrow the task of explaining the methods by which effect was given to the change in policy. These have been open to view right along; they have been as easily understandable as they have been effective.

An ingenious formula was devised. This was to declare that League methods could be employed only if they did not go beyond acts peaceful in their consequences; the two processes of restraint and peace preservation, it was asserted, were identical and inseparable. The statement was untrue; but it sounded true to a public which had been shielded from an understanding of League responsibilities. It was only neces-

sary to say—as statesmen of the highest rank said repeatedly—that nothing must be done that would lead to war to give Mussolini the cue to reply: “Go any further and your action will mean war.” This put into the hands of the aggressor and took out of the hands of the nations pledged to prevent aggression the power of regulating and limiting the extent of the pressure which might be applied in stopping his aggression. Naturally, he employed it to defeat the League.

Could anything more preposterous, more treacherous, be imagined! To every appeal that the League should enlarge sanctions for the purpose of giving effect to its professed intention, there was the answering taunt: “You preach peace, but you are asking for war.” They were trying, it was asserted, to turn the League which was intended to serve only the ends of peace, into an “international war machine”. How effective this was, the sorry record of the retreat from the League reveals.

The historian of tomorrow—in the light of what has happened and will happen between 1935 and, let us say, 1945—will be able to give an informed opinion as to the consequences directly attributable to this watering down of League commitments to sheer pacifism. There has not been a day of peace in the world since the formula was concocted; and there is not likely to be while the governments of the countries that profess a desire for peace, adhere to it. Indeed, is it not evident this very day that the denial of collective security implies an ever-widening state of war?

It is a point upon which no positive judgment can be given, but the chances in 1935 were overwhelmingly

on the side of a victory for peace without sacrifice, if the League powers had said to Italy that they proposed to stop her aggression in Ethiopia whatever the cost. The principle of collective security would then have been vindicated once for all, probably without the firing of a shot. If Italy had replied to the tightening of sanctions by attacking the League nations, the resulting war would have been a mere skirmish in comparison with the current war the opening phases of which are proceeding in Spain and in the Far East. There is now war in three continents, for it is pretty evident that Ethiopia has not been pacified. In contrast, a League victory in 1935, which would have been certain, would have given the world assured and permanent peace. There were those who saw this clearly at the time but, for their advocacy of unflinching adherence to the principle of collective security, they earned the title of "war-mongers" from the statesmen in office and their allies.

This interpretation of "defence" under "collective security" as meaning nothing loosened the whole structure of the League. It was a notification to every small country in Europe that if it were attacked by a more powerful neighbour its fellow-members of the League would not come to its defence and would survey its destruction with calm detachment. Nevertheless, the League retained—as it still retains—the appearance of an alliance of countries pledged to self-defence against attack. The possibility therefore continued that it might, given leadership in an emergency, act collectively for self-defence. This was alarming to the busy band of League wreckers, and they had to think

up a further formula to discredit this inclination towards common action.

After much mental toil and strain they discovered and proclaimed this profound theory: That it would be most sinful for the League nations to even appear to be in agreement to act collectively for defence and peace because this would justify other nations in agreeing to act collectively for plunder and aggression. It simply must not be advertised—so they held—that there were two classes of nations in the world; and therefore the League must not show a common front for peace until such time as the gangster nations decided to mend their ways and join with them. Not, of course, that the League should go out of business; there remained for it wide fields of usefulness such as “giving information about earthquakes all over the world, protection of birds against destruction by oil, and many others”, in the language of one distinguished correspondent of *The Times*, writing from the august precincts of the Athenaeum.

This formula has been put to wide use. The nations of the League, it was charged, were being asked by those who still urged collective security to engage in what was in effect a military alliance, thus putting themselves on the same level as the members of another military alliance. One group, it was held, was as great a threat to world peace as the other. The slight difference that one alliance was for a single purpose, collective defence, while the other was for war and aggression, meant nothing to the group of distinguished Britons to whom the glory of this invention belongs. It is a Commonwealth-wide humiliation

that a paraphrase of this specious bunkum should have found its way into the report of the Imperial Conference in the smug observation that nothing should be done that would proclaim "a division, real or apparent, of the world into opposing groups."¹

What is to be thought of this extreme solicitude lest there should be even an appearance of division among the nations of the world, in the light of today's international situation? While the League nations have been dissuaded from standing openly together in common defence in the supposed interest of a world solidarity that does not exist, the nations that are bent on rapine and plunder flaunt their alliance to these ends in the face of a disunited and timorous democratic world—disunited and timorous because in 1935 the countries that should have taken command of the League were united only in a feverish determination to scuttle the ship.

[The League has been sabotaged deliberately in the attempt to placate Nazi Germany.]

THE LEAGUE WON'T WORK . . . OF COURSE NOT! AND WHY?

(March 10, 1938)

ON Monday the *Free Press* published the opinion, expressed over the air to the people of the United States

¹ *Imperial Conference; Summary of Proceedings*, King's Printer, Ottawa, 1937, p. 15.

by Graham Hutton, associate editor of *The Economist*, that the present Government of Great Britain for political, social, financial and personal reasons was definitely friendly to the Fascist governments of Europe; and to give them a free hand in extending their dominions, had thrown over the League of Nations, rejected collective security, refused to co-operate with democracies and was prepared to leave the little nations of Europe to their fate.

About ten days ago Lord Astor—named by Mr. Hutton as one of the “authoritarian group” which runs the foreign policy of Great Britain—told the people of the United States that British foreign policy was directed towards righting the wrongs of the Versailles Treaty “without war”.

The wrongs about which Lord Astor talked are admittedly those associated with the territorial adjustments in Central Europe made by the Peace Treaties. The judge of the nature and extent of these wrongs and the remedies required is, it is apparent, to be Germany, according to Lord Astor's view. Whatever Germany does will be all right with Lord Astor and his friends. When he says “no war” he means “no war” for England. Doubtless Lord Astor, who is a kindly and humane man, hopes that Germany will only have to make a display of force to right “the wrongs” as she sees them in the way she desires; but it has been made abundantly clear by Lord Astor and his friends that if resistance is offered by the little countries what happens to them will be—in their opinion—no concern of Great Britain.

That is rather reminiscent of Artemus Ward's

famous Civil War declaration that he was prepared to sacrifice all his wife's relations in the defence of the Union.

Cool detached contemplation of a prospective massacre of the little nations of Central Europe is not as easy to many British and American citizens as it is to Lord Astor and his friends; because they are not so ready, as Lord Astor is, to forget that if these little nations exist it is because the United States and Great Britain willed it so; and that they have an inescapable responsibility in the matter, the United States particularly.

"It will be well for Englishmen of all classes," wrote Stephen Gwynn in the *Fortnightly* when this theory of English unconcern about Nazi aggression in Central Europe first began to be put forward, "to think about this matter in advance of events. . . . Czechoslovakia has justified its right to a national existence more clearly than any other of the succession states."²

H. A. L. Fisher in his *History of Europe*, says of the territorial provisions of the peace treaties:

"The peace treaties bear Wilson's mark. The new map of Europe was drawn according to that principle of self-determination which the President had proclaimed as the clue leading through a labyrinth of evils to justice and peace. Americans have no right to argue, as some do, that in this fundamental aspect of the peace-making, American idealism was upset by the wickedness of Europe. The new political frontiers of Europe are Wilsonian and so drawn that three per cent. only of the total population of the

² *Fortnightly Review* (New Series) CXLI, 1937, "Ebb and Flow", a monthly commentary, p. 107.

continent live under alien rule. Judged by the test of self-determination, no previous European frontiers have been so satisfactory.”³

Of the part played by the British nations in creating Czechoslovakia and fixing its boundaries, there is a record at first hand in *Peacemaking 1919* by Harold Nicolson. Mr. Nicolson is now a National Labour member of the British Parliament. At the Paris Peace Conference he was the Foreign Office expert on Central European questions and he was one of the two British representatives on the Committee of Ten which defined the boundaries of Czechoslovakia. His British partner was Sir Joseph Cook, a venerable Australian politician who, in the opinion of his young colleague, was “an angel of obedience”. Mr. Nicolson’s diary, quoted in the book, shows clearly that he was “the works”. With the possible exception of the American members of the Committee Mr. Nicolson had more to do than anyone else with drawing the frontiers which now bulk so large in Lord Astor’s mind as “wrongs”.

Mr. Nicolson’s diary covering weeks is peppered with phrases like these: “We discuss Czech frontier in Bohemia and Moravia”; “Czechs all morning”; “Czechs all afternoon”; “We appoint a sub-committee to trace the actual frontier line”; “We decide on what I trust is quite a good line in Silesia”; and so on, over and over again.⁴

It might seem, in view of all this, as if Great Britain

³ Fisher, H. A. L., *History of Europe*, Edwin Arnold, London, 1936, p. 1160.

⁴ Nicolson, Harold, *Peacemaking 1919*, Constable & Co., Ltd., London, 1933, pp. 272-3.

and the United States can hardly wash their hands of all responsibility for the security of Czechoslovakia. But to take this view, is, it appears, to be very old-fashioned indeed.

The pro-Hitler drive began in England about two years ago; it is now apparent that the purpose from the start was to reach the objective now attained; a definite attitude by the British Foreign Office of willingness to give the Nazis a free hand in Central Europe. To attain this it was necessary to discredit the League by creating the impression that it was quite beyond its power to deal with the Central European situation.

A rather ingenious formula was worked out. In its simplest form it amounted to this: Germany's "wrongs" are intolerable and must be righted; the League by its very nature is unable to deal with these evils; therefore Germany must be permitted to attend to these matters herself by the threat of force, or failing this, by the application of force.

The reason given why the League could not deal with these matters was that it was made up of sovereign powers instead of being a superstate. All it could do was to guarantee the *status quo* by force. Since the *status quo* was iniquitous, since the League was by its nature its defender, the plain course, according to the simple logic of these pro-Nazi apologists, was for the League to declare itself impotent and let Germany employ its great and evergrowing power to make over the map to suit itself. As it would not be likely that the nations standing in the way of Germany would dare to resist under these conditions, there would be "peace"

—blessed word—in Central Europe. With a Germany thus, in theory satiated and content, Great Britain would make an alliance; and by these means the “peace” of Central Europe would be extended to the British possessions.

If any simple soul should ask why the pro-Nazis were so determined to assist Hitler to extend his domination over Central Europe they will find the complete answer in a paragraph in an article by J. L. Garvin, appearing in *The Observer*, March 21, 1937. Mr. Garvin is one of the journalistic mouthpieces of the combination, the other being the editor of *The Times*. In this article Mr. Garvin dwelt upon the “vast Soviet power” and went on to say:

“For the interests of Western civilization the counterpoise and bulwark at need will be required a few years hence not against Germany but against the Red Tsardom which stretches from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. That counterpoise and bulwark can be created only by the reconstruction and federation of ‘Middle Europe’ under German headship on some such lines as we described last week. So far from opposing this or dreaming of plunging into futile war against Germany, we should favour it and promote it.”⁵

“The German headship” which had been described by Mr. Garvin the previous week envisaged the domination of an area containing a population estimated at 140 millions—nearly half of whom would not be Germans. Realizing that Czechoslovakia stood in the way

⁵ *The Observer*, March 21, 1937, p. 16. Editorial, “The Key to the World”, by J. L. Garvin.

of the "headship", Mr. Garvin was all for encouraging Germany to tear Czechoslovakia to pieces. It never should have been created, he opined; and Great Britain, he pontificated, would do nothing to protect it.

The simple explanation of the existence of the pro-Nazi group in Great Britain and the fervour of the devotion to Hitler is that they share his fears and hallucinations about the threat of Communism and are one with him in his hatred and fear of it. As Mr. Hutton said in the broadcast, they have an idea that if Communism and Fascism are deadlocked on the continent, their position as the ruling caste in Great Britain will be strengthened.

And, of course, they have great possessions—in wealth, power and personal distinction.

The line of attack on the League which began some two years ago was carried out with such spirit that by April, 1936, Lord Lytton, one of the staunch supporters of collective security, found it necessary to challenge the accuracy of the formula. Taking a statement by Lord Lothian, as a typical presentation of the argument, he found that it rested on five assertions which he thus listed:

(1) That war is equally dangerous whoever the belligerents may be.

(2) That the application to an aggressor of military sanctions—i.e., the starting of a "police war" will, in the absence of the United States, Germany, Japan and Brazil, not suppress aggression quickly but risk extending a local aggression into a world war.

(3) That aggression means any attempt to alter the *status quo* by force.

(4) That neither we nor the League have any means of altering the *status quo* except with the consent of all parties concerned; and (by implication) that such general consent is unattainable.

(5) That the States Members of the League of Nations are pledged to go to war to preserve the *status quo*.

Lord Lytton said that every one of these assumptions was demonstrably incorrect. He in particular attacked the statement that the League is compelled to go to war to maintain the *status quo* (which has really become the cornerstone of the case preferred against the League by its enemies). He pointed out, as has been pointed out many times since, that there are only two obligations under the Covenant: 1. To prevent the *status quo* being altered by force; 2. To act collectively to stop a war, by collective force if necessary, if one should break out.⁶

There are quite ample provisions in the Covenant by which a nation deeming itself aggrieved can oblige the members of the League to take note of its grievance and provide an international hearing at which it can state its case. Moreover if, by these proceedings, it does not get redress, it can, after observing these preliminaries, proceed to apply force legally under the Covenant. The Covenant does not prohibit the application of force; it does not prevent the resort to war. But it does seek to forbid aggression, where a country is judge in its own case, and undertakes to give effect to its own purposes by its own power, in indifference to and, if

⁶ It has proved impossible to place or verify this speech, of which a summary is given above, even by reference to the author, who most courteously made search on enquiry. It may have been a speech delivered at Southport to the National Union of Teachers on April 15, 1936, of which a most inadequate report appears in *The Times*, April 16, p. 9.

necessary, in defiance of, the judgment of other nations.

A League devoted to the defence of this central principle of the Covenant would, of course, have completely blocked the plans of the friends of Hitler in London. Therefore the League must be deprived of its power and turned into a "sham and pretence". Efforts to this end, begun two years ago and pursued with resourceful vigour, have now been crowned with success: the League is powerless and discredited, and it is permitted to live only on the condition that it remains so.

The steps to this end were easy to take, given the will to take them. The strength of the League was the strength of its members; withdraw the strength of the leading member and the already weakened structure was bound to collapse.

There was such a withdrawal when in 1936 the British Government gave to the world a declaration of its "definite obligations", for which it would resort to arms, and refused to put its obligations to the League, as a guarantor of and participant in collective security, in the list.⁷ The destructive effect of this omission upon the prestige of the League and upon the sense of security felt by those nations which knew that the League was their only possible safeguard against assault has never been fully realized.

It meant, of course, the calculated and deliberate repudiation of British policy as set forth in a formal statement made just one year before in a communication from the Government of Great Britain to the Government of Italy in these terms:

⁷ Eden, Anthony, Rt. Hon., *Foreign Affairs*, Faber and Faber, London, 1939, "The Purpose of British Rearmament" (The Leamington Speech), November 20, 1936, pp. 166-7.

"His Majesty's Government, in subscribing to the Covenant, did not, indeed, abandon or renounce their own free and sovereign judgment, but undertook to exercise it henceforth in accordance with the obligations of that instrument. No other attitude is open to them, and they would naturally desire to see the Italian Government place a similar construction on their own adhesion to the Covenant."⁸

Instead of this attitude—which in 1935 was the only one open to it, according to its own statement—of moral obligation, which is absolutely necessary to the League on the part of all its members if it is to function, it took the position that outside of its "definite obligations" it would not concern itself in any League interest whatever unless it became also "a vital interest" to Great Britain on grounds not of League but of Imperial policy.

This is the correct appraisal of this declaration by the British Government; since it was made Great Britain, as an element of strength to the League with respect to the purpose for which the League was called into being to serve, has been completely washed out; it has been as negligible as Liberia or San Salvador.

The disintegrating, shattering effects of this withdrawal were at once evident in the scurrying for shelter of the small European nations who realized that membership in the League had become instead of a possible protection an added danger; and they sought an escape in various directions: by declarations of neutrality, as

⁸ Reply of British Government, November 22, 1935, to the protest of the Italian Government, November 11, 1935; Heald, Stephen, *Documents of International Affairs, 1935*, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, London, 1937, pp. 221-2.

in the case of Switzerland and Belgium; by following the example of Great Britain and disowning any moral obligation to go to the defence of an attacked League member, which was the course taken by the Scandinavian countries, up to that time the staunchest of League nations; by trying to shift from an exposed position as a League adherent into the orbit of a Fascist power, which has been the obvious desire of the Danubian and Balkan powers.

The barrage upon the League continued, in the fear, no doubt, that stricken as it was, it might yet become, in an emergency, the centre of resistance to aggression. Some remarkable lines of attack developed.

The most transparently fraudulent of these was the charge that since the League was not universal, an effort by it to function would reveal the world as divided into two camps which, it was argued, would be most unfortunate for good feeling and peace.

The two camps or alliances were assumed to be mutually exclusive as is, of course, the case with actual military alliances. The distinction was ignored that in this case one group was allied for the purpose of plunder and aggression, while the other had for its objective the prevention of aggression and the adoption of an international system for the peaceful adjustment of all disputes. The League could be universal because it was open on these terms to all; the Fascist alliance was necessarily limited to those nations that planned the use of force to attain their own ends at the expense of their neighbours.

Yet the charge was persistently and brazenly made that it was inimical to peace for a nation to belong to

the League dedicated to the ultimate ends of peace as to be a member of a group organized for war and actually active in its pursuit: (Japan in China, Italy and Germany in Spain).

Some of those who were active in inventing and advocating this view finally got to the point of believing that to belong to the League was to be a member of an anti-German alliance. There was a very naive avowal of this in a letter by Lord Astor in *The Times* last October, in which this choice statement made its appearance:

"Some of the countries in Central Europe have recently shown a disposition to follow the example of Belgium, Switzerland, and Scandinavia and to consider their prospects of preserving territorial integrity and political independence as greater if they are neutral than if they form part of an anti-German military bloc even if this be labelled collective security."⁹

The nations which are thus the concern of his lordship are members of the League. They are certainly not planning any attack upon Germany; but there is still a possibility that if one of them were wantonly attacked by Germany, the others might come to its defence. They thus appear to his lordship as "part of an anti-German bloc. . .!"

Could there be a more complete revelation of the mental attitude of the British friends of Hitler? To resist, or even to be in a position to resist, the wishes of

⁹ *The Times*, October 27, 1937, p. 10. Lord Astor to *The Times*, October 23, "German Equality".

Der Fuehrer is an offence against the peace of the world!

The mentality is identical with that of the Japanese war-lords who have now made it known that any individual, combination or country that resists their benevolent activities in China, is an enemy of civilization.

Lord Astor, according to Mr. Hutton, as noted earlier in this article, is one of the "authoritarian group" who decide what the foreign policy of Great Britain is. It naturally follows that they will see to it that Great Britain will give no support to the League now that it has descended to the level of "an anti-German bloc", which, even in its decrepit state, might still offer resistance to the destruction of Czechoslovakia and the over-running of the Danubian and Balkan countries.

The plans formulated two years ago by what has come to be known (and which will have its own black page in history) as the "Cliveden Set" have thus been carried to a triumphant conclusion. They are now the proclaimed policies of Great Britain; and so far as the Government of that country is concerned, the way is now clear for the Nazi legions to move for the building up of that huge Fascist fortress in Middle Europe so ardently desired by Mr. Garvin, speaking for the "Cliveden Set".

If there is hesitation in launching the legions and the air navies, it may be due to an apprehension that other powers might be less complaisant; and that once the guns began going off, it might be found that there was a wide divergence between the wishes of the "Cliveden

Set" and the British Government on the one hand, and the determination of the British people on the other.

Perhaps the peace of Europe and of the whole world hangs on this precarious thread.

[Germany, inspired by the successful seizure of Austria on March 11, 1938, threatens Czechoslovakia. The lack of opposition is due to the destruction of the League as an effective instrument for the maintenance of the peace.]

THE RESULTS OF BETRAYAL

(September 9, 1938)

.... THINGS having reached this desperate pass, what is to be said about the justification for the policy of surrender and retreat, which has been pleaded for three years, that this was the road to appeasement, to an adjustment of Europe's difficulties, to a continuing peace? What of the alternative policy, rejected, scorned, despised by the powers of this world, which said that the only possible escape from ultimate war was a union of all the countries which desired the continuance of peace in mutual defence against aggression? Which policy gave the greatest guarantee against the employment of force? Who were the war-mongers, the upholders of the principle of collective defence or the believers in unilateral understandings between the democratic countries and the dictators? The answers

to these questions are becoming clear. The nations which desired peace threw away their best and surest shield for alternatives whose inadequacy has now been revealed; and the one remote and desperate chance for effective defence now depends upon an *ad hoc* reconstruction of an alliance for self-protection of enough non-aggressive nations to give pause to the dictators. The next few days may show whether or not these last-minute expedients are in time to ward off the threatened catastrophe.

[Prime Minister Chamberlain and Premier Daladier would be happier at the Munich Conference today if they had behind them a revived League, a defensive alliance of peace-loving powers.]

THE ONLY ROAD TO PEACE

(September 29, 1938)

ELSEWHERE on this page we display some remarks in the British House of Commons by Winston Churchill which, though delivered upon the occasion of the rape of Austria last March, are charged with timely suggestion and warning not only for the British Government but for all other governments which begin to recognize, however dimly, that peace is indivisible, at least in those parts of the world where the interests of nations are integrated and where it is not possible with-

in that area to localize war and permit it to be fought out.¹⁰

The words are notably significant and of enduring value whatever the outcome of the present crisis. If out of it there does not come a "settlement" that will be dishonourable and humiliating to the two countries that were forced to attempt an interposition, the escape will be due to a belated, halting and limited resort to a principle which, if applied by a League of Nations to which competent leadership had been given, would have insured a just and honourable settlement and the assurance of permanent peace to Europe by making it clear once and for all to the totalitarian powers that aggression would be resisted with overwhelming force.

Nothing approaching this can be hoped for from the meeting at Munich; but it may be that it will put limits to Hitler's plans of aggression which he will accept in preference to instant war, but which he will regard as merely obliging him to await, with impatience, for another opening which he will forthwith proceed to create by the underworld sinister agencies which are at his disposal.

If there is this breathing space, Mr. Churchill's words are a warning to act without delay to rebuild the League and to vest it with the potencies which were its original endowment. The peoples of the civilized nations, long sunk in the stupor of complacency and indifference, have awakened to find themselves on the brink with the baleful fires of war blazing below them. They are, it is to be hoped, intelligent enough to know

¹⁰ Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., *While England Slept*, G. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1938, p. 387.

why they are in this situation—that it is because the security obtained for them by their sacrifices in the War and upon which they have been relying has been ignobly frittered away by their governments.

The imminence of war, which now fills them with consternation, and the horrors of war should these descend upon them, are the results of the impotence of the League; which is in turn the consequence of a continuous policy of retreat by the governments of the League nations, with the Governments of Great Britain and France leading the retreat. It is an ironic but fitting circumstance that it is these Governments which have been forced by the dangers of a deteriorating international situation to make an attempt themselves to save the world from war when they might have had behind them the moral and material power of forty or more nations, putting the issue beyond question. Surely, if they now escape the disaster which they have invited, the democratic nations will hasten, in Mr. Churchill's words, "to proclaim a renewed, revived, unflinching adherence to the Covenant of the League". Among the nations who might very properly hasten to join in giving a lead of this nature is Canada, whose League record to date ought to be—and is, we hope, rapidly becoming — a matter of humiliation to Canadians.

Prime Minister Chamberlain, in his speech in the British Parliament yesterday,¹¹ made a passing reference to the League of Nations by saying that it was unfortunate that more use had not been made of Article XIX of the Covenant which provides for the recon-

¹¹ 339 H.C. Debates, 5s., September 25, 1938, p. 6.

sideration by the League of "treaties which have become inapplicable". Certainly, if the British Government, down the years since the League took form, had actively advocated making the rule which was indicated in Article XIX an active principle in League affairs, it would not have lacked ardent supporters; but until Sir Samuel Hoare touched on the matter in his Geneva speech¹² this article was to Great Britain as to other countries a counsel of perfection. But it was not the failure to make use of Article XIX that brought about the present situation; it was the repudiation of the obligations of Article XVI (for the imposition of sanctions upon an aggressor) that gave an open door for the adventures in aggression of the totalitarian states. Mr. Chamberlain could not be expected to say this, for reasons very personal to himself; but if he knows it to be true, as may well be the case, there may yet be time for him to assist in rebuilding the League in keeping with the Churchill proposals.

Mr. Churchill, it is to be noted, asserted all the things which the Government and its outside circle of advisers denied, to be true; and denied practically all the claims put forward by the Government in defence of its non-League policies. The developments of the past six months afford the tests as to whether he or the Government was right. He declared that the policy of no League obligations and "go it alone" made not for peace, as loudly claimed by the Government, but

¹² *International Conciliation*, 1935, p. 515. "Yet the world is not static and changes will in time have to be made. The Covenant itself admits this possibility." It was, of course, in this speech that Sir Samuel said: "the League stands—and my country stands with it—for the collective maintenance of the Covenant in its entirety and particularly for steady, collective resistance to all acts of unprovoked aggression." September 11, 1935.

for war; that conversely, only by a rapid return to collective security could this "approaching war" be arrested; that to give effect to "collective security" there ought to be "a grand alliance" for defensive purposes; that if the League faded out there would be a landslide of small nations to the orbit of the Fascist powers; that if Great Britain persisted in her course she would ultimately be left to face her fate alone.

Every one of these statements was a frontal assault upon the case in defence of the Government put forward by its apologists in and out of the Government and most vigorously by what is accurately described as the "Cliveden Set". Their cardinal argument was that while it was quite right for the Fascist powers to arm to the teeth, the League of Nations must not dream of opposing to them the "collective security" of the League; this would be to divide Europe into "ideological blocs" and by giving offence to the dictators endanger peace. This incredible nonsense is even to be found in the report of the last Imperial Conference,¹³ placed there at the instance of those in England who thought that a declaration of this kind would buttress their dissolving citadel. Would not the statesmen of Great Britain and France, as they face the dictators across the council table at Munich, be in a very different position if there was behind them an "ideological bloc" of European nations pledged to offer collective defence to any victim of Fascist aggression?

¹³ May, 1937. *Imperial Conference; Summary of Proceedings*, King's Printer, Ottawa, 1937, pp. 12-15.

[This is "peace with honour".]

WHAT'S THE CHEERING FOR?

(September 30, 1938)

WHILE the cheers are proceeding over the success which is attending the project of dismembering a state by processes of bloodless aggression, some facts might be set out for the information of people who would like to know what the cheering is about and who ought to be taking part in it.

First we draw attention to this passage in a letter from the Berlin correspondent of *The Economist*, appearing in its issue of September 17:

"When Prague made concessions which would have more than satisfied the Sudeten Germans, *had they desired to remain within the Republic*, the pretence that they only wanted autonomy within the Czechoslovak State had to be abandoned. In fact, it was abandoned in Germany before Herr Hitler made his final Nuremberg speech—first when the press was ordered to print dispatches, all dated from Nuremberg, declaring for partition (an English newspaper article provided incentive and text); and, secondly, when Herr Hitler made a general statement in favour of the right of 'self-determination'. He was most emphatic addressing the army on September 12, in his announcement that 'no negotiation, no conference, no agreement (Abmachung) gave us the natural right to unite Germans.' He was expressly referring to Austria; and he added that the right was vindicated 'thanks to the soldiers'.

"Significantly, the only 'agreement' in question at the time of the Anschluss was the agreement concluded between the Fuehrer and Herr von Schuschnigg to respect Austria's independence. What, we may ask, would be the use of a similar agreement about Czechoslovakia—were there any chance of such an agreement—if, 'thanks to the soldiers', the agreement would merely lead to further disagreements and the vindication, as in Austria's case, of the natural right to unite Germans?

"It is to be feared that, in these matters, the blunt-minded English people do not understand the Nazi psychosis, sometimes misnamed an ideology. The substance of this is that there are no limits to what may rightly be done in the name of unity, Aryanism, might, and other national values, real or ornamental. It is from this that the impressive single-mindedness of National Socialism derives—the great thaumaturgy of doing-as-one-likes in pursuit of aims which, neither moral nor immoral, are always National Socialist. From this single-mindedness also arise the apparent contradictions and anomalies of National-Socialist actions—the execution today of political enemies for shots fired in street riots six years ago, while shots fired on the other side are applauded; the impending trial of Austrian Separatists; and so on."¹⁴

In this brief compass there is given the formula for Nazi aggression, which excludes as worthless agreements, engagements, pledges, guarantees, when they get in the way of desire for aggression and the power to effect it. Austria yesterday; Czechoslovakia today; what of tomorrow and the day after?

¹⁴ *The Economist*, September 17, 1939, "Germany, War or Peace?", Berlin, September 14, 1939, p. 540.

To apply the formula to the events of only the last two years is to see how effectively it works in the absence of countervailing force. These need not be given in detail since this would be to repeat what has already appeared on this page; but they can be so grouped and summarized as to throw a penetrating light upon the manoeuvres of today and the consequences tomorrow.

Nazi Germany guaranteed the independence of Austria July 11, 1936,¹⁵ and destroyed it on March 11, 1938. The steps can be clearly identified: internal disturbances organized and directed from outside; the habitual misrepresentation in Germany of efforts by the Austrian authorities to maintain law and order as diabolical persecution of a minority; intervention by ultimatum to force the admission into the Austrian Government of Nazi agents; further intervention by a second ultimatum demanding the transfer of power to Hitler's representatives; then the rape of Austria covered with a thin veil of legality by the pretence that the new Government, established by these means, requested the assistance of German troops. The brazenness of these successive steps towards the destruction of a friendly and kindred power are undisguised.

With Czechoslovakia more devious methods were necessary. First it was necessary to make protestations that Nazi Germany had no designs upon the territorial integrity of Czechoslovakia. Hence Herr Hitler's announcement in the Reichstag in March, 1936, that:

¹⁵ Toynbee, A. J., *Survey of International Affairs, 1936*, p. 450.

"We have no territorial demands to make in Europe" (just as he now says that his demands upon Czechoslovakia are the last that he will make of Europe). Further, in this speech he went on to say that he favoured, not force, but "a slow evolutionary development of peaceful co-operation" for the adjustment of "wrong relationships between the populations living in areas" [of tension caused by "wrong territorial provisions"]¹⁶

Though there has been friction between the Czechoslovakian Government and the Sudeten Germans (or rather a section of them) since the peace treaty, the Nazi Government did not come into the open as instigators of extreme courses by the minority until after Austria had been safely bagged.

On February 20 Herr Hitler, in his address to the Reichstag preparatory to the raid on Austria, declared that Germany charged herself with "the protection of those fellow-Germans who live beyond our frontiers and are unable to ensure for themselves the right to a general freedom, personal, political and ideological."¹⁷ The Czechoslovakian premier naturally interpreted this as implying a possible "attempt to intervene in our internal affairs, an attempt incompatible with the principle of the recognition of the sovereignty of other states," and declared the purpose of his country to defend "the attributes of its independence".¹⁸

This was on March 4, 1938. Just one week later, on

¹⁶ Heald, Stephen, *Documents of International Affairs, 1936*. Hitler's speech to the Reichstag and declaration of German Government, March 7, 1936, pp. 35-41.

¹⁷ Curtis, Monica, *Documents of International Affairs, 1938*, Vol. 2, Oxford University Press, London, 1943, p. 13.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* Extracts from speech of Dr. Hodza, p. 116.

the day that the Nazi forces marched into Austria, Field-Marshal Goering gave "a general assurance to the Czech Minister in Berlin—an assurance which he expressly renewed later on behalf of Herr Hitler—that it would be the earnest endeavour of the German Government to improve German-Czech relations." This quotation is from a statement to the House of Lords on March 14 by Lord Halifax.¹⁹ Two days later Lord Halifax again noted these assurances in a statement to the House of Lords, and added:

"By these assurances, solemnly given and more than once repeated, we naturally expect the German Government to abide. And if, indeed, they desire to see European peace maintained, as I earnestly hope they do, there is no quarter of Europe in which it is more vital that undertakings should be scrupulously respected."²⁰

The recital, for the purposes of enlightenment, need hardly go further; the general course of events since March being within the knowledge of the public. Herr Hitler made no attempt whatever to "improve German-Czech relations"; on the contrary, once Austria was safely in his power, he tuned up the agitation of the Sudeten Germans to a degree which gave him the opening for the application of the formula of Nazi aggression on racial grounds, as described by the writer in *The Economist*. This writer, in the same article, states as something about which there is no doubt whatever, that the Nazi Government from the first had no other

¹⁹ Halifax, Lord, *Speeches on Foreign Policy*, Oxford University Press, London, 1940, p. 124.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 128.

intention than the wresting, by force or duress in other forms, of portions of Czechoslovakia.

The doctrine that Germany can intervene for racial reasons for the "protection" of Germans on such grounds as she thinks proper in any country in the world which she is in a position to coerce, and without regard to any engagements she has made or guarantees she has given, has now not only been asserted but made good; and it has been approved, sanctioned, certified and validated by the Governments of Great Britain and France, who have undertaken in this respect to speak for the democracies of the world.

This is the situation; and those who think it is all right will cheer for it.

[As Europe approaches war, "appeasement" must be discarded as a policy that has failed. With the League was thrown away the chance to make a stand which might have preserved peace.]

THE ORIGIN, GROWTH AND DECAY OF "APPEASEMENT"

(April 8, 1939)

IN the illumination of the tragic events that are now succeeding one another in Europe with ever-increasing tempo, it might be profitable to look back over the developments of the recent past for enlightenment and guidance in the difficult and dangerous days of the future—for we are far from the end of surprises. As

a starting-point for a survey of these developments the midsummer of 1936—less than three years ago—can rightly be taken. During this period there have been wide deviations in policy and tactics by the nations that, in this crisis of humanity, are making history, with accompanying clashes of popular opinion revealing profound and passionate differences. The worth of policies adopted and pursued; the merits of the controversies to which they have given rise; the predicted results and the actualities of today—all these matters, about which there have been such bitter and prolonged battles of opinion, can now be judged in the light of accomplishment, with a resulting growth in public knowledge and understanding.

The summer of 1936 is chosen because it is now quite clear that it was at that time that the Government of Great Britain began, tentatively, its experiment with policies of "appeasement". This followed upon the military occupation of the Rhineland by Hitler's forces in March, 1936, and the withdrawal of sanctions against Italy in June, 1936. The first of these blows at the existing order destroyed the Locarno Pact and made one more breach in the Treaty of Versailles; the second marked the abandonment by the League nations of the principle of "collective security" to be enforced by common defensive action.

The military re-occupation of the Rhineland by Nazi troops had been marked by professions by Hitler of a desire to make this rejection of Versailles and Locarno a step towards peace, with a readiness to substitute for these rejected documents new engagements including treaties and guarantees which would insure the peace

of Europe. A "lasting desire for the true pacification of Europe" was proclaimed; there was a declaration to the Reichstag that "we have no territorial demands to make in Europe"; even a return to the League was fore-shadowed.²¹ The British Government accepted the situation and hastened to embrace the opportunity thus offered. The Foreign Minister (Mr. Eden) admitted that one of the main foundations for peace had been destroyed: "If peace is to be secured," he added, "there is a manifest duty to rebuild."²²

To forward this good work the British Government addressed a questionnaire to Berlin,²³ giving the Nazi Government an opportunity to elaborate its peace plans. This document contained this passage:

"The question is really whether Germany now considers the point has been reached at which she can signify that she recognizes and intends to respect the existing territorial and political status in Europe except in so far as this might subsequently be modified by free negotiation and agreement."

Though the British Government never got a reply to the questionnaire—a cynical commentator has said that the reason for this was that all the answers could be found in *Mein Kampf*—it proceeded, following this rejection of the Peace Treaty and the collapse of the League which followed hard after, to develop a policy of securing "peace" by negotiations and contacts be-

²¹ Heald, Stephen, *op. cit.*, 1936, Hitler's speech to Reichstag and declaration of the German Government, March 7, 1936, pp. 35-45.

²² Heald, Stephen, *op. cit.*, 1936, Statement in House of Commons, March 9, 1936, p. 56.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 214, May 6, 1936.

tween governments apart altogether from the League system.

In the midsummer of 1936 The London *Times* vigorously advocated such a policy and foreshadowed its adoption by the Government. "A clear understanding with Germany," said *The Times* on July 6, "would not solve all the problems of the world; but it would be a strong foundation on which to build, and British opinion means to try it out."²⁴ The significance of the attitude taken by *The Times* was not realized at the time. The movement thus begun, for furthering "appeasement" by conceding Germany's dominant position in Central Europe, which at once made itself known to the public by methods of propaganda, was not at that time nor for long after regarded as embodying government policy; but it is now evident that *The Times* from the very outset of this movement and down to the present, has been the mouthpiece of a group in the Government powerful enough to determine policy, and also to command outside the Government the devoted backing of great figures in the world of politics, society, rank, banking, business. From its beginning this propagandist drive was concentrated on a disparagement of Czechoslovakia which was recognized as a hurdle which had to be surmounted. It opened up vigorously in this wise:

. . . "But what then of the political lunacy (in England) which proposes that Britain and the Empire should prevent . . . by force of arms the closer union of a mighty race in Central Europe . . . ?

²⁴ *The Times*, July 6, 1936, "The League and Germany", p. 15.

. . . the proposal that we should go to war in any circumstances whatever for Czechoslovakia against the Reich is a moonstruck notion . . . ”²⁵

This is not from *The Times* but from its cousin-germane, *The Observer*. By March 21, 1937, *The Observer* could hail the Greater Germany of its fancy as the protector of civilization against Soviet Russia:

“For the interests of Western civilization the counterpoise and bulwark at need will be required a few years hence not against Germany but against the Red Tsardom which stretches from the Baltic Sea to the Pacific Ocean. That counterpoise and bulwark can only be created by the reconstruction and federation of ‘Middle Europe’ under German headship. . . So far from opposing this or plunging into futile war against Germany, we should favour and promote it.”²⁶

In the interval between these two pronouncements by its junior organ, the British Government, by a carefully prepared declaration made by Mr. Eden, Foreign Secretary, at Leamington, November 20, 1936,²⁷ repudiated any obligation under the Covenant to aid in the defence of League members in the event of aggression. Great Britain, it was declared, recognized com-

²⁵ *The Observer*, November 21, 1937, p. 18. Editorial: “Key of Peace” by J. L. Garvin.

²⁶ *The Observer*, March 21, 1937, p. 16. Editorial: “The Key to the World” by J. L. Garvin. The dates at which these two quotations from *The Observer* appeared are at variance with the text of Mr. Dafoe’s editorial. No explanation can be offered other than that Mr. Dafoe was in error, as to the dates. The sense of the argument is not affected, but the quotation last above does not mark the beginning of *The Observer’s* support of the policy of “appeasement”.

²⁷ Eden, Rt. Hon. Anthony, *Foreign Affairs*, Faber and Faber, London, 1939, pp. 163-167.

mitments only with respect to her "vital interests". These were carefully listed; they included only the traditional Imperial interests of Great Britain. This elimination of support of "collective security" as a vital interest put British policy back definitely on the pre-War basis of "power politics" and gave an assurance to would-be aggressors in areas outside the limits of the enumerated "vital interests" that activities by them would be regarded by Great Britain, not in keeping with League principles, but along the lines of traditional policies excluding intervention on any higher principle than self-interest.

Here, then, were the origins of the policy of "appeasement" which, until its repudiation just the other day, determined the attitude of the Government of Great Britain towards all questions affecting its relations with the countries of Europe. As it was not a policy to be boldly and openly championed, a very considerable proportion, perhaps a majority, of the electors had no exact knowledge of its scope and character and still less of its implications. With the general assurance of the Government that it was pursuing policies of peace, the British public in the main was well content; and it accepted the policies and acts of the Government as means to that end.

The policy of "appeasement" in its details was not thought out from the beginning; it developed gradually around a central dominating idea. This was that there was no reason why there should be a conflict of interest or power between Great Britain and the Third Reich—on the contrary, a community of interests could and ought to be developed. A division of Europe in

which German interests were held to be predominant was conceded in fact, though of course not in precise terms; this included, roughly, Central and South-eastern Europe. The busy, imaginative Mr. J. L. Garvin in *The Observer* mapped out an area which Germany was to dominate containing a population of 140 millions, nearly half of whom were not Germans. Within this area Germany was to be free to expand subject to one condition: that it should remake the map by pressures falling short of war—that is, by the threat of force. The British promoters of the unproclaimed Anglo-German understanding were aware that its existence would be threatened if there should be actual fighting on a scale approaching war.

The obstacle to the success of the plan, of which its promoters were most conscious, was the possibility that the principle of “collective security” embedded in the Covenant might be invoked on behalf of a country threatened by this enlargement of German power by an aroused League of Nations. It thus became necessary to eliminate the League as a possible source of danger; and this was done quickly and effectively by the employment of a technique which had already been effectively used in damping down the indignation of the people of Great Britain over the abandonment of Ethiopia. In that case the claim had been made by the apologists for the policy of abandonment that the application of effective sanctions would have led to Italy declaring war on the member-nations of the League; for such a war, they insisted, the League and not Italy would have been culpable. League commitments, it was declared, must not involve any possibility

of war; therefore the League must never apply "collective security" to the point where it would evoke forcible resistance by any nation bent on aggression.

This formula, which reduced the League to a nullity, was enlarged and sharpened to be still more effective when the movement was launched to completely immobilize the League, thus preventing its employment as a resisting force to the extension of Nazi hegemony over the German "sphere of influence". This assault upon the League was wide in scope, ingenious in plan, vigorous and persistent in application; and it was so completely successful that though the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia last September took place while the League Assembly was in session, no notice of it was taken by that body. It would take a volume to tell adequately the story of this skilful anti-League campaign; here only some of the high points of the attack can be indicated.

The defects of the Versailles Treaty were set forth in extreme terms; the injustices to the Germans were multiplied and exaggerated; the necessity for immediate adjustment was urged; the impossibility of the League doing anything to remedy these conditions was insisted upon—this particular contention being the prize weapon in the armoury of assault. It rested upon the claim that the League, being an alliance of sovereign states, was inescapably impotent. Since the wrongs of the treaty thus cried to heaven for righting and the League was powerless, the alternative was obvious. Germany, herself, was to right her "wrongs" by the display of overwhelming force, compelling submission. Hence to the arming of Germany and her

allies there was no objection, this being necessary to the success of the "appeasement" policy. But the nations belonging to the League must not co-operate for purposes of common defence. This would be to "encircle" Germany; to make Geneva "an international war office"; to reveal Europe as divided into "ideological blocs" which would be fatal to peace. To be even a member of the League was, on the part of a Central European nation, a threat to Germany and peace. It would thus, in the opinion of Lord Astor as expressed in a letter to *The Times*, "form part of an anti-German military bloc, even if this be labelled collective security."²⁸

Every suggestion of collective security, of the advisability of nations coming together for mutual defence, was denounced as "war-mongering"; this, as threatening the success of the "appeasement" policy by making dangerous the unilateral tearing up of the peace treaties by Germany, was the unpardonable offence. Perhaps in this regard Winston Churchill was the most incorrigible offender, the most notorious of the "war-mongers". He not only wanted the Central European powers to unite as League powers; he demanded that Great Britain put herself at their head as the best guarantee of peace and, as well, of the continued existence of the British Empire. His warnings and his appeals delivered in Parliament session after session, year after year, have been collected in book form; they make timely, alarming—yes, appalling—reading in the setting of today's news. One such appeal of many may here be quoted; it was delivered (November 5,

²⁸ See note, p. 149.

1936) just as the great "appeasement" movement was getting under way; and perhaps nothing that has been said or written since is a more trenchant commentary upon the enterprise:

"Only by a firm adherence to righteous principles sustained by all the necessary 'instrumentalities', to use a famous American expression, can the dangers which close in so steadily upon us and upon the peace of Europe be warded off and overcome. That they can be overcome must be our hope and our faith.

"It will be said, of course, that these words lead in one direction. 'What you really mean,' it will be said, 'is the gathering together under the aegis of the League of Nations of what amounts to a grand defensive alliance against Germany.' Germany, we are assured, is a most peace-loving country. It is true they are scraping together a few weapons but that, we are told, is only because of the terror in which they dwell of a Russian Bolshevik invasion. Night and day the fear, we are told, of the aggression of Soviet Russia rests upon Germany. If that be their trouble it can easily be healed. Let them come into the system of collective security and if Russia is the aggressor and the invader, then all Europe will give to Germany guarantees that they will not go down unaided. They have only to ask for guarantees for the defence of the soil of Germany and they will find them forthcoming in the fullest measure from many nations, both powerful and small alike.

"What, then, is this talk about encirclement? It is all nonsense. There is nothing that we ask for ourselves under collective security that we will not willingly concede, nay, earnestly proffer, to Germany. Let her join the club, and make her great contribution and share its amenities and immunities. Let me

make it clear that those who are devoted and sincere supporters of the Covenant of the League of Nations do not confine their position to an armed and combined defence of the *status quo*. We contemplate machinery for the redress of legitimate grievances between nations, and we must contemplate that if a grievance is shown to be justified it shall be corrected even against the wishes of nations who would be unwilling to make the sacrifice.²⁹

In time the issues became clearly defined; and controversy centred on the innovation of policy thus revealed. The case of those who viewed the developments of British policy with consternation rested almost wholly upon the conception of collective security, involving acceptance of the basic commitment of the Covenant—that of going to the defence of a member nation if attacked before the dispute had been subjected to examination in keeping with the League procedure. The arguments in support of this doctrine need not be recapitulated; they are familiar to everybody.

To an equal degree dislike of "collective security" was the inspiration of all those who favoured the foreign policy of the British Government; and their influence has been revealed not only in the course taken with respect to Germany, but in the Italian and Spanish aspects of foreign policy as well. The case made for this policy has lacked the symmetry and cohesiveness of the argument for "collective security" for there were many currents in the great anti-League tide; but they had a common factor in an equal detestation of the revolutionary doctrine that nations, in the field of

²⁹ Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., *While England Slept*, G. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1931, pp. 311-17.

international relations, should suffer some derogation of sovereignty in the matter of making war an agency of national policy.

It is not often in history that a policy of major importance, deeply dividing the people, is put to the test with the promptitude and completeness that has marked the British Government's experiment in power politics in the supposed interest of "appeasement" following the repudiation of League commitments. It is less than three years since Great Britain made the decision to reject the League's "way of life" for the nations. As recently as March 26, 1936, the whole case for collective security was put with extraordinary clearness and compactness in the British House of Commons by Neville Chamberlain (then Chancellor of the Exchequer):

"You cannot divide peace in Europe. Under the League we are interested just as much in the preservation of peace in the East of Europe as we are in the West, and our obligations under the League will apply equally whether aggression takes place in the eastern or western parts of Europe."³⁰

The policy embodied in those simple, clear, ringing words was abandoned a few months later, Mr. Chamberlain himself giving the signal for retreat; and the British Government took, in preference, the road which has led through Austria, Munich, Czechoslovakia, Memel, to the crossroads at which all humanity finds itself today.

³⁰ 310 H. C. Debates, 5s. March 26, 1936, p. 1541.

IX

WAR

The imminent outbreak of war might have been averted by a return to the League and a firm stand against the threat of force, if Canada and, more remotely, the United States, had declared their readiness to support such a stand. When war came, it remained only to wage it to such ends as would rally the free nations of the world, and especially the United States, to the cause of the democratic powers. Civilization was at stake; this time there must be no possible doubt of the military victory of the Allies. Only an overwhelming victory would afford the foundation for a new international organization which would succeed where the League had failed.

[Appeasement is dead, the Czechoslovakian crisis in May has passed off, but the present peace is intolerable. The peace-loving nations must stand ready to use force against the disturbers of the peace, if war is to be averted and the world brought back to sanity.]

ALTERNATIVES CLEAR BEYOND DISPUTE

(July 1, 1939)

DISCUSSION of the international situation goes on endlessly; but in the main counsel is still darkened by the flood of words. The present crisis is the result of a refusal to face realities (in the guise of a claim that realities were being faced) and it is continuing towards further convulsions because there is still a reluctance on the part of statesmen and the general public to look at the whole situation steadily and unflinchingly. Because there has been in Europe a lull in the openly aggressive tactics of the dictatorships, there is a willing disposition to regard the situation as one in which equilibrium has been reached; the world is to go on from here, it is assumed, in a state of armed peace which will permit "business as usual". Fortunately, voices of authority and knowledge give warning of the dangers of the present situation and the urgent need for courses tending towards their removal, if catastrophes which now threaten are not to become inevitable.

At the meeting in Copenhagen of the International

Chamber of Commerce,¹ stress was laid upon an aspect of the situation that must never be lost sight of: The impossibility of any improvement in world economic conditions, but instead a progressive deterioration, while the present international tension continues. "This wanton preparation for war means world economic disaster," said Thomas J. Watson of New York, the retiring president. J. B. Condliffe of the London School of Economics, long on the economic staff of the League of Nations and the writer for some years of the League's invaluable *World Survey*, told the Conference that all "hope of world-wide economic co-operation may be abandoned as long as the present political tension is not relieved." It is to be noted that neither Mr. Watson nor Dr. Condliffe are saying that it is war that will bring these disasters—they point out that the present preparations for war, the result of existing tension, will in themselves be ruinous to the world. What war will do if it comes, they leave to the imagination.

The problem before those statesmen of the world who see the impending catastrophe and desire to avert it, is first to prevent the present situation from deteriorating into war; and then, to so relieve international tension as to permit the gradual return of a measure of co-operation, making for economic recovery. The means by which these essential ends are to be attained are being discussed in Great Britain with candour and directness. In a recent debate in the House of Lords there was both agreement and disagreement between

¹ Tenth Congress of International Chamber of Commerce, Copenhagen, June 26-July 1, 1939.

Lord Cecil, the staunchest of League advocates, and Lord Halifax, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Lord Halifax disagreed with Lord Cecil that "the authority and prestige of the League could be immediately re-established"; but he accepted the principle embodied in the Covenant.² Great Britain's policy, as announced by him, is one of creating an alliance to meet force with force, looking forward to the re-establishment of the League.

He accepted for Great Britain, presumably without mental reservation, the obligation which his predecessors, Simon, Hoare and Eden, refused to recognize—that of meeting aggression with force. The defence of peace by the threat of armed resistance to aggressors becomes for Great Britain a vital interest involving obligations that must be fulfilled. "If force is used to-day," he said, "those who use it must count upon force being met by force." That, he said further, was the principle on which the Covenant of the League was based. The work the British Government was now trying to do was, so far from being antagonistic, "the essential preliminary to the larger work to which Lord Cecil and I look forward,"—which is, of course, the re-establishment of the League.³

It is hardly necessary to stress the fact that in taking this position Lord Halifax, on behalf of the Government of Great Britain, concedes the issue about which League controversy has raged for eight years. This was the point upon which believers in the League were uncompromising. In their view, either the League

² Halifax, Lord, *Speeches on Foreign Policy, 1934-1939*, Oxford University Press, London, New York, Toronto, 1940, pp. 259-64.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 281.

gave its members security from aggression by the guarantee of all member nations, or there was a betrayal of the purposes for which the League was brought into being. Those who held to this view have been denounced as cranks, fanatics, impractical idealists, visionaries, dreamers, war-mongers and what-not. To-day their vindication is complete. It is now clear that the alternatives are what they have said they were. The nations can choose on the one hand the world as it is today, facing economic ruin, and as it will be tomorrow in the torments of war, or on the other, acceptance of the principle of collective defence with its obligation to face the risks and make the sacrifices which will make a system of collective defence one of ultimate collective security.

Mr. Churchill in his recent speeches sees in the "peace bloc" which has come into being since March, a "grand alliance" which, had it been in existence last year, would have saved Czechoslovakia and may now save Poland. "In a way," said Mr. Churchill, "a league of nations is being formed in the form of a grand alliance."⁴ Lord Halifax and Mr. Churchill thus are agreed that a defensive alliance may at this juncture keep the peace. A grand alliance, defensive in character, may, indeed, save the world from war in the immediate future; but if it does not go beyond creating a state of checkmate it will not stop the progressive economic deterioration which in itself involves disaster. A world divided into two grand alliances is

⁴ Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., *Blood, Sweat and Tears*, McClelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1941, p. 136, "The New Army", Speech at Cambridge, May 19, 1939.

a world engaged in a hidden war which, given time, will break out into the open. We have returned to power politics; the "peace" of the world system of power politics is merely the period of recuperation from one war and of preparation for the next. This is the kind of "peace" we now have. And if it gives way to war, the resulting struggle may have the appearance to peoples whose co-operation will be necessary to victory as merely a battle between conflicting imperialisms, to the issue of which they can afford to be indifferent. A war waged avowedly in defence of League principles would command from the outset a support both moral and physical which would be lacking, at least in the early stages, in a conflict between two "grand alliances". The "peace" we have today is ruinous; and such as it is it cannot be maintained for any length of time on the basis of an armed balance of power in Europe.

There is only one alternative that gives any promise of a continuing peace. This is not to be described as a return to the Covenant of the League, for it is now clear that the principles of the Covenant were never honoured by the governments of the world; but instead an honest, if belated, acceptance of those principles by all those nations which desire a world at peace. They outnumber the nations that seek a free field for plunder and conquest by a margin which will insure them protection if they will pool their power and take their fair share of risk. The nations that want security, prosperity and all the blessings of peace, have thus to face up to the issue which they have dodged for years

with results that ought to have given them an ample dose of enlightenment. The alternatives at last are so clear as to be beyond dispute.

[North American isolationism will be a potent factor in deciding whether or not war comes.]

ISOLATION AND WAR

(July 20, 1939)

THE common observance that the Great War was a turning-point in history may prove to be a premature generalization. The war, terrible as it was, may appear in the retrospect of history as merely the overture to a greater conflict, in which the course of humanity for a long period of time was decided. If the tension of to-day breaks down into a conflict of the range and violence which is clearly indicated, the results, whatever they may be, cannot but be calamitous. Even victory for the alliance against the Fascist triumvirate would leave a world more disordered than that of 1918, though probably wiser in its post-war policies; while a triumph for the dictators would carry with it consequences that can best be left to the imagination. In the fact that these are the hard alternative results of any resort to arms, the pacifist and the isolationist think they find justification for their attitudes. Honest, non-resistant pacifism is not a factor of influence in the discussions that must be made. But those who seek a refuge from the troubles and dangers of a demented

world think they find formulas of escape in a crude and unreflecting isolationism. Theirs is the philosophy, widely followed, that has brought the world to its present plight.

North America is a stronghold of isolationism. Many Americans, perhaps a majority, and Canadians in large numbers, take no note of what happens outside the North American continent. They can remain unaffected by war in Europe, Eastern Asia and elsewhere. They think they can choose the "vital issues" about which they should concern themselves, and thus make themselves immune from involvement when the "vital issues" of other nations are put to the test of battle. This is not surprising when it is recalled that the Government of Great Britain, noting the growing disorder of the world, decided to withdraw within its traditional commitments, leaving Europe, save where it was touched by these commitments, to be the sport of savage tyrannies whose conceptions of international morality appear to derive from Genghis Khan. Less than a year ago the Prime Minister of Great Britain could speak of the Czechs as "a far-away people of whom we know nothing". The sequence of events, since the time of that historic saying, has been swift and terrible; and today Great Britain is committed to the defence of peoples much farther away than the Czechs and much less worthy on their own merits of being defended.

Great Britain's tortuous and uncertain course is the subject of taunts and jeers aplenty, particularly this side of the Atlantic; but, though these are understandable, they make no contribution to the supreme question of the hour, which is: "How to keep the guns from

going off in Europe?" Granting everything that is said about the follies and mistakes of the past, it is not possible to doubt that British and French public opinion, which now appears to be in control, realizes that unless the dictators can be stopped by the strength of the line-up, actual and potential, against them, there is nothing for it but a war which, beginning in Central Europe, will envelop the world. The desire of the dictators to continue their aggressions and their purpose to do so, if opportunity is given them, is not in doubt; and the sole chance of peace is therefore that they may be deterred by consequences they can foresee. With the opposing alliance at its present strength, they may decide to take a chance, relying on the hope that with the necessary show of force they can score another Munich; or they may believe themselves powerful enough to crush all opposition.

It is therefore highly important that the powers who are in combination against Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy should wax in strength, actual and potential. Every addition to the line-up helps; this is why the clear intimation by Canada that she will consider a war to resist aggression as, in effect, a League issue calling for support, if necessary to the point of actual participation, would, not only by the contribution thus offered, but by the rallying power of her example, have a moral effect far beyond her actual strength. Our example might have a very considerable and perhaps decisive effect on our neighbour south of the line. Not that there is any possibility that the United States, in advance of hostilities, would formally join the anti-Nazi alliance; but it might result in some clearer in-

dication being given of what is undoubtedly the growing determination of the American people that they will not look on with indifference while the three Fascist aggressors tramp over the world. This probably would be all that would be necessary to make the present highly precarious peace secure for a long enough period of time to enable the defences of collective security to be rebuilt.

So far from being aloof from the world, the United States is perhaps at this moment the decisive factor in deciding the question of whether there will be war or peace. A United States determined to be completely isolationist—an attitude which would be interpreted by the Fascists as friendly to them—may well mean a world war, during the progress of which it would find, after irrevocable damage had been done, that it was no more isolationist in sentiment or in ultimate action than it was last time.

[War has come, a grim struggle for national existence and the preservation of civilization.⁵ There is a growing determination among the Allies and neutral nations that war shall be put an end to; this time it must be ensured that the will and the power to enforce peace are not lacking.]

THE ONLY POSSIBLE FUTURE

(November 9, 1939)

THE war aims of the Allies ought to include a defeat as complete as that which the German Kaiser experi-

⁵ *Winnipeg Free Press*, September 4, 1939—"Canada Is at War".

enced in 1918; and the creation of a world order in which the recurrence of this catastrophe will be impossible. Those words have a familiar sound; cynics will not fail to remind us that it was with these cries and this rainbow promise of an end of war that the Allies triumphed in 1918. And now it is 1939! If it had not been for these visions of a possible better world the sacrifices by nations and by individuals that brought victory twenty-one years ago might not have been possible. But the peace that followed victory proved only to be an armistice; and the new war, which threatens to engulf the new generation, is nothing but the old war revived.

The declaration to date of war aims is not unsatisfactory; but for the winning of the war and the securing of permanent peace it must go much further. It must be more specific in its terms, more precise in its engagements; and it must have a note of sincerity so clear and convincing as to overcome doubts and hesitations and induce a will to victory that will be irresistible.

The sceptics and the doubters will say that in view of all that happened between 1919 and 1939 this cannot be done; but this is to take a view of the situation that overlooks some factors of importance. The paradox of the post-War and pre-War years was the universal loathing of war by the peoples of the nations that fought and won the Great War and their refusal nevertheless to insist upon their governments making the League of Nations the bulwark against war that its founders intended it to be. They had an invincible faith that war on any large scale could not happen again; man could

not be such a dolt and idiot as to permit war to return after the experience of what modern war was which the world experienced from 1914 to 1918. Perhaps the most effective weapon used against the League was the charge by its pacifist enemies that because it embodied the idea of force, should this be necessary, it kept alive a sense in the public mind of the possibility of war, thus postponing the coming of the millennium of peace. "Geneva, an international war office" was a slogan used with effect by the foes of the League. Thus insensibly the idea of collective security and the ensuing peace and providing the means to give effect to it yielded ground, until it disappeared; and the peoples awoke to the fact, astounding to most of them, that power politics had returned to drench the world with blood.

A disposition to return to the thinking of the last years of the Great War; the will to resist aggression to the death; the determination to rebuild the destroyed walls of the League; the recognition of the follies, weaknesses and blindness which have loosed war once more upon the world—these feelings are far more general than the sceptics and doubters have knowledge of and they are growing hourly in volume and intensity, and not only in the Allied countries. The war aims of the Allies must not be merely an attempt to enlist these feelings in support of their cause; they must be their embodiment and expression, the means by which these moral forces will over-ride the powers of evil. If the war aims are less than this, the victory that is sought and will doubtless be attained may be as vain in its ultimate results as the triumph of 1918.

[The enemy must not be allowed to divide the Anglo-American powers and Russia. Whoever fights Hitler fights for civilization and the possibility of a peaceful world.]

"WHEN THE DEVIL WAS SICK . . . "

(February 12, 1943)

. . . THERE may be wide diversities of view about the Soviet Republic, its international policies of the past, and the possibilities of trouble with it in the future, but this does not furnish a feather-weight to balance the scale in which the grim determination of the Allied nations is weighed. It does not affect in the least their fixed conviction that German Naziism, Italian Fascism and the Shintoism of Japan, are the vilest faiths to which modern man has given his allegiance; that their leaders and the agents of these leaders are creatures whose presence on it pollutes the earth; and that the war against them must be waged until "unconditional surrender" delivers them up to the avenging sword.

What the outside world is thinking about Russia and its people at the moment is that they are making a major, and indeed indispensable, contribution to the war upon the Nazis and their European allies; and that because of this they are entitled to and are receiving our deepest gratitude and our help in every way in which it can be rendered—by guns and tanks and aeroplanes and munitions of war; by food, medical supplies, clothing and everything of which there is need for the maintaining of life; and by blows of ever-increasing fury against the enemy, wherever they can

be delivered. All of which is well in hand. As for the future, it is reasonable to suppose that the world, saved by their sacrifices and their valour, will afford a peaceful home for all the nations that served to this great end. If, after this great experience, these nations cannot form a brotherhood in which they can lead their own lives in their own way, it will be time for a crazier and still more savage Hitler of the future to ring down the curtain on civilized man. This possibility is too remote to justify any turning aside to give it consideration from the business in hand, which is to make an end, by the pooling of all the power of the United Nations, of Hitler and Hitlerism at the earliest possible moment—a moment which may come in 1943 if sought with sufficient diligence and determination.

[The mistake of 1918⁶ must not be repeated. The Axis powers must be totally defeated if the peace of the world is to be secured. Of this Mr. Churchill and President Roosevelt, in the Conference at Casablanca, February, 1943, are well aware.]

“UNCONDITIONAL SURRENDER”

(February 13, 1943)

MR. CHURCHILL, in his speech in the British Parliament, supplied the gloss upon the Casablanca declaration of a policy of “unconditional surrender” which it

⁶ See Introduction, pp. xvii-xviii. Address to the Canadian Club of Winnipeg, April 8, 1919, pp. 98-9, *Addresses of the Year*.

was suggested in these columns would be forthcoming. He said:

"Our inflexible insistence upon an unconditional surrender does not mean we shall stain our victorious arms by any wrong and cruel treatment of whole populations. But justice must be done upon the wicked and the guilty, and within her appropriate bounds justice must be stern and implacable."⁷

The protests already being made by soft-hearted "liberals" in the United States, that the employment of this term, revealing a spirit of wild vengeance, will put the whole German people behind the Nazi tyranny, are thus shown to be without value. If among the German people there is a large element which desires a future from which the influences of the Nazi madmen and the no less guilty army chiefs are to be eliminated, making possible a truly democratic regime, the joint declaration by Roosevelt and Churchill should be welcomed as giving grounds for hope that such a future can be reached.

Overtures for a negotiated peace, either by the present regime or by an alternative government, following the liquidation of the Nazis by the army, would be traps for the victorious Allies, the purpose being to leave an unregenerate Germany in a strategic position in the centre of Europe, from which a third assault could be launched against the world in due time. There will, of course, be most pitiful appeals that a kinder view be taken of the professed German passion for peace, and there will be fervent assurances that, given

⁷ 386 H. C. Debates, 5s., February 11, 1943, p. 1473.

one more chance, Germany will become a shining light in the democratic and liberal world. To all of which a deaf ear must be turned. The warning example of what followed Wilson's acceptance of similar assurances in the last War must never be absent from the minds of the Allied statesmen. Casablanca is an assurance that the fatal mistakes of the last War will not be repeated.

Those mistakes, seen in retrospect and in the powerful illumination of the present conflagration, are not the "mistakes" about which the critics of the Versailles peace raved during the twenty years' armistice. To talk of the peace of Versailles as "punic" in the light of the demonstration by the Germans of their idea of a victorious peace, would now be absurd. Yet German apologists could make a defence of sorts for their assaults upon that peace by still claiming that it was not a peace which represented an Allied victory, but was one made, not to save one of the parties to the war from defeat, but to bring an indecisive conflict to a close, thus saving the world from utter ruin. The initial blunder last time, which perhaps made all the subsequent mistakes inevitable, was the granting of the armistice upon terms which made it possible for the German army leaders, the public men of Germany, including the leading figures of the Weimar Republic, and an array of lesser apologists, to claim, with a plausible but entirely misleading parade of documentary support, that Germany had no greater responsibility for the war than the Allied nations; that the German army had not suffered defeat in the field; that what was intended to be a peace between equals be-

came an "imposed peace" because Germany had been tricked into laying down her arms.

This initial and fatal mistake was made by President Wilson, who was, of course, inspired by the highest motives. The record of events from September 26, 1918, when Hindenburg and Ludendorff advised the Kaiser that the war was lost and an armistice must be sought, until November 11, 1918, when the armistice was signed, which can be compiled from the wealth of available documents, official and personal, tells the story of a well-meaning, opinionated and not very well-informed man insisting upon a particular course being taken, against public opinion in his own country; without any real consultation with the governments and military authorities of the European countries that had for four years taken the brunt of the German attack; and in repudiation of the strongly expressed judgment of General Pershing, who commanded the American armies in the field. Colonel House, his confidential adviser, informed President Wilson, while the negotiations between Washington and Berlin carried on via Geneva, were in their early stages, that there was throughout the United States a nearly unanimous sentiment against anything but unconditional surrender. Perhaps the result of the elections, three weeks later, which produced a Congress that would not co-operate with the President, was the outcome of this sentiment. On October 30, General Pershing condemned the proposition that an armistice should be granted; the correct line, he insisted, was to continue the war until the German army was destroyed. However, President Wilson, convinced by a course of carefully arranged

events, designed to deceive him, that Germany was hereafter to be a peaceable democratic country, insisted upon the armistice. The consequences are with us today.⁸

Recollections of these matters are, of course, blurred in the public mind, but they are doubtless vivid in the memories of Roosevelt and Churchill, who were close to the events of 1918 and 1919, and more than any other two men in the world can justly estimate how disastrous were the legacies they left to later times; and their advisers had also a background which included the first World War and the inter-War years. It was therefore natural and inevitable that in looking forward to victory and post-War adjustments they should proclaim to the world, and in particular to the German people and their present leaders, that the only tolerable foundation for peace is a defeat of the Axis powers so complete and final that there will be no room for the dodges, shifts, evasions and falsehoods in which the defeated took refuge after the first World War.

[The Teheran Conference, November 28-December 1, 1943, confirms Casablanca.]

WORDS OF DOOM!

(December 8, 1943)

. . . . THE defeat of Germany this time is to be complete and overwhelming, leaving no ground for the re-

⁸ Baker, Ray Stannard, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters*, Vol. VIII, "Armistice". Doubleday, Doran & Co. Inc., New York, 1939, Chap. IV.

newed growth of the myths that gave rise to Naziism. There will be no Nazi, no race-crazy Teuton anywhere in the wide world, who will not know that the armed might of Germany was annihilated in battle by its adversaries, that the collapse of the home front had nothing to do with this defeat, and that any revival of the myth of the master-race will be quenched in blood and fire. There will thus be a foundation upon which the structure of permanent world peace, envisaged in the Teheran declaration,⁹ can rest. The League of Nations, with the Germans believing that they had been tricked, not beaten into defeat, and cherishing unimpaired their dreams of enslaving mankind, was built upon quicksands.

⁹ Declaration issued after the Conference of President Roosevelt, Marshal Stalin and Prime Minister Churchill, November 28-December 1, 1943.



X

THE OUTLINES OF THE PEACE

Now that war, so deeply dreaded, had come after the League had been destroyed and Germany had defied the Anglo-French ultimatum of September 1, 1939, what hope was there that this would not prove only a renewal of the world conflict begun in 1914, which would complete the destruction of civilization? Hope cannot perish while men are still ready to fight for liberty. Experience does teach, nations may learn. There is the hope that this time victory may not be muddled, that the growing coalition against the Axis powers may, as it fights the war, organize itself to establish and maintain the peace. In the union of peace-loving nations the United States and Russia will this time be included.

These are the fundamentals — total victory, union among the victors, the will and the power to peace. What agencies should be devised is not so important. The League, after all, was but machinery.¹ But too much must not be attempted. Federal Union would defeat its own end by asking more than the nations will yield, nor must victory and peace be made conditional upon the prevalence of some particular philosophy of Left or Right. The principles of the Covenant were sound. What is needed in a revived League is executive authority and a striking force to maintain the

¹ *Interdependence: A Quarterly Review of the League of Nations and International Affairs*, March 4, 1934, p. 69.

peace.² After the grim experience of this war the nations should be ready to back a League which has the authority to keep the peace.

² *Of Things to Come*, Spring, 1943, Radio Round Table, Winnipeg, February 28, 1943, p. 12.

[War aims must include a return to the attempt of 1919 to prevent the recurrence of war by recognition of the indivisibility of peace and of the need of collective action against an aggressor.]

LOOKING BEYOND THE WAR

(February 27, 1940)

THE realities of the war are beyond question. It has still to be fought and won. Between today and that achievement lie the fearful certainties and the dread uncertainties of war. But perhaps there is more speculation today about the peace that will follow the war than about the course of the war itself; and these speculations, whether they are made within the nations at war, or by the statesmen and writers of neutral countries, all rest upon the assumption of an Allied victory. Of course, with the defeat of the Allied nations there will be no peace, but a continuation of aggressive war until world domination is a reality instead of a hope. The confidence of the Allied nations is based upon those national qualities which have proven equal to the trials of the past; the confidence of the lookers-on is based upon various considerations, including wishful thinking, since an Allied defeat might draw them into the vortex. It has even been explained that the neutral nations will be best fitted to make a just peace because their minds will be beautifully detached, whereas the actual victors, with their lists of dead, their damaged trade, their bombed cities, their bank-

rupt treasuries, might have their judgment affected by these experiences. No more discreet division of labour could be envisaged.

By an effort of imagination let us leap beyond these years of tribulation to the making of peace, the war having been won. What kind of a peace is to be made? Mr. Chamberlain, Lord Halifax, Mr. Daladier and other Allied statesmen have given us a general idea of what is in their minds. On some points they are specific. Czechoslovakia and Poland are to be restored as independent states. Nothing less than this could be expected from an Allied victory; Czechoslovakia, which was offered up as a peace token to Hitler; and Poland, which bore the first fury of the war for the world's freedom. But after they are reconstituted, how are they to be protected? Guarantees and assurances to this end are to be given. By whom? And who will guarantee the guarantees and insure the assurances? There is to be disarmament. But as we have learned during the past ten years, nations can be disarmed and they can re-arm without saying "By your leave" and get away with it. The war is to go on until Freedom is safe. But how? Nations, it is announced, must be freed of fear if they give up their defences. But who will come to their defence if a nation that does not disarm attacks them?

For these specifications of the peace that will be insisted upon by the Allies, should they win, we have drawn upon Mr. Chamberlain's speech at Birmingham last Saturday.³ There is no intention here to be critical

³ Chamberlain, Rt. Hon. Neville. Speech at Birmingham, February 24, 1940: "We are fighting to secure that the small nations shall live in security, free from the constant threats of aggression against their independence and the extermination of their peoples, but we do not want domination for ourselves, nor do we covet the territory of others."

of Mr. Chamberlain; he could not reasonably be expected to answer these or other equally pointed questions at that time and place. But the questions are implicit in the situation that the war is creating and they are in the minds of everyone who looks beyond the war to think about the peace. They will be asked and they must be answered. It is all the more certain that explicit answers will be demanded because this will not be the first time of asking. All these factors affecting peace were in the minds of victors once before; they were considered, solutions reached, and guarantees given. Nevertheless, there is today war over a large portion of the world with every prospect that it will spread. States whose security was guaranteed have been put to the sword; others tremble with the sword at their throats.

With the war over and peace-making about to begin (the Allies having won) the powers that made the last peace and gave the world the glad assurance that war would thereafter be forbidden, will be at the council board. Great Britain will be there; France will be there; the United States will be there, and if it lives up to announcements of various American prophets, it will take full charge of the business in hand. Canada will be there, too; and a much more important member of the gathering than it was last time by virtue of the sacrifices exacted by war which by that time will have been paid. Assuming that the issue is in their power as much as it was at Paris in 1919, what are they going to do about it? They ought by this time to begin to have some ideas about what is to be done to provide

against the weaknesses in the last peace, which gave to many of the signatories of the peace treaty twenty years of precarious peace and then aggression and war.

Possibly they have given some thought to the dictum that in the modern integrated world peace is indivisible in the sense that if war is permitted in one area, it will break out elsewhere, given a little time. The statement that the Mukden incident in September, 1931, lit a fuse which has since touched off wars in every part of the world, and has now relit the fires of the World War may not seem as absurd to the governments of these countries as it did until recently. Conceivably it may have come home to the nations now at war that when they made excuses for not defending little nations from aggression, they were committing their own countries irretrievably to conflicts beside which a defence by force of a threatened League member would have been nothing but a skirmish. And in time this may prove equally true of the United States.

As they face up to the problem which has got to be solved this time (if there is a "this time"), they may reach the opinion that the incompetent, impractical idealists of Paris—Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson, Jan Smuts, Lord Cecil, R. L. Borden and others—knew what they were about when they created the League of Nations and imposed upon its members without exception the moral obligation to come to the defence of every member nation, whatever its size and wherever situated, if threatened with aggression. The problem is what it was in 1919; and they are free to improve upon the solution which was then attempted

if they can find a better one. But they will find no solution in a Federal Union of Europe⁴ (even if it is feasible, which may be doubted), which leaves the rest of the world free for the playing of power politics. Nothing smaller than the world will do for the field of the League or for the improved substitute of the League if one can be devised and the obligation of every member to help in keeping the peace will need to be put on a firmer basis than in 1919, when it was mistakenly assumed that an obligation of honour was enough.

We are assuming that the government of every nation which is now at war, realizes that the peace aims which are now being stated in general terms can only be implemented by arrangements and engagements of this scope; and is resolute in its determination to see that this will be done and no mistake about it. Unless this is done, the Allied nations may win the war, but all they will get out of it will be a twenty years' armistice, as before.

[Nations fighting for freedom, and those still free and at peace, must combine to win the war and establish peace.]

FREE NATIONS AND COMMON DEFENCE

(May 18, 1940)

THE cabled news that merely a skeleton staff is being retained by the League of Nations organization, and

⁴ The idea of federal union on an international scale was, of course, made popular by Mr. Clarence K. Streit, *Union Now*, Harpers, New York, 1939.

that this staff is poised for flight once the expected attack by the totalitarian powers on Switzerland is launched, marks the end, not of the League of Nations that was brought into existence in Paris, but of the League as it was after being denatured and devitalized with the consent of members by the Great Powers that found the obligations implicit in the Covenant inconvenient.

As this process of destruction went forward, there was no lack of assurances that these modifications in policy would the more effectively equip the League to further its purpose of keeping the world at peace. With the very idea of force eliminated, as no longer in keeping with the world's pacifist trends, the League Council would be a meeting place for world statesmen who in sweetest amity would settle all international disputes in the spirit of good will. Meanwhile, the good offices of the League in carrying out peaceful international projects, in health, in social betterment, in advising backward nations and helping them with their financial problems, would strengthen its moral authority and day by day increase the recognition by all the nations of the world of its indispensability.

All this sounds now like the chattering of amiable lunatics; but, as recently as two years ago, this was the attitude of the governments and it was warmly supported in all countries having within themselves the most diverse views: by the pacifists who saw in it the practical expression of their doctrines; by the isolationists because it was a cheap gesture towards a harmless internationalism; by the politicians in power because it relieved them, as they thought, of risks; by

all the people with old-fashioned ideas because it meant the defeat of a new-fangled conception of international relations leaving the field open for the playing of the time-honoured game of power politics.

The League, as thus transformed, was a most grotesque parody of the League as it was envisaged by its founders at Paris. The League would not have come into being had its purpose been only the social and humanitarian activities by which it was afterwards distinguished—those ends would have been sought by other and less elaborate means. The need of a League to prevent the recurrence of war was apparent in Paris in the fierce illumination cast by the Great War; and it came into being for that purpose. The obligations assumed by the member nations were thought to be sufficient to ensure this needed security; and so they were while the lessons of the war were still vivid in the minds of the statesmen, the generals, and the people generally. To create the modern Europe, without assuring the support only to be obtained by continuous common action that would protect it against the possibility of a revival of the hostile forces that had been defeated in the war, was an act of such supreme folly that the very existence of western civilization has in consequence been put in jeopardy. The public men of the United States, of France and of Great Britain who between them destroyed the League as the guardian of the new world of peace which it was hoped had been born from the agonies of the late war, and made possible the terrible situation of today and the world wreckage of tomorrow, are sure of their place in the

pillory of history. They could not see that for the wine of the new world, the old bottles would not do.

As the present war has proceeded on its devastating way, the obscurities which hid the realities in the post-War decades have been swept away and the clear vision which the lessons of the last war gave has again returned. The peace aims, as they are set out by the Allied nations and as they are outlined in the almost countless books and studies that are pouring from the press, are in essence those of 1918 and 1919—the differences in view are minor disagreements as to the procedures best fitted to attain the common end sought. That end is the obtaining of security for the nations of the world that want to live in peace; and there is almost universal agreement as to the only possible means by which it can be obtained. It is by an alliance of the nations thus disposed for mutual protection, and the provision by joint effort of sufficient strength to deter gangster nations from attacking them. A collective agreement for common defence and force to give effect to it was the foundation upon which the League was built. One of the most mischievous falsehoods told about the League was the claim that it was created upon the assumption that it was to be universal from the outset; and that because it did not become universal, all the member nations were freed from their obligation mutually to defend one another. What the League founders tried to do and what they hoped they had done is now sought by all who hope to see this war end in an arrangement by which nations, large and small, will come together—by means of a League, or an Alliance, or by Federal Union; these are relative-

ly small matters—for effective mutual protection by the provision of a common defence, too formidable to be assailed by those gangster nations with which the world will continue to be afflicted as long as there is profit or satisfaction in loot and murder.

The opportunity for creating such a League or Alliance which came to the world in 1919 is not likely to come again in such favourable form. It is pretty plain, and getting plainer every day, that the League or Alliance to keep this world from plunging to ruin must be formed as the war goes on, and that to it must repair, as rapidly as they can be brought to see realities, those nations which are not prepared to see the world sink to levels of primitive savagery unknown for a thousand years.

Free nations must unite if they are still to be free.

[The public opinion of the United States is overwhelmingly sympathetic to the cause of the Allies, yet that sympathy does not suggest participation in what is really a common task. The Allies will not prevail merely because their cause is just, nor will the United States escape the consequences of their defeat.]

THE APPARENT AMERICAN ENIGMA

(May 27, 1940)

WHEN the historian of the future comes to tell the story of this war—its origins, its course, its consequences—he will have to explain as best he can the part played

in the tragedy by the three great democracies which at the close of the 1914-18 War had the peaceful future of the world in their keeping and somehow threw it away.

This story, in all its frightful details, will be told with no great delay in time if civilization survives the shock of this convulsion. Alternatively it may have to be pieced together ages hence in a later civilization by an historian who will try to find the facts that will explain how it happened that in the Twentieth Century, after hundreds of years of civilized life, the Dark Ages settled again upon the earth.

About the part played by two of the three great democracies, the record will not be obscure. It will be a sorry tale of cross-purposes between them, of jealousy and contention, of blindness and indecision, of opportunities to protect world peace ignored; but in the end it will say that when civilization was in jeopardy they redeemed themselves by valour and sacrifice in defence of the threatened altars. The record of the third democracy, joint victor in the earlier deadly struggle, is one of almost complete non-co-operation, with pages still to fill; and in those pages, when filled, will be found the answer to questions that at the moment may be asked in vain.

The historian of the future, studying the course of the United States towards the war, will be confronted with a mystery that it may be beyond his powers to understand or unravel. He will note that when the war broke out and in its early stages, public opinion in the United States, as measured by accepted tests, was nearly ten to one in favour of the cause for which the Allies

were fighting, and also by the same tests that it was opposed, to an almost equal degree, to taking any part in the war. Why this amazing contradiction between thought and action?

The reason for the overwhelming moral support for the Allies will be as clear to the historian as it is to contemporary observers. It lies in the unchallengeable righteousness of their cause. Nothing else could have commanded the almost undivided approval of a people who are derived from all the races of Europe. If this were a war of rival imperialisms, if it were a vulgar struggle of pelf and power, there would be profound divergencies of view in the United States. But the complete failure of those who sought to disinterest the American people in the war on the ground that it is no concern of theirs whether Germany over-runs Europe or is defeated is conclusive that the American people know what the real issues are and have passed judgment upon them.

They agree with Winston Churchill that "the British and French peoples have advanced to rescue not only Europe but mankind from the foulest and most soul-destroying tyranny which has ever darkened and stained the pages of history."⁵ They accept the summing-up of King George of England as words of sober truth:

"Let no one be mistaken; it is no mere territorial conquest that our enemies are seeking. It is the overthrow, complete and final, of this Empire and of everything for which it stands, and they will bring to its

⁵ Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., *Blood, Sweat and Tears*, McClelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1941, p. 281.

accomplishment all the hatred and cruelty which they have already displayed. It is not easy for us to believe that designs so evil could find a place in the human mind. But the time for doubt is long past."⁶

Such is the moral judgment on the issues of the war of the peoples of the United States; a people, noble in their ideals and wedded to democratic institutions, who have a deep hatred of cruelty and oppression and a native generosity of soul that inclines them instinctively to take the right side when great issues arise.

Why then this overwhelming verdict on the justice of the Allied cause and the almost equally positive registration of a refusal to do anything to insure the success of their cause? Why? This is a question that history will ask in searching tones if this cause goes down to defeat and the darkness that is Hitler's blots out civilization. The answer to this riddle is pretty clear to the questioner of today. The American people have deemed their attitude of friendliness enough, since they have thought, in their simple idealism, that right is might and that therefore the Allies can themselves stem the tide of primitive savagery that threatens to engulf the world.

Clinging desperately to this belief, so necessary to the easing of their consciences, they have been able to adorn their attitude with the garb of noble, idealistic purposes. They would keep their minds clear from the warping influences of hate and revenge, unfortunately inseparable from taking part in war, in order that they may intervene the more effectively in the

⁶ Empire Day speech of King George VI, May 24, 1940.

peace negotiations in the interests of justice and the future pacification of the world. They would save their money and their credit so that they could help the nations ruined by the war to get on their feet. There have been many variations of these themes but they all rest upon the unchanging assumption: the peace at which they were to play this role and which they were to benevolently dominate was to be made by the victorious Allies with a defeated Germany. In the making of such a peace the United States, as the most powerful neutral in the world and first among the democratic nations, would see to it that the mistakes of Versailles, so plain in retrospect, would not be repeated. All this has been wishful thinking on a scale quite unknown in the Allied countries. No serious-minded, intelligent person in those countries has been able fully to share the cheerful confidence either as to the war or the peace which has been the foundation for the attitude of the great majority of the American people.

In the years immediately preceding the war there was, it is most true, wishful thinking of the most disastrous kind by the governments of the Allied countries and the groups and organizations which supported them. They held desperately to the belief that if Hitler were permitted by force or the threat of force to obtain certain objectives, for which an apparently plausible claim on racial grounds could be made, peace could be secured for Europe for a generation at least. When these hopes by the acts of Hitler were proved baseless, wishful thinking, at any rate along these lines, ceased; it has not been revived to encourage a belief in early

victory. Victory indeed is looked for; but at best by a narrow margin and only after incredible sacrifices of property and life, judged even by the standards of the last war.

The nature of the war in its further stages, its final result, its consequences to this and succeeding generations, may be profoundly affected by the impact which the events of the past months is making upon the American mind. There are certain hard facts which have surely been driven into the mind of Mr. Average American who thought it was enough if he wished the Allies well. He must be surer than ever that victory for the Allied cause is the sole protection against Hitler domination of Europe which would be the starting point for further campaigns for world domination. He must realize more deeply than ever before that Hitlerism is a menace to human freedom such as has not been seen in the world for thousands of years. He must know that, having regard to the state of society in the nations where Hitler has waged total war in the last eight months, the Nazi terror has caused more human suffering and loss of life among civilians—men and women, children and old folk—than the count of all the wars of the last century; and that the havoc is only beginning. And he must know that his calm and comfortable assurance that the Allies had matters well in hand, which never had any sure foundation outside his wishful thinking, is still more doubtful in view of the present state of the war.

What, then, is Mr. Average American going to do about it? Those future studies into the character and consequences of this war about which we have been

speculating will, in the backward glance of history, record the consequences of his action or inaction. If the most disastrous of all outcomes should be the result—and we have the less hesitation in referring to this since within the last few days three eminent Americans, one of them Cordell Hull, have envisaged the return of the Dark Ages as a possibility—the historian of the future will have room for moralizing—much as historians today moralize over the destruction of ancient Greece—about the fate of the democracies in the twentieth century which, in the face of known danger of the direst kind, refused to co-operate in defence of the civilization they had created.

[The Atlantic Charter, August 14, 1941, is a restatement of the principles of the Covenant, and Roosevelt's joint authorship with Churchill puts the United States back in the position of leadership in world affairs renounced under President Harding. This means that there will be no peace without victory, and that the war will be pushed through to the conclusion of a peace underwritten by the United States. Like Lend-Lease, the Charter means that "as the war proceeds it (the United States) will make contributions of whatever kind are necessary to ensure this end", a victory of the Allied cause.]⁷

CHURCHILL'S SPEECH

(August 25, 1941)

WINSTON CHURCHILL'S speech,⁸ which was listened to yesterday by the world, set forth in language, vivid

⁷ *Winnipeg Free Press*, March 11, 1941—"The Battle of the United States".

⁸ Churchill, Rt. Hon. Winston S., *The Unrelenting Struggle*, McClelland & Stewart, Toronto, 1942, pp. 231-41.

and vigorous, the purpose of that great addition to the outstanding documents of history, which he called the Atlantic Charter—an admirable title by which it will be forever known. It was, he said, symbolical of the deep unities which the English-speaking democracies reveal in times of world crisis. They are now united in a noble, inspiring and most difficult task upon the success of which the future of mankind rests. There are, in this task, various objectives to be attained, but they all depend upon the attainment of the main purpose—freeing the world from the scourge of Hitlerism. . . .

The Atlantic Charter is simply worded; it is without the stately phrasing of other great historic documents. It has no such ringing sentence as this: "And for the support of this declaration we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our Sacred Honour." But this is the import and the spirit of the document. The British nations and the United States by it engage themselves to destroy Naziism, to free Europe, to stand guard against any recurrence of despotism and to give leadership in political and economic co-operation that will make for a safer, more stable and happier world. They renounce any intention of seeking for themselves advantages and rewards of any kind. This is no proclamation of overlordship in the world which they propose to save.

The signatory nations are learning—at a cost as yet wholly beyond calculation—that it matters mightily to them what kind of world it is that lies outside their boundaries. When the bills for their cherished isolation are all presented and paid they will have run into astronomical proportions. Hence their readiness, as

specifically declared by Mr. Churchill, to co-operate with all nations of good intent to ensure political stability and economic security for the future.

Mr. Churchill in his remarks was most specific as to the binding engagements for the attaining of the ends indicated. He did not dwell on means to these ends. What these means are so far as the British nations are concerned does not call for restatement; they are known to the world. The contribution already made by the United States has been immense and indispensable; that it will be enlarged and adapted if this is required to attain the designated ends is as certain as is the resolution of the British nations never to stay their hand until the task is done. The additional participation, if any, will be determined by events and by the recognition by our neighbours of obligations implicit in the Atlantic Charter. This time the plough will not be left in the unfinished furrow.

There is in Mr. Churchill's speech reference to the situation in the Far East which in emphasis and directness hardly falls short of an ultimatum. It is a notice to Japan to cease her aggressions and seek peace, in which case there is more than a hint that a favourable peace could be made in which Japan would receive all possible consideration. The foreshadowing of a common action by the British nations and the United States if it is found necessary to resort to force to block her programme of conquest is definite. This language to Japan is many years overdue; it has been made no doubt in the hope, which may prove delusive, that it is not too late. But at least it gives Japan an opening to avoid war on not too onerous terms.

The effect of Mr. Churchill's speech cannot but be favourable to the Allied cause. If the belief becomes widespread that the United States and the British nations are bound in an unbreakable agreement to see this war through to a victorious conclusion and then to give effect to the other engagements of the Atlantic Charter, it will have a powerful effect upon morale, to the injury of Germany and to the advantage of the belligerent nations, since there is not a nation in the world, including the Axis powers, whose people do not know in their hearts that this combination, if it puts forth its maximum powers, can give effect to its will.

[Mr. Eden develops the significance of the economic clauses of the Charter. This is a great advance over 1919, for "In the economic field the League hardly went beyond the stage of wishful thinking."⁹ If war had been outlawed trade would have been freed.]

PLEDGES FOR THE FUTURE

(September 4, 1941)

To Mr. Churchill's comment upon the economic clauses of the Eight Points, Mr. Eden¹⁰ has added more precise and extended observations. Points four and five forecast, but in very general terms, the economic conditions that will be necessary following the war if there is to be any chance of world recovery. By

⁹ *Winnipeg Free Press*, May 23, 1941—"Mr. Hull's New Order".

¹⁰ Speech at Coventry, August 30, 1941.

the fourth point the British nations and the United States pledge themselves "to further the enjoyment of all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity." The terms are general but they are not vague; the implications are radical to the point of revolution, if one seeks to compare the relations between the nations which they foreshadow with the kind of world which existed at the outbreak of the war—a world poisoned and bedevilled by economic warfare in which every nation in the universe was briskly engaged. The fifth point amplified in some respects the engagements of point four. The British nations and the United States proclaim a desire to see all nations attain improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security by "fullest collaboration".

Mr. Churchill in his speech said that the spirit embodied in these declarations was widely at variance with the economic practices and policies which were pursued following the last war. This is true; but in the Fourteen Points with which the Atlantic Charter is rightly compared, there was a foreshadowing of post-War economic relations to which the declarations of the Atlantic Charter bear a filial resemblance. The third of Wilson's points pledged: "The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves with its maintenance." In the League Covenant this engagement appeared in this shrunken form: "The

members of the League will make provision to secure and maintain freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for the commerce of all members of the League." Neither the Wilsonian engagement nor the much vaguer expression of policy in the Covenant served to mitigate in the slightest degree the ferocity of the tariff warfare which raged throughout the world following the last war. The two attempts by the League to get the nations of the world to co-operate for their common prosperity—the conferences of 1927 and 1933—were tragic failures.

Mr. Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, has now underlined and reaffirmed Great Britain's commitments under the Eight Points. He makes admission of a fact that the post-War statesmen could not or would not see that "international security and economic security are inseparable and indivisible." There are to be regulations preventing "autarchic methods of trade arbitrarily imposed by which nations can be starved out." Nor in the economic field is there to be any distinction between nations based upon the divisions of the present war. Precautions will be taken that will prevent Germany again arming herself for aggressive action, but "on the other hand it is equally important that she should not become a source of poison to her neighbours and to the world by economic collapse."

These are commitments as to policy of remarkable range and of extraordinary importance. They are made with deliberation by the leaders of the British nations and in agreement, it is to be assumed, with the President of the United States. Following a victory

for the Allies, these are the nations that will, in very large measure, determine the character of the peace. They are pledged to use this influence to insure a post-war world from which the use of force will be banished and in which "access on equal terms to the trade of the world", in the words employed in the Atlantic Charter, will be provided. Nor is this boon to be limited to the victorious and the neutral nations—the gates to a world free of war and open to commerce "on equal terms" will be open to the Axis powers and the enslaved nations that are tied to their chariot wheels. This is a much brighter prospect to the peoples of the enemy nations than anything they can be offered by their fuehrers by methods of continuing war and conquest; and should have a disintegrating effect upon their war-time morale.

The effectiveness of the appeal of this blueprint of the world following an Allied victory can be blunted only by questionings as to whether these engagements can be, or will be, implemented. There can be no question of the bona fides of President Roosevelt, Mr. Churchill and Mr. Eden. But they are the leaders of democracies and their power to implement their engagements may be revoked by their peoples. It is therefore desirable and necessary that there should be a popular understanding in Great Britain, the other British nations and in the United States of the extensive commitments made on their behalf by their leaders and that manifestation, as opportunity is offered, of warm commendation and support of these engagements should be forthcoming.

[To the German assault on Russia on June 22nd, 1941, there has been added the Japanese attack on the United States at Pearl Harbour, December 7th, 1941. Now the United States is irrevocably committed not only to the war but also to the task of preserving the future peace. The hopes for the enduring qualities of that peace are vastly improved now that the myth of isolation may be finally destroyed.]

ROOSEVELT: "NEVER AGAIN"

(December 13, 1941)

IN President Roosevelt's address¹¹ to the people of the United States there are poignant paragraphs charged with might-have-been reflections over the past, and vital warning instructions for the future. This is what the President said:

"In my message to the Congress I said that we will make very certain that this form of treachery shall never endanger us again. In order to achieve that certainty, we must begin the great task that is before us by abandoning once and for all the illusion that we can ever again isolate ourselves from the rest of humanity.

In these past few years—and most violently, in the past few days—we have learned a terrible lesson.

It is our obligation to our dead—it is our sacred obligation to their children and our children—that we must never forget what we have learned.

And what we all have learned is this:

There is no such thing as security for any nation

¹¹ December 9, 1941.

—or any individual—in a world ruled by the principles of gangsterism.

There is no such thing as impregnable defence against powerful aggressors who sneak up in the dark and strike without warning.

We have learned that our ocean-girt hemisphere is not immune from severe attack—that we cannot measure our safety in terms of miles on any map any more."

Mr. Roosevelt could have used blunter language. He could have said—and the American people would have taken it from him in their present open-minded readiness for enlightenment—that the world-wide catastrophe of today is the direct consequence of the refusal of the United States and the other nations which fought the last war to preserve the peace they thus won by accepting, without question or challenge, the "new order" which President Wilson and those who were in agreement with him knew to be necessary if the peace was to be preserved.

The responsibility of the United States for this disaster is so great as not to be calculable; but at that, something can be said for its record in comparison with that of the other great powers into whose hands were also put the issues of peace and world order. At any rate, the United States and the other defaulting nations are in different categories. The United States pulled out of the League because it recognized that membership involved the country in responsibilities of the most exacting kind; the nations that stayed in gave lip service to their obligations with the mental reservation that they would not take them seriously. The respon-

sibilities were thus equally rejected: by the United States openly and defiantly; indirectly and covertly by the other great powers, which went ahead with the organization of the League. Between them they lit a fuse which has been exploding for the last two years until the whole world is at last involved.

The reasons for this repudiation are now so clearly revealed that they can no longer be explained away or denied. The principle of collective security was so profoundly revolutionary and its implications were so far-reaching and imperative that it was everywhere regarded by those little hollow men, the post-War politicians, with fear, anger and disdain. Lived up to and enforced, it would put an end to imperialist adventures of all kinds—there would be no more conquests, no more military glory, no more fulfilments of national "destiny". It enraged nations which cherished secret hopes of conquest; outraged the sentiments of influential classes in nations that were ostensibly pledged to the support of the Covenant; and in nations that had no external ambitions induced the fear that they would be involved by it in liabilities which they insisted were no concern of theirs, and in dangers from which they would be free if they lived to themselves in isolation.

In the years when the League was disintegrating because it would not face its responsibilities, there was a formula of denial and avoidance which became shop-worn from constant use by the governments of League countries. This was to assert as a proposition beyond challenge that nations could not be expected to invest their blood and treasure in the defence of another

country unless its own interests were directly and inextricably involved. Almost without exception—in fact New Zealand was the only exception that we can recall—the view became universal, following the Manchurian and Abyssinian episodes, that the League, if it lived up to its engagements, would trap peaceful nations into taking part in outside wars which were no concern of theirs. Dr. Koht, Foreign Minister in the exiled Norwegian Government, has just written a book about the over-running of Norway. (Dr. Koht is the gentleman who sat up all one night drafting a blazing protest to Great Britain against the placing of mines off the Norway coast, only to find before his labours were completed that the Germans had captured the capital of his country.) We quote from his book:

"She (Norway) had never imagined that membership of the League of Nations might involve her in foreign wars . . . together with the other Scandinavian nations she had helped from the start to make the military obligations of the League as non-committal as possible. . . In the Royal Address opening the Storting on January 12, 1938, it was stated . . . that it ought to be a principal task to keep Norway outside all warlike entanglements. . . Norway would maintain perfect neutrality in all wars that she herself did not regard as actions on the part of the League of Nations. . . A proclamation virtually supporting the same principle was issued by a meeting in Copenhagen on July 27, 1938, of the Foreign Ministers of the so-called Oslo powers (Finland, Sweden, Denmark, Norway) and the three Low

Countries nations (Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg).'¹²

It was completely beyond the comprehension of all the governments that desired peace and hoped to preserve it for themselves by adhering to policies of isolation, that aggression anywhere in the world by a country on the make was a matter of vital concern to them directly, affecting their security, their treasure and the lives of their citizens. Mr. Eden was the most enlightened Foreign Minister of the day, but in his Leamington policy speech made in 1937, he was blind, deaf and indifferent to the basic principle upon which the whole League structure rested. From all these discussions the United States could remain serenely aloof. It had no worries about its obligations to the League because it had never belonged to it. It was secure and safe, whatever might happen elsewhere, in its isolationist citadel behind the protecting oceans east and west.

These were the memories, thoughts and reflections that stirred everywhere in the minds of his world-wide audience as Mr. Roosevelt made the trenchant observations which we have quoted. "Never again!" was the burden of his pledge. But it will be as idle as the similar pledge made with equal sincerity by President Wilson, unless the peoples of the world, now battling for their lives, prepare themselves for a real "new order" following victory—one that was so drastically revolutionary when it was first advanced by President

¹² Koht, Dr. Halvdan, *Norway, Neutral and Invaded*, Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., London & Melbourne, 1941, p. 22.

Wilson that it was rejected openly by his own people and no less decisively, though by indirection, by the nations that were allied with the United States in the last war in the defence of human freedom. But where Wilson failed, Roosevelt will succeed. The lesson has indeed been learned; it will never be forgotten. However unfortunate the prophets of permanent peace in 1919 may have been, their successors today stand on firmer ground.

[In the post-war world the prospects of peace will be closely bound with the extent of freedom of trade among nations.]

IN THE POST-WAR WORLD

(April 6, 1942)

IN the discussion which is going on everywhere about the reconstruction of the post-war world it is very heartening to note that practically without exception there is an acceptance by all taking part of the view that the very foundation of the new international democratic order which is visioned must be a large measure of freedom of trade between all parts of the globe. A classic definition of the advantages of such a policy is to be found in *The Wealth of Nations*:

“Were all nations to follow the liberal system of free exportation and free importation, the different

states into which a great continent was divided would so far resemble the different provinces of a great Empire. As among the different provinces of a great Empire the freedom of the inland trade appears, both from reason and experience, not only the best palliative of a dearth, but the most effectual preventative of a famine, so would the freedom of the exportation and importation trade be among the different states into which a great continent is divided.”¹³

The general principle is embodied in the Atlantic Charter, the fourth article of which calls for “the enjoyment by all states, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw materials of the world which are needed for their economic security.” There is, it is true, a qualification as to “existing obligations”, but this could not be extended to the point of destroying the content of the declaration without making the Atlantic Charter a byword of history. This charter has been formally adhered to by the twenty-six nations which signed a joint accord on January first of this year.

In the current issue of *Foreign Affairs* there are two notable articles in which the need of a world-wide exchange of goods is stated in unqualified terms. André Istel, a French banker, formerly adviser to the Ministry of Finance, in an article entitled “Free Access to Raw Materials”, says:

“I wish to state most emphatically, however, that neither the problem of access to raw materials, nor

¹³ Smith, Adam, *The Wealth of Nations*, edited by Edwin Canaan, Methuen & Co., London, 1904, II, p. 41.

any other world economic problem, can be solved unless it is realized that, for countries as well as for individuals, specialization is the key to improved living standards, and that this cannot be attained without a broad exchange of goods and services. Nations have been acting like families in primitive societies who try each one to bake its own bread and weave its own clothes. The great challenge to statesmen in each country after this war will be this—Will they have the courage and the strength to override the powerful pressure of vested interests, both capital and labour, and to cease favouring the production of goods which can be produced elsewhere more efficiently?

“Will the United States, above all, be able, as a creditor nation with giant industries, to discontinue its former policy of a debtor nation with infant industries? Will it take the leadership of the movement for a return to world trade? The solution of the problem of raw materials, like that of all other economic problems, rests finally on this momentous decision.”¹⁴

There is an equally emphatic statement, though in the briefest of terms, in *The Economic Tasks of the Post-War World*, by Alvin H. Hansen and C. P. Kindleberger:

“A country should not, for the sake of creating domestic employment, force exports into areas where that action would displace equally or more efficient labour engaged in making the same products. Similarly, no country should cut off imports from an efficient source of supply for the purpose of shifting

¹⁴ *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 20, No. 3, April, 1942, p. 465.

the associated employment from foreign to domestic labour."¹⁵

This statement is of special importance because one of the joint authors of this article, Alvin H. Hansen of Harvard University (formerly of the University of Minnesota), is the American chairman of the Joint Economic Committee of Canada and the United States and special economic adviser to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. Mr. Hansen is known to be engaged at this time in working out plans for post-war reconstruction in which particular attention is given to conditions in Great Britain, Canada and the United States, the countries which will be called upon to make the greatest contribution towards the restoration of world prosperity. The general lines of Mr. Hansen's thinking are indicated in the article from which we have quoted. He aims at expansionist programmes designed to achieve and maintain full employment in the United States and to encourage a similar development in the other key countries; and from this central reservoir of energy and prosperity influences will radiate that will tend to raise productivity throughout the world.

That this programme of domestic expansion in the United States should be projected not only without an accompanying demand for domestic autarchy but by a warning that there must not be an attempt to create artificial prosperity by arbitrary interference with international trade marks a revolution in New Deal thinking. Attempts to create home prosperity in

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 469.

the pre-war world took the form of restrictions upon international trade; there were very few countries that did not go to extremes, in the form of prohibitive tariffs, currency manipulation and fixed quotas, to attain this end. That the lesson of the resulting disasters should have been so thoroughly learned by the statesmen and by the economic advisers to governments is encouraging; but it would be a mistake to assume that the battle is won. The upholders of the contrary view, that the road to prosperity for a nation is that of economic exclusiveness, are silent at the moment, but they are not converted and they will be in full cry the moment the war is over. But perhaps this time they can be prevented from capturing governments and putting into effect economic policies which in due time could be relied upon to breed World War III.

[The need is military victory for the United Nations, not the triumph of this or that ideology.]

POST-WAR FOUNDATIONS

(September 1, 1942)

. . . . **T**HE Laskis¹⁶ to the Left and the Voigts¹⁷ to the Right are typical of very considerable bodies of opinion in all the Allied countries not excepting Britain, where

¹⁶ Prof. Harold Laski of the London School of Economics, distinguished author of many books on political science.

¹⁷ F. A. Voigt, editor of *The Nineteenth Century and After*.

the fate that would follow defeat and the impossibility of any peace short of the peace of death ought to be apparent not only to the meanest intelligence but as well to intellectuals of the rank of Laski and Voigt. Akin to their slogan "our way of peace or Hitler's terms" is the once common observation, which can still be heard in quarters that should know better, that it is not worth fighting the war if it means the return to the *status quo*. This can be interpreted as meaning that life in Warsaw in 1942 is no more undesirable than life in Winnipeg was in 1933 when our pre-war depression was at its height. Put this way the supreme foolishness of this cheap remark is evident.

The post-war world will be Hitler's world if the Axis powers triumph. To prevent this by every means in our power, physical, financial and moral, is the first obligation of every citizen. The *status quo* can never be fully re-established, as everyone must know; but it will be found that a good many principles and practices of the pre-war world will be necessary to the existence of the post-war world. First and foremost of these will be national liberty and individual freedom as expressed in our free constitutions and the way they work. It is for these and not for fancy post-war programmes that the free men of the endangered nations are fighting and dying. Given these, the future will be what the free men and the free women who survive choose to make it by the methods of democracy. This is an objective about which there should be no slightest divergence of opinion in any Allied country. The man who puts his own interests or the fulfilment of his own programmes higher than this objective is re-

tarding its attainment. Unless winning the war is put above all prejudices, all attempts to exploit the situation for ends that under other conditions would be in order, September 1 for an unforeseen number of years may mark the beginning of one more year of war—a prospect too terrible to be permitted to become a reality.

[Mr. Henry Wallace, Vice-president of the United States, has outlined, in his speech at the celebration of the eighty-sixth anniversary of the birth of Woodrow Wilson, December 28, 1942,¹⁸ the new international organization to be founded by the victorious United Nations. This will be a renewed League exercising wider powers.]

THE LEAGUE: REVIVED, ENLARGED

(December 30, 1942)

. . . . MR. WALLACE does not submit a plan in detail but he lays down principles and obligations from which the general scheme which he has in mind can be deduced. The report states that he dismissed the League of Nations as not being strong enough, but what he has in mind is a new League with powers and duties which the failure of the old League has shown to be necessary. He retains the nation as the unit upon which the League will be built and he recognizes that a world authority resting upon these foundations must have the will and the power to enforce obedience to rules necessary for world security and freedom. The plan

¹⁸ Wallace, Henry A., "The Century of the Common Man", Reynal and Hitchcock, New York, 1943, *World Organization*, pp. 41-51.

by implication rejects Federal Union as too rigid and it also subordinates any regional organizations that may be formed to a world authority. To recognize nations as continuing organizations and to make them all subordinate in certain respects to a common authority world-wide in scope, is to apply anew the principle which brought the League of Nations into being. The individual nations are to have "the maximum of home rule that can be maintained along with the minimum of centralized authority that must come into existence to give the necessary protection."¹⁹

It is apparently proposed that the charter members of the new organization are to be the United Nations which are actively at war with the Axis powers; they will disarm and keep disarmed the nations that have broken the world's peace. The blueprint, apart from its formulation of general principles, is vague; but its implications are reasonably clear. Presumably all nations, except those responsible for the war, will be taken into the League and further additions to the membership will be possible as the "psychological disarmament" to which Mr. Wallace makes reference restores the Axis nations to sanity. Apparently the over-riding authority is to have power and machinery to apply that power far beyond anything that was in the minds of the drafters of the Covenant. For one thing, the full text of Mr. Wallace's address will show that in his opinion there should be a right of intervention in the internal affairs of nations to deal with developments that threaten the world's peace. There will be no more looking unconcernedly over the boundary

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 45.

while a nation rushes back to savagery at break-neck speed. The world has learned the cost of permitting nations to produce monsters like Hitler and Mussolini.

Mr. Wallace's address must be regarded as an event of world-wide importance. There are in existence scores of blueprints for a new world far more detailed than that offered by Mr. Wallace, which attract no particular attention because they are the product of individual planners. But Mr. Wallace speaks for the Government of the most powerful of all the Allied powers; and gives the assurance that he speaks, as he believes, for the people of the United States. This makes his proposition one to which the whole world, Allied and Axis, will pay instant attention. It marks the resurgence of the principles which Woodrow Wilson avowed at Paris and unavailingly advocated at home; and for which he, in fact, gave his life.

[The new world order will rest on greater freedom of trade and on collective security. In the post-war plans put forward the principles of the League appear. It will be for the United Nations, as they forge the victory on which all depends, to decide how the old League shall take its place in the international organization of the future.]

POST-WAR PROSPECTS

(April 13, 1943)

IN the discussions now going on about the post-war world and the institutional changes that will be necessary to safeguard it against stresses that will be fatal

to its peace, there is an encouraging degree of agreement upon the two main questions that arise. At the moment there is very general acceptance of the view that the artificial restrictions upon the movements of international trade must be in large measure removed. Striking proof of the support which is being given this programme is supplied by the simultaneous appearance of Keynes' plan for currency stabilization in the interests of trade in England, and of the corresponding studies of the treasury experts in the United States.²⁰ It would, however, be premature to accept the view that this question has been settled; there is certain to be a desperate struggle to recover all the advantages they had before the war, and to retain the further advantages which the war has brought them, by the powerful interests that prefer sheltered markets at home to competitive world markets. At present they are saying little, but they will be heard from in due time.

Upon the other large question—that of the vital need of collective security as the foundation for all the post-war plans for social security and the re-establishment of the destroyed nations—there is a theoretical unanimity among those who speak and write on the subject that is most impressive. About details there are differences of opinion, but the general principle that if future wars are to be prevented there must be effective collective resistance to the aggressor, with exemplary punishment for every breach of the common law of the nations, commands almost universal support from all who are giving expression to their views.

²⁰ The Keynes and White plans published in preparation for the International Monetary Conference, held at Bretton Woods, N.H., July 1-22, 1944.

As the examination of the various tentative plans goes on, there emerges more and more clearly the outline of an organization that is recognizable as the League of Nations, modernized and stream-lined to meet the needs of the world of tomorrow. It will retain the two prime characteristics of the League. The first of these is its universality. This will not prevent the Council of Europe as foreshadowed by Mr. Churchill²¹ from functioning, or the creation of similar councils for other continents; but over all there must be a world order to deal with world issues. The second is the doctrine of all for each and each for all when it becomes a matter of putting a stop to aggressive wars.

It may be denied that an obligation of this severity was a binding principle of the League; but if this provision had not been basic to the whole conception of the League its founders would not have bothered to bring it into being. The obligation was clear, but it was denied; and being denied, the foundation-stone of the League was torn out, with consequences now apparent.

Dr. Gilbert Murray, who divides with Lord Cecil the honour of leadership in the League of Nations Society of Great Britain, has been speaking over the British radio about the post-war world and collective security. Some of his observations bear directly upon the points we are here discussing. Dr. Murray, in answer to the question, "What are the prospects for a League of Nations after the war?" said:

²¹ In broadcast of March 21, 1943, *International Conciliation*, 1943. "One can imagine that under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations, there should come into being a council of Europe and a council of Asia.", p. 445.

"A League of Nations, or an international organization on the lines of the League of Nations, is absolutely inevitable if the United Nations remain united. If they fail to be united, it would be a weak and struggling League and they would fail as they did last time. Last time, we did not stay united; that was the fundamental cause of the League's weakness and failures. We have great advantages now. Last time, we had to create the League of Nations out of nothing. This time, the foundations are there. The International Labour Office is working hard on the post-war problems; it's regularly consulted by governments; even the League itself in its non-political work is carrying on. It's doing a surprising amount of work considering the difficulties.

"Of course, it all depends on whether we have learnt our lesson—whether the unspeakable misery caused by this war shows that war has grown more and more intolerable and incompatible with civilization. If we want to live as good neighbours, we must stand together to maintain the law. As the Prime Minister used to say again and again in the old days: 'There is no security except collective security.'"²²

As to how the League will be adjusted to the new conditions, there is room for divergences of view. It is not likely that there will be formal action by a peace conference by which the old League will be transformed into the new. As the governing controls of the United Nations develop, the League machinery will be indispensable for many purposes; and the modifications necessary in the Covenant to make it an efficient agent will be made, not by the tedious procedures of

²² Murray, Gilbert, "The League's Prospects" in *Headway, The Journal of the League of Nations Union*, April, 1943, p. 9.

the original provisions, but at the instance of the victorious powers. The United Nations will themselves, in fact, constitute a new League; and whether it loses its identity or not, the old League will be part of the new machinery. This estimate rests on the belief, which we cannot but hold to be well-founded, that the purposes of the old and the new League will be identical—the establishing of a world-wide system of collective security to which they will all subscribe. Should this not be attainable—and it has to be conceded that there are doubts as to whether the United States will play its indispensable part, as indeed Mr. Sumner Welles admitted in his recent speech—this war will be just one of those periodical recurrent catastrophes with which mankind is afflicted.

[El Alamein, Stalingrad and Tunisia, with the victories in the Pacific, have brought victory within sight. Neither Federal Union nor the British Commonwealth furnishes a model for the new international organization which must be worked out. The League does, if there are added to it lesser bodies with delegated powers, and the authority to enforce peace.]

OLD LEAGUE AND NEW LEAGUE

(May 6, 1943)

As the prospect of defeat of the Axis conspiracy against the freedom of mankind takes on the form of certainty, the question of world government in the post-war world—how it is to be obtained, what its powers

and obligations must be, how its permanency is to be assured—is more and more occupying the minds of men, not as a subject for academic speculation but as a practical question of the utmost moment with which the Allied nations, at a moment's notice, so to speak, may have to grapple.

There is no lack of vague suggestions at one end of the problem, nor of definite schemes worked out in detail at the other. In the latter class must be put proposals of a world federation with all the paraphernalia of a universal super-state, having executive, legislative and judicial functions. The rigidity and finality of these schemes mark them, to practical minds, as impossible of attainment in the immediate period following the war, even if they are the ideal solution, as to which claim scepticism is in order. *Human Nature in Politics* was the title of a thought-provoking book by Graham Wallas written before the last war. He found that the varieties of human nature were highly disturbing factors in the field of domestic politics; and in any project of rigid world organization they would have a wrecking power that would reduce it to helplessness the moment it began to function.

At the other extreme was Mr. Eden's recent hint that perhaps the British Commonwealth of Nations might supply a working model for a first attempt at world government from which there might evolve, by processes of trial and error, an effective organism.²³ The British Commonwealth is, and is likely always to re-

²³ Speech at Annapolis, Maryland, March 26, 1943, *International Conciliation*, 1943. "I maintain that these principles of our Commonwealth are not of limited application. They are inseparable from the kind of world for which we are fighting, the kind of world we hope to see." p. 462.

main, unique in the record of political organizations; the influences that animate it, hold it together and make it an essential unity when its members are threatened with a common duty, do not exist and cannot be developed, at least at this stage in the political development of mankind, in an association which includes nations of all sorts and conditions.

As practical men, particularly if they have had personal association with the League of Nations, get to grips with the problem, the stronger grows the case for a post-war arrangement that will be built upon the foundation of the League. Two of the three men who were chiefly instrumental in founding the League are still with us—Lord Cecil and General Smuts. Neither of them proposes that the League should be restored to the role which it attempted to play following the last war; but both are agreed that there should be incorporated within the new international body all that proved useful and sound in the first venture at world government.

Those who are in agreement with this general proposition look to the United Nations as charter members of the new League, with such neutral countries as may be invited to join. With the exception of the United States, all the United Nations are or have been members of the League. It will be easy for them to agree with the finding of the League's Supervisory Commission made in 1941: "It is of the greatest importance for the future to keep up the framework of the League and not to lose the accumulated experience of the more than twenty years of international co-operation and

administration.”²⁴ Of the defects in the Covenant and the weaknesses in the League machinery of supervision and control, these nations are fully aware; in making the new start they, guided by the light of experience and supported by a demand for continuing the peace far outranging the pressures of 1919, can eliminate these weaknesses and deficiencies, thus giving the peoples of the world a firmer hope that war is to be banished.

In building the new League there are bound to be differences of opinion which will have to be adjusted on lines of reasonable compromise. One of the questions, about which divergences of view are already emerging, is that of the degree of responsibility and control that should be vested in the world organization. There are those who think that immediate controls should be exercised by a number of Councils, the world organization occupying a somewhat dignified and detached position with an authority that might be little more than nominal. This is a proposition with great disruptive possibilities; but fortunately its impracticability is likely to be apparent as the nations come to closer grips with the matter. One obvious objection is that these councils cannot be erected on a geographical basis; membership in them would have to be on the basis of interest. The result would be that the great nations would be members of several councils, thus creating in fact a series of bodies with overlapping interests and jurisdictions.

The case for direct and active world control by a

²⁴ First Report of the Supervisory Commission for the year 1941 (*League of Nations*), p. 2.

single organization, with a delegation of power to lesser bodies in the interests of prompt action, is too conclusive to be effectively met by alternative propositions, the effect of which, given time, might be to create conditions that would make for war. What the world needs is a new League, as universal in its scope as the old League, but equipped with powers of enforcing peace which the older organization lacked. Behind this general proposition the collective opinion of the free world should be—and we believe will be—marshalled.

[Senator Robert A. Taft has challenged the conclusion that the victory of the United Nations must be followed by their collective action to enforce peace. The United States, says the senator, is fighting for its own ends, and in any international organization there must be no surrender of sovereignty. But any worth-while international organization must include the United States and limit the right of its members to go to war of their own volition.]

A SIGNIFICANT STATEMENT

(June 3, 1943)

CONSIDERABLE political significance is attached to a speech recently delivered by Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio at the Commencement exercises of a Pennsylvania college.²⁵ Senator Taft was a contender for the Republican nomination for the presidency in 1940 and may again be in the lists next year, though the

²⁵ Grove City College, May 25, 1943. *New York Times*, May 26, p. 23.

predictions are that the conservative Republicans will unite behind the candidature of Governor Bricker of Ohio. Senator Taft spent some time "debunking" to his own satisfaction the idealism of President Roosevelt, Mr. Wendell Willkie, Governor Stassen and others who think that the United States will have to play a considerable role in the post-war world as a supporter of the plans for a new world envisaged by themselves and other forward-looking men.

The United States, he explained, was not and did not intend to become interested in crusades for the four freedoms or the objectives of the Atlantic Charter. This was not, he insisted, a war of democracies against dictatorships, since non-democratic countries could be found in the list of the United Nations. Apparently, in the senator's mind, the United States is fighting only to insure its own liberty; if its example aids the spread of the ideal of liberty throughout the world, well and good, but this must happen fortuitously and not by any action directed to this end by the nation.

The senator was willing to see an international organization worked out "along the general lines suggested in the League of Nations". There is a measure of encouragement here; but it is pretty thoroughly destroyed by his further insistence that in the post-war international organization, no matter what form it may take, there must be no surrender of sovereignty by the member nations. No League thus limited is worth the trouble of bringing it together; nor will this be attempted on this basis. The League of Nations, when it came into being in 1919, rested on a foundation of limitation of sovereignty. This was implicit in the rele-

vant articles of the Covenant; but the observation of the obligation was made a matter of national honour instead of being defined in unmistakable terms. In any revived League there must be a specific limitation of the right of any nation to go to war on its own, and an inescapable obligation to take part in a League war when called upon by whatever governing body is entrusted with the power of making this decision. Lacking these provisions, the new League would be what the old League became when it was evident that each nation retained full sovereignty unless it chose to waive its rights: a mere debating society.

The experience of the last League has established, beyond question, the fact that no League can successfully function unless the United States belongs to it and plays the part which devolves upon it as one of the great powers. When the United States backed away in 1919 from the engagements made in its behalf by President Wilson, the other nations went on with the plan in the hope that the withdrawal of the United States would not prove fatal to the enterprise. That was a vain hope as events proved. That the League would have failed even if it had included the United States is a contention put forward by apologists for the course taken by the United States Senate and by President Harding; but this is a matter of opinion with plenty of arguments to support the contrary view. But there will now be no disagreement with the statement that an international organization for collective security will be nothing but an empty gesture if the United States is not an active member of it. It is not possible to imagine any attempt to create such an organization

without the United States playing a leading role in creating and directing it.

Senator Taft's position is therefore one of negation of the whole proposition that victory in this war shall be followed by collective action by the United Nations to guard the world against a recurrence of world war a generation hence. His position is a challenge to the statement, so frequently made as to be almost a commonplace, that in the light of the events of the past quarter of a century, public opinion will ensure post-war co-operation between the United States and its present allies in establishing a workable and effective system of collective security. In view of his eminence in the Republican party, Senator Taft's attitude is thus one of great importance. It will doubtless be the occasion for wide and frank discussion in the United States.

[Public opinion, on which any system of collective security depends, is encouragingly in favour of an international organization after the war. But the disposition to link collective security with the retention of unqualified national sovereignty is alarming. The two are incompatible.]

THE ONLY SURE FOUNDATION

(September 22, 1943)

THE evidences of popular opinion in the United Nations in favour of a post-war system of collective security against aggression by nations crazed with visions of world conquest multiply on such a scale that a belief

in the certainty of an international organization to ensure peace in the post-war world would appear to be amply justified. But it would be as well for those who desire such a post-war development not to rest on their oars and assume that the race is as good as won.

The parallels with conditions as they were at the close of the last war are sufficiently disturbing to forbid feelings of complacency. There was an almost equally loud call for guarantees against a recurrence of its horrors as the first Great War entered upon its final phase with victory certain in the offing; and the declaration by the founders of the League of the purposes to which it was committed were as definite as the forecasts of today. The stately structure of the League of Nations was, however, wrecked by a time-bomb in its foundations; and it is only too clear that history may repeat itself if those who really desire guarantees against the recurrence of war are not alert and resolute in guarding against this danger. The destructive element in the League Covenant was the recognition of the sovereignty of the nations as absolute as against any external influence, and subject only to limitations at their own instance to meet the requirements of the covenant in the matter of safeguarding peace. With this optional power held in reserve it was only a case of waiting until nations came to regard the League obligations as too onerous to bring the whole edifice crashing to the ground.

The League had not come into actual existence before a commentary upon the obligations which the Covenant imposed upon its member nations "was issued under the authority of the representatives of the British

Empire on the League of Nations Commission of the peace Conference". The League, it was pointed out in this document, was not a "Super-State" but "a solemn agreement between sovereign States, which consent to limit their complete freedom of action on certain points for the greater good of themselves and the world at large." The commentary continued:

"Recognizing that one generation cannot hope to bind its successors by written words, the Commission has worked throughout on the assumption that the League must continue to depend on the free consent, in the last resort, of its component States; this assumption is evident in nearly every article of the Covenant, of which the ultimate and most effective sanction must be the public opinion of the civilized world. If the nations of the future are in the main selfish, grasping and warlike, no instrument or machinery will restrain them. It is only possible to establish an organization which may make peaceful co-operation easy and hence customary, and to trust in the influence of custom to mould opinion."²⁶

This interpretation was agreed to, according to the statement we have quoted, by Lord Cecil and General Smuts of whose devotion to the League then and subsequently there can be no question. How then did they come to consent to modifications in the Covenant which, in time, destroyed the League and cleared the way for a second war? They, obviously, expected that public opinion in the countries signing the Covenant would see to it that the freedom of action which the nations retained would be employed solely in the sup-

²⁶ Accounts and Papers (United Kingdom): 22, 1919, p. 696.

port of the principle of collective security. They banked upon the solicitude of the nations for their good name as an influence that would ensure that in the exercise of their option (which was not a real option but one that could honourably be exercised in only one way) they would uphold and enforce the principles of the League.

Instead, as the sorry record of the years reveals, the convention became established that the option was real—that a nation was equally free to recognize or to disown its obligations to the League, without thereby inviting the censure of the world. It was the business of each nation to decide this question, when it arose, for itself; and it was an impertinence for outsiders to even question the propriety of any decision thus reached. After the retreat from sanctions in the summer of 1936 the doctrine of the right of every country to limit its responsibilities to what, in its own wisdom was in its interests, was proclaimed in the countries that should have been the bulwarks of the League. The Scandinavian countries, in a joint statement, formally repudiated any League obligation; Mr. Eden, Foreign Secretary for Great Britain, listing the interests for which that country would fight, failed to mention collective security; Mr. King made the Canadian Parliament the sole judge of this country's responsibilities; and so on down the line. All these countries, without exception, thought they were safeguarding themselves against future trouble; what they were actually doing was steepening the slope down which they slid within four years into the greatest war of all time.

What must never be forgotten as the problem of

future security is considered, is that collective security and the right of any nation to go to war in what it regards as the advancement or defence of its interests cannot be linked. The submission of even the greatest nation to the decision of an international body, safeguarding the interests of all its members, in all matters affecting the application of physical force, is the cornerstone of any workable system of collective security. A. J. Toynbee in his *A Study of History* says that the work of security "will never be done by the petrified devotees of the idol of National Sovereignty."²⁷ The disturbing aspect of the present discussion of peace and the post-war world is the frequency with which the qualification that of course nothing must be done to limit national sovereignty is found in the next sentence to one in which devotion to the idea of peace enforced by international action is avowed in accents of apparent sincerity. There is either ignorance or insincerity in these declarations, no matter by whom made. The right of nations to make war at will and the guarantee of collective security by international action simply cannot cancel one another out.

[The United States Senate, following up its endorsement of the Moscow Declaration of November 1, 1943, has accepted the establishment of a general international organization as the declared policy of the United States. The harm done the League by the refusal of the United States to accept membership was incalculable. Now the new League will begin with fairer prospects.]

²⁷ Toynbee, A. J. *A Study of History*, Oxford University Press, London, 1939, Vol. IV, p. 320.

BACK TO THE LEAGUE

(November 13, 1943)

THE resolution²⁸ adopted by the United States Senate by an 85 to 5 vote, pledged that country to join with "free and sovereign nations" to establish and maintain an international organization for the preservation of peace "based on the principle of the sovereign equality" of the member nations. Further, there is recognition of the right of any "free and sovereign" nation, regardless of its size, to join this organization and accept its share of responsibility for maintaining order in the world. The explicitness of these engagements derives from the additions to the original Connally resolution which were made after the Four-Nation declaration at Moscow. Of the amended and enlarged Senate resolution, *The New York Times* says:

"It provides for peace and international democracy by specifically rejecting both a world super-state and a war-breeding system of alliances, and by projecting instead a 'general international organization' founded on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, large and small."²⁹

The words with which these purposes are declared have a very familiar sound. The United States Senate of 1943 has accepted, by an almost unanimous vote, the identical proposition which it rejected in 1919. It has

²⁸ Congressional Record—Senate, November 3, 1943, p. 9175, Senate Resolution 192.

²⁹ *The New York Times*, November 7, 1943, p. 10E.

declared for a League of Nations fashioned after the model built by the special commission which, under the leadership of Woodrow Wilson, produced the Covenant of Paris in 1919. And in so declaring, it has made it extremely improbable that any of the more radical plans will have any chance of being seriously considered when the United Nations, assembled in conference, set about making effective their pledge that they will by mutual action guarantee the future peace of the world.

One effective argument against breaking new ground will be that this would give the isolationists of the United States an opening for a campaign of repudiation. They have been driven underground for the moment by the strength of public opinion, but they may be counted upon to renew their opposition to policies of enlightened and effective internationalism once it is proposed to commit the United States formally to these policies. It would be dangerous to put in their hands so effective a weapon as a departure from the path which the Senate has now marked out for itself.

Loud and vigorous protests can be looked for from those who have been urging more drastic programmes: "Union Now"; regional federations with some shadowy central machinery; a world police force on land and in the air; and so forth. They will say that a revived League of Nations, even with the improvements that are suggested by experience, will prove as impotent as the discarded model in restraining aggressor nations. They will predict that history will repeat itself, and that a third World War at no distant date will destroy civilization.

Opinions upon the causes which led to the collapse of the League have abounded, but they have not all been in agreement that the failure was inherent in the composition and nature of the League. Many of those most competent to give a considered judgment based upon experience and close observation have found other reasons for the tragedy than the defects of the Covenant. They agree that there was from the outset a disinclination to employ the machinery of the League to restrain aggression by force, provided the aggressor was a power of magnitude. It was all very well to intervene decisively when little nations like Bulgaria and Greece proceeded to break the peace; but it was a very different matter when powers like Japan and Italy decided to revert to pre-League methods of persuasion. Not for a single minute, said Sir John Simon, then Foreign Minister of Great Britain, did he entertain the idea of going beyond conciliation procedures when Japan proceeded to seize Manchuria. That was when the slide began which grew into an avalanche that covered the world.

It may be said, it certainly will be said, that the free and sovereign nations of the revived League which can now be foreseen will be just as selfish, cowardly and useless as were the members of the League that crashed. There are reasons for hoping that this will not be the case. For one thing, even nations can learn by experience, and the defaulters of yesterday are certainly getting a lesson that should live in their memories. Further, the restored League will include Russia and the United States from the outset, which will be a state of affairs very different from the earlier adventure. Russia

did not join the League until after it had, in effect, renounced the ideals which had called it into existence; the United States, at the very outset of the League's career, gave it a "stab in the back" from which it never recovered. The consequences of the defection were disastrous in endless ways. Thus in Great Britain American withdrawal gave foes of the League the plausible — and not altogether imaginary — argument that if Great Britain put its navy at the disposal of the League to enforce sanctions, it might find the United States navy blocking its passage.

The revived League will begin under much more favourable auspices. There is also ground for hope that the new League will not shrink from making a definition of aggression that will be so clear that the operation of sanctions on the part of the contracting parties will be all but automatic. In dealing with this matter there will be, it is to be hoped, none of the casuistical splitting of hairs in which Mr. Balfour indulged in a notable argument which Mr. Austen Chamberlain presented to the League Council.³⁰ It is upon these far more favourable conditions that reliance must be placed, since all the dreams about nations extinguishing themselves in some vast universal philanthropic merger might as well be recognized for what they are. The nations, with all their good points and their weaknesses, are here to stay for a period of time that will take care of mankind for this generation and for many generations to come.

³⁰ On March 12, 1925, in stating the reasons for the rejection of the Geneva Protocol by the Government of the United Kingdom.

XI

THE COMMONWEALTH AND THE PEACE

When the outlook for a new and effective League was so bright, and the adherence of the United States probable, though not decided, it was imperative that nothing should be done to rouse the American dislike of British imperialism or to give excuse for raising again the spectre of a bloc of British votes in the prospective international organization. The proposals of "The Round Table" and of Viscounts Bennett and Elibank for a common Empire foreign policy threatened not only the established autonomy of Canada in the conduct of her foreign policy, but might also give isolationists and crypto-isolationists in the United States means whereby to resist the assumption by the United States of a position of leadership in the revived League. Accordingly this unfortunate recrudescence of the old idea of a centralized Empire must be fought as a menace to the Commonwealth and to the prospects of the peace.

[If the American public can be brought to see that British imperialism is a liberal and self-liquidating relationship between a great power and people not capable of standing alone, the omens of future collaboration in preserving the peace of the world will be better.]

INDIA AND THE COMMONWEALTH

(October 28, 1942)

MR. WILLKIE, in his report to the American people,¹ made references to the British Commonwealth of Nations and also the dependent Empire and to India, which are not wholly in harmony. He formally associated himself with General Smuts' tribute to the Commonwealth in his recent speech in London.² Elsewhere on this page we reproduce what General Smuts said on that occasion. History will amply confirm General Smuts' estimate of the contribution which the family of British nations has already made to the defence of civilization. It was indispensable in the testing time of 1940 — failing it, Hitler would have been at this moment Lord of the Universe. Of all the political experiments of the last half century, none has been so vindicated by the testing of events as the transformation of the British Empire, as it was at the turn of the century, into today's League of British Nations.

Mr. Willkie spoke of those portions of the Empire

¹ Broadcast of October 27, 1942.

² Speech before joint session of Lords and of Commons, October 21, 1942.

which are not yet included in the brotherhood of the Commonwealth as "colonial possessions" and "remnants of Empire". Millions of people within the Commonwealth, he said, were working for an extension of the Commonwealth principle, thus reducing the area of colonial dependence. He devoted a single sentence to India, but it was sufficiently explicit to make it clear that Mr. Willkie thinks that there is resistance to the granting of the freedom of the Commonwealth to India, and that the United States should feel that it has an interest in the question. He agreed, however, that it is a very complicated question. This it most certainly is; and the more it is studied, the less likely it is that anyone who desires to see the Indian deadlock—which has in it possibilities of defeat for the United Nations—broken and a workable adjustment found, will accept ready-made solutions offered by deeply interested parties.

Dominion status, which General Smuts accepts as satisfactory, with Mr. Willkie in apparent agreement, has been, as the Viceroy stated in his declaration of August 8, 1940, "the proclaimed and accepted goal of the Imperial Crown and the British Parliament".³ A very long step towards the attainment of this objective would have been taken had the federal provisions of the Government of India Act of 1935, which was the fruit of a long series of commissions and conferences, been given a trial. Unfortunately the Congress party refused co-operation and, with the evolutionary process thus checked, the war found India without a central

³ See Duffett, W. E., Hicks, A. R., and Parkin, G. R., *India Today*, The Ryerson Press, Toronto, 1941, p. 79.

government representative of all sections of the Indian peoples; and there has followed the unfortunate succession of events by which the complete intransigency of the leadership both of the Congress party and the Moslem League has been revealed. The Cripps offer,⁴ which provided for a provisional government with real power and for post-war machinery by which the Indians by agreeing among themselves can attain Dominion status or, if they prefer it, complete withdrawal from the Commonwealth, still stands. Its rejection frees the British Government from the charge that it is refusing freedom to the Indian people. The course offered precisely meets, so far as India is concerned, Mr. Willkie's stipulation that there should be an "orderly but scheduled abolition of the colonial system". Mr. Willkie's observation about the Indian problem thus makes no contribution towards its solution, but rather adds to its complication.

As for the future political status of possessions of the British Empire, scattered over the wide expanse of the world—islands set in all the seven seas, patches of territory here and there, mostly in Africa—this is part of a post-war problem which affects more than Great Britain. The British Imperial rule of yesterday, which may have paid some slight dividends, in prestige and in opportunity, has become an obligation whose burdens, already heavy, may become not bearable in the years to come. In the predatory world of today and yesterday, it has been the good fortune of the dependencies to enjoy the protection of the British Empire

⁴ Made in March, 1942. See *International Conciliation*, 1942, p. 5, *et seq.*

and the very substantial measure of freedom which goes with this status.

Until we get a world from which force and aggression are forever banished, there will be relationships between peoples not capable of defending themselves and protecting powers which it will be possible for critics to characterize as imperialistic; but which will be in fact, in the case of civilized countries, the assuming of responsibilities by nations capable of discharging them. The United States to a limited degree is a protecting imperialist power; and unless there is a new and much improved world order, which is of course to be desired, it will have to take on a much heavier burden of this nature after the war. If the United States, after the Spanish-American war, had kept the several thousand islands of Micronesia under American protection and direction, the resulting American "imperialism" would have been a good thing for all concerned. Incidentally, it might have saved the world from the present war, which can be dated back to an act of aggression by Japan, which acquired these islands after the First World War.

Problems of independence, or self-determination, or dependency, or association, as they apply to many parts of the world, are very complicated; they cannot be solved by a slogan. It may be that in the future, control and supervision, where necessary, will be international; but this involves Allied victory and a just peace that will endure. Proffered solutions, ahead of these conditions, are not very helpful.

[The existing Commonwealth is an example and a pledge of the future being prepared for and by the peoples of the dependent Empire. This the American public can be trusted to grasp if the word "Empire", well enough within the family, is not kept before them to stir their anti-imperialist prejudices.]

THE BRITISH COMMONWEALTH

(December 28, 1942)

BRITAIN is the name of an official publication issued in New York by "the British Information Services, an agency of the British Government", as it officially defines itself. In the December issue there is an article by W. J. Hinton, who is described as "Director of the Speakers and Exhibition Division of the British Information Services; formerly director of the Institute of Bankers in London; faculty member of the University of Hong Kong, 1913-1929." The credentials of Professor Hinton—who has been in Canada and is known to many Canadians—are thus unexceptionable. We draw attention to his article because it has to do with a subject of some importance, which was recently discussed in these columns. The article deals with the British Empire, which, says the author, "is very hard to describe and very easy to abuse". After describing the Empire with some particularity, Mr. Hinton says:

"If this were an official document the word Empire in the foregoing paragraph would be firmly struck out and the words British Commonwealth of

Nations painstakingly substituted. But it is very doubtful whether the change of names makes very much difference to those who, rightly or wrongly, dislike the thing. To them it is the British Empire alias the British Commonwealth of Nations. So let's call it the British Empire whenever we feel like it."⁵

We cite the passage because it supports the statements made in these columns recently that the official title of the Association of British Nations is "the British Commonwealth of Nations", as against the declaration made to the recent Conservative Convention⁶ by George Drew⁷ that the "British Commonwealth of Nations" is only a portion of the British Empire (and therefore inescapably subordinate to the larger body). This has been the case since the passage of the Westminster Act of 1931. But from 1917 onwards the term "British Commonwealth of Nations" was upon occasion used in official statements though British Empire was the preferred title. Thus in the British statute establishing the Irish Free State passed in 1921 "the community of nations known as the British Empire" is mentioned and likewise "the British Commonwealth of Nations". But since the enactment of the Westminster Act the correct title is as stated by Mr. Hinton.⁸

To use the older title whenever we feel like it, as Professor Hinton suggests, may be all right within the family if it is understood that it is being used because it better expresses a traditional emotional attitude; but

⁵ *Britain*, December, 1942, Hinton, W. J., "If This Be Tyranny", p. 5.

⁶ Winnipeg, December, 1942.

⁷ Hon. George Drew, Premier of Ontario, August, 1943-.

⁸ See Keith, A. B., *Speeches and Documents on the British Dominions, 1918-1931*, Oxford University Press, London, 1931.

where it is employed as Mr. Drew employed it as a repudiation of the constitutional development of the last twenty-five years, its effect is not beneficial at home and it can be put to mischievous uses abroad. It can be used in the United States, for instance, to combat the statement just made to the people of that country by Field Marshal Smuts that "the old British Empire died with the nineteenth century". It can be pointed out to the Americans that a public man in Canada of some standing, speaking to a body representative of one of the great national parties, contradicted Field Marshal Smuts in advance without anyone challenging his statement. It is true that a competent observer writes that Colonel Drew lost his audience "when he became a lone voice of old-style Toryism"; but it would have been better if his statement had been answered on the spot.

An Empire is a collection of countries, colonies and dependencies where the whole is subject to the ultimate authority of a government representing the dominant nation in the combination. From this definition it is evident that there is still in existence an Empire to which the name British can be accurately applied. This is Great Britain with the countries, colonies and dependencies where the final word, if this is necessary, can be spoken by the Government of Great Britain. The term "British Commonwealth of Nations" covers all the autonomous British nations and their dependencies, as well; this is the only form of words which has this connotation. There are very good reasons why it should be invariably used in discussing British questions with the outside world; and this is

especially true in the case of the people of the United States.

"Empire" and "Imperialism" are words against which there is a prejudice in the American mind. This feeling is in very large measure irrational when it is directed against "the British Empire" and "British Imperialism". That the people of the Dominions should voluntarily subject themselves to the handicap of this prejudice when they can counter it pretty effectively by the employment of accurate terms is somewhat remarkable. It may be magnificent but it is not sensible.

"British Commonwealth of Nations" is a term which can be made intelligible to Americans; and once they understand it and its implications they can be brought to a realization that British Imperialism is not a static form of government but is an evolutionary process by which dependent countries can be transformed into independent nations. It is practically impossible to get Americans to understand the present relationship between Great Britain and India as something that is at the moment necessary if that country is to be saved from civil war and anarchy; but they can and do grasp the argument that the door to independence as a member of the British Commonwealth of Nations will be wide open to India once there is agreement among the Indians themselves as to the constitution under which they desire to live. It is the growing recognition of this fact that is beginning to restrict the all but universal sympathy with the propaganda directed by the Congress party against "British Imperialism" which has been rampant in the United States for the past twenty years. What is open to India is open to other

areas in the dependent Empire which have the physical basis for independence — Burma and Rhodesia for example.

It is important, not only for purposes of this war but still more for the negotiations of the post-war period that the other members of the United Nations should understand that the British nations which are allied with them are members of a Commonwealth and not sectional parts of an Empire.

[How real are the dangers that any indication of centralization in the Commonwealth will be used to challenge Canada's right to independent representation at the peace conference and in the post-war international organization is shown by Senator Gillette's declaration made during the discussion of the Connally resolution.]

SENATOR GILLETTE'S WARNING

(November 1, 1943)

THE declaration by United States Senator Gillette,⁹ in the discussion of the Connally resolution, that Canada would not be eligible for membership in the Peace Conference—which would imply a denial of representation in the membership of any body brought into existence for the enforcement of peace in the post-war world—is not to be dismissed as without significance despite the fact that no support for his contention from

⁹ Congressional Record—Senate. October 25, 1943, pp. 8769-72.

other senators has been forthcoming. It is a warning signal that there may be a revival of tactics that played a part after the last war in breaking up the co-operation between the victorious nations without which, as time has demonstrated so terribly, there could not be permanent peace.

There is not the remotest possibility that Canada's right to representation in the peace conference under present conditions can be challenged. If that right was recognized at the Paris Peace Conference, it certainly cannot be disputed at the conference that will follow this war. In 1919 the Canadian claim to representation, in which the other Dominions joined, was entirely unexpected by the British Government which had already agreed with the other great powers—the United States, France, Italy and Japan—that the British Empire would have equally with these other nations, five members at the Conference table.¹⁰ The intention of the British Government had been to admit each Dominion to the Empire panel when questions affecting its particular interests were up for discussion. This was wholly unacceptable to Canada and the other Dominions; and they ultimately carried their point by securing first the support of the British Government to their claim and afterwards by inducing the United States and France to withdraw their opposition.

Technically the case against the Dominions at that time was conclusive. Their legal position was that of colonies. They had not declared war but had been committed to hostilities by the action of the British

¹⁰ See Dafoe, J. W., "Canada and the Peace Conference of 1919". *Canadian Historical Review*, September, 1943.

Government. They gained their point by making a claim, which was conceded by the United States delegation, that whatever the documents seemed to show, the Dominions had, by their participation in the war, established their nationhood and by that fact were entitled to representation. By virtue of the precedent set with respect to membership in the Conference, Sir Robert Borden secured, though not without much opposition, representation in the I.L.O. and the League of Nations. Much of this opposition came from British officials who could not rise above the legal technicalities which gave the Dominions a lesser status.

The rapid subsequent attainment by the Dominions of nationhood by instruments that could not be challenged—the Balfour declaration and the Westminster Act — flowed directly from Sir Robert Borden's achievement at Paris.

With these credentials there need be no fear that there will be difficulty about Canadian representation in conferences dealing with the peace. But there may be trouble later just as there was after the last war. There is general agreement that the spirit of isolationism is still strong in the United States; and there are no lack of predictions that once the war is won there will be a powerful movement favouring the retirement of the United States behind the ramparts of America. One of the influences that may be instrumental in preventing this movement from wrecking the peace settlement and putting the world on the road to World War the Third will be the moral obligation that will rest upon the American people to live up to the engagements now being entered into while the war is going

on by the Senate, the House of Representatives, and by the President. They, of course, cannot bind their successors, and the next administration and Congress could kick the arrangements of today out into the street. But the moral influence restraining any such action should prove irresistible provided the conditions attached to the American engagements are scrupulously respected.

We have already said that the terms upon which American support is able to be pledged excludes any such post-war structure as Federal union. It calls for a League of Nations, and these nations are to be "free and sovereign". Canada, as things stand, will qualify under that definition. The survivals from our days of subordination are too trivial to support a challenge to our status. Nevertheless, it would be just as well if they were removed, thus supplying no pegs upon which isolationist senators can hang arguments four or five years hence. It is even more important that no strong popular support is forthcoming for the imperialistic drive which is already taking shape in Canada, with headquarters—of course—in Toronto. From London also there comes an argument by Lionel Curtis highly reminiscent of the days of the old Round Table movement, in favour of a Federated Empire to replace the Commonwealth.

There cannot, of course, be several "free and sovereign" nations in a federation—they thereby merge their sovereignties into a unity. An agitation of this character—if it gained any strength, and still more if it had results—would recreate the very conditions which

put into the hands of the isolationist senators in 1919 the weapons with which they blocked the ratification of the peace treaty and destroyed any possibility of a post-war world guarded against a recurrence of war. Though Senator Gillette has received as yet no open support it may be assumed that he spoke for other senators; and there was undoubtedly method in his performance. His words are a fair warning to Canada and to the other Dominions to protect their sovereignty against limitations that would give strength to Senator Gillette's argument.

This means that Canada must go into the post-war combination of powers, which will have to deal with the immense problem of peace and reconstruction with precisely the same rights and powers of sovereignty as the United States; and it will submit in common with all other powers to the diminution in these rights which will be required if some kind of world-wide control, ensuring peace and the rebuilding of a ruined world is to be established on a firm permanent basis. The constituent nations of the Commonwealth are as much entitled as the United States itself to take a direct part in post-war conferences, negotiations and activities; and let us be on the alert to safeguard and at the proper time to enforce these rights.

[The proposals for an Empire Council are either meaningless, or an attempt to undo the evolution of the Commonwealth and return to the project of a centralized Empire, acting as one in matters of foreign policy.]

COUNCIL AND COMMONWEALTH

(November 24, 1943)

THE motives behind the drive for an Empire Council and the objectives which it is hoped to achieve are both veiled in obscurity; but some of the possibilities of the situation were dealt with candidly in these columns yesterday by Mr. Bruce Hutchison.¹¹

The idea is either a harmless proposition for holding something like the gatherings which are known as Imperial Conferences annually in place of triennially, as was the case in peace-time; or we have here a trial balloon to see whether the once-defeated project of a consolidated and centralized Empire cannot be revived. If the latter theory is correct, and there is a good deal to support this interpretation, there is much that is mischievous and dangerous in the proposal.

When Mr. Eden¹² paid his visit to Ottawa he was asked, in the audience which he gave to the press, whether there was any movement to give greater cohesion and more central direction to the war efforts of the members of the Commonwealth; and he answered in words the substance of which was that matters as they stood seemed to be on a very satisfactory basis. More recently when the project of an Empire Council was being debated in the House of Lords,¹³ with Lord

¹¹ Associate editor, *Winnipeg Free Press*. Author of *The Unknown Country* and *The Hollow Men*.

¹² March 31, 1943.

¹³ 129 H. L. Debates, 5s., November 2, 1943, pp. 474-518.

Elibank and Lord Bennett taking part in the discussion, Ottawa despatches reported that the Canadian Government did not know what it was all about and was awaiting further details as to the innovation that was being sought, and the purpose that it was counted upon to serve.

That appears to be still the situation except that since that time the Canadian Government, no doubt in keeping with long-term policy and not as a quickly planned improvisation, put one more insurmountable obstacle in the way of any return to an arrangement which would sweep away all that Borden and King have accomplished in the last twenty-five years. We refer, of course, to the action of the Canadian Government in giving Mr. Leighton McCarthy the status of an ambassador at Washington.

The British Commonwealth of Nations, just as it is, without this additional machinery which Mr. Curtin, Lord Elibank and Lord Bennett seem eager to provide, is being widely recognized as a development in government, in keeping with the British genius for supplying unconventional solutions for seemingly insoluble problems, which, in the coming crisis of world reorganization, may prove of great value. One such tribute was paid by the Right Hon. L. S. Amery, Secretary for India in the Churchill Government, who, speaking in York, August 9, 1943, said:

“My own belief is that in our tentative, instinctive way we have discovered, in the conception of a freely co-operating Commonwealth, a new constitutional

principle of immense hopefulness not only for ourselves but for the world.”¹⁴

Within the past week Mr. Wendell Willkie has said :

“It is fortunate that the history of colonial administration provides us with a working example of the transformation of colonial and dominated peoples to independent and free peoples. I refer to the evolution of the British Commonwealth of Free Nations, the most exciting experiment in international democracy the world has ever known. It demonstrates that colonies do not have to remain unfree; that independence can come without disorder; that peoples located all around the world can co-operate to a common end.

“What I am suggesting, then, is not something new, but the rapid acceleration and progression of what the world has learned can be done.”¹⁵

The British Commonwealth of Nations comprises Great Britain, with its dependent Empire, and six other members which have evolved from a status of subordination to one of full sovereignty; and one of the hopes for the future peace of the world is that other sections of the British Empire will attain the status of free and independent nations and join the Commonwealth. The most immediate hope has to do with India which, by taking this road, will join the company of free and independent nations; but other nations, it is hoped, may emerge in time in keeping with Mr. Willkie's statement.

How consonant with this conception of a family of

¹⁴ *The Times*, August 10, 1943, p. 2.

¹⁵ *The New York Times*, November 18, 1943, p. 14. Address to *The New York Herald-Tribune* Forum.

independent nations, each free to make its own decisions in international matters, the plan which Mr. Curtin has in mind and which Lord Elibank and Lord Bennett show a desire to adopt, may be is not yet plain; but if it involves in the slightest degree provisions by which common action in international matters—whether of finance, trade, world government or war—can be compelled by machinery designed for the purpose of overcoming minority views, they seek to destroy the Commonwealth as it has been developed over forty years by the statesmanship of Laurier, Borden and King. Mr. Hutchison states the simple truth when he says that “Canada is the true architect of the present British Commonwealth of Nations.”¹⁶ If this suggestion of an Empire Council tends to damage in the least the structure thus created, it will be rejected as an attempt to turn back the clock of time.

[If Mr. Curtin’s speech of December 14, 1943, to the Federal Conference of the Australian Labour Party means a return to the attempt to achieve a single imperial foreign policy, it cannot be tolerated, for the sake both of Canada and of the developing international organization of the United Nations.]

THRESHING OLD STRAW

(December 20, 1943)

THE address by Mr. Curtin, Prime Minister of Australia, delivered last Tuesday¹⁷ to the Federal Con-

¹⁶ *Winnipeg Free Press*, November 23, 1943.

¹⁷ December 14, 1943.

ference of the Australian Labour Party, which appeared almost in its entirety in these columns on Saturday, is worthy of careful study in view of the sudden resurgence, suggesting a common origin, of a movement to give the British Commonwealth—or the Empire to those who prefer that title—a single voice in the determination of policies arising out of the war or out of the problems of the post-war world. The Commonwealth is to decide upon its policy upon all those problems by machinery which is to be set up; and these policies are to have the backing of the Commonwealth as a unit when these questions come to be dealt with by the United Nations. The discussion which has been going on is meaningless if this is not its objective. If there were doubts on this point the revealing statement in the leading article in the current *Round Table* which we have already quoted, should dispel them. "The nature of the problem," it says, "insists upon more than compacts and conferences; there must be executive machinery and joint resources. There must be means of action as well as policy, joint finance as well as mutual agreement."¹⁸

An examination of Mr. Curtin's speech yields no light on the questions of how these desired objectives are to be reached; nor indeed upon the nature and purpose of the common policies which *The Round Table* finds so necessary. Mr. Curtin was certainly of two minds when he made his speech; and because of this the trumpet gives forth an uncertain sound. The statement in his last sentence that there must be "sovereign

¹⁸ *The Round Table*, September, 1943, "The Commonwealth and the Settlement", p. 311.

control of the policy of Australia by her own people, Parliament and Government" doubtless expresses the mind and will both of himself and of the Australian people. There are echoes of this statement all through the address: "The fundamental consideration in the evolution of Empire co-operation has been the development of and respect for the autonomy of the Dominions." . . . "Consultation must be consistent with the sovereign control of its policy by each government", and so forth.

Mr. Curtin further makes statements about the value of the Commonwealth system as it stands. "The British Commonwealth has exemplified to the world how autonomous nations can collaborate on matters of mutual interest. It has given to the world a notable demonstration of the working of an international democracy." "From their experience as units in a greater unity they can make a notable contribution to the wider circle of international co-operation." "They (the Dominions) have been free to decide their policies and because they have been like-minded, free and peace-loving peoples they have generally reached the same conclusions when independent decisions on major issues have had to be taken. This has been demonstrated in two wars." This correctly states the virtues and the success of the present system of autonomous nations within the Commonwealth. This has been so evident that Mr. Curtin offers the Commonwealth to other nations as a model. This being so, why not leave well enough alone? But after this whole-hearted tribute to things as they are Mr. Curtin proceeds to say: "In the fourth Empire which is approaching, the trend is

to augment an association of independent sovereign peoples by a common policy in matters that concern the Empire as a whole."¹⁹

If the group of free nations which constitute the Commonwealth want a common policy upon any or all matters there is no difficulty in quietly attaining this objective as matters stand. But how are they going to attain a common policy if they do not agree? Before any progress can be made down the path which is so plainly marked an answer to that question will have to be given by *The Round Table*,²⁰ Mr. Curtin, Lord Bennett, Lord Elibank and other advocates of a "common policy", whether or no all the nations are agreed upon it. Whether General Smuts belongs to this group is not clear from his recent statement which is somewhat cryptic in character. It may be doubted whether Mr. Curtin belongs to it in view of the reservations with which his speech is plentifully besprinkled.

If there is to be some kind of an Empire organization which is to have the authority to impose common policy in the event of disagreement it would probably not be difficult to foretell the reaction of Mr. Curtin or any other Australian prime minister to this situation which would inevitably arise, and at no distant date: The Empire Council decides that in the interests of the Empire (the Commonwealth having become in fact suspended with the virtual cancellation of Do-

¹⁹ Excerpts from Prime Minister Curtin's speech are to be found in *The United Nations Review*, VI, 1, January 15, 1944. For a discussion of the Prime Minister's views see *The Round Table*, March, 1944, "Australia", pp. 168-173.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 306-312. See also *The Round Table*, December, 1943, "The Powers and the Peace", pp. 15-17, and *The Round Table*, March, 1944, "Common Counsel", pp. 103-107.

minion autonomy), Australia must abandon her "White Australia" policy, owing to the objections of India. Canada also might find herself in a minority in her opposition to some plan of Empire aviation which would not fit the interests of this country. On neither point would the Dominion, whose interests were thus threatened, submit; and what would then become of the Empire Council and the harmony which it would be supposed to represent?

The objections to this attempted revival of a dead issue are as plentiful as blackberries, but they cannot be set forth here in detail. One of quite serious proportions may, however, be noted. It is well set forth in an article in *The Round Table* on the Hot Springs Conference in these terms:

"Foreign nations are inclined to regard with jealousy the claim of the Dominions to send separate delegations and to exercise separate votes at an international conference. They feel that the arrangement is unfair as giving a plural vote to what they regard as fundamentally a single interest. . . The majority in every country think that the power of the Crown still resides in London and emanates from there alone."²¹

To the extent that influential voices are raised in favour of the creation of an Empire Council with the power which it is proposed to vest in it, these objections to the presence of separate Dominion nations at international conferences are validated. Canada played a very leading part in the Hot Springs gathering; and in

²¹ *The Round Table*, September, 1943, p. 339.

the UNRRA conference just held at Atlantic City, if apparently well-founded reports are to be believed, Canada was the leader in a successful movement to have functions which the great powers had planned to keep for themselves shared with the smaller nations.

As a consequence of this ill-considered movement Canada may, in future international conferences dealing with post-war matters, face a revival of the opposition to Canadian representation which appeared in Paris in 1919; and, even though it should fail as it did in Paris, it may put a weapon into the hands of the U.S. isolationists with which they can repeat the sabotage of 1919. The parties behind this drive are playing with fire. It may be the duty of the Government of Canada one of these days to tell them so.²²

²² Mr. Dafoe was not spared to comment on the speech of Lord Halifax before the Toronto Board of Trade, January 24, 1944, in which Lord Halifax called for "unity of policy" in the Commonwealth, or Prime Minister King's address to both Houses of Parliament of the United Kingdom, May 11, 1944, in which Mr. King stressed the need of the Commonwealth nations pursuing "inclusive", not "exclusive" policies. King's Printer, Ottawa, 1944, p. 16.

XII

“BLUNDERS” AND ACHIEVEMENTS

Mr. Dafoe died suddenly on January 9, 1944, with not even a day of illness keeping him from his desk. His work was not finished, but simply broken off. Fittingly, one of his last editorials links the names of Wilson and Smuts and pays tribute to the great American whose name he had defended and for whose concept of the League he had himself fought for a quarter of a century.

"BLUNDERS" AND ACHIEVEMENTS

(January 6, 1944)

LAST week at its annual meeting the American Historical Association heard an address by an American professor in which President Wilson was accused of having made twenty-two blunders in his attempt to establish a world system of peace as part of the Versailles settlement. By the time Professor Thomas A. Bailey of Harvard University got through with his indictment, he was prepared to concede to the great President nothing but "the vision of a reformer and the zeal of a crusader". But he was, in Professor Bailey's opinion, hopelessly impractical in his efforts to give effect to his views. He did not have the patience, it seems, "to recognize that human nature, if it changes at all, changes with geological slowness."¹

His supreme blunder, according to Professor Bailey, was that he insisted upon the peace settlement embodying as well the provision of a League of Nations to keep the peace. Rather there should have been, he says, some general declaration in the treaty in favour of permanent peace, and the task of working out plans for permanent peace should have been remitted to a commission for future action.

The proposition that the making of peace and the founding of the League should be tied together did not,

¹ Bailey, Thomas A., "The Blunders of Wilson in Retrospect". Paper read before the American Historical Association, December 30, 1943. See Professor Bailey's *Woodrow Wilson and the Last Peace*, Macmillans, Toronto, 1944.

however, originate with Wilson. A resolution for this action was passed by the Council of Ten on January 22, 1919, and this resolution was accepted, without opposition, three days later at a plenary meeting of the Conference. This resolution in part reads as follows:

"19. It is essential to the maintenance of the world settlement, which the Associated Nations are now met to establish, that a League of Nations be created to promote international co-operation, to insure the fulfilment of accepted international obligations and to provide safeguards against war.

"20. This League should be created as an integral part of the general Treaty of Peace, and should be open to every civilized nation which can be relied on to promote its objects."²

Sir Robert Cecil (now Lord Cecil of Chelwood) suggested this action and drafted the resolution as he states in his book *A Great Experiment*.³ The proposition was thus not the product of the supposedly impractical president of the United States. It was put forward by an experienced British statesman; it received the approval of the Council of Ten, representing the five great powers and their judgment was confirmed by the Conference itself.

When the Covenant was presented by President Wilson to the Peace Conference on February 14, 1919, he praised the simplicity of the document, declaring that "a living thing is born",⁴ which must grow and develop in accordance with the laws of life. It is true

² Temperley, H. W. V., *A History of the Peace Conference of Paris*, Oxford University Press, London, 1920, Vol. III, p. 56.

³ Viscount Cecil, *A Great Experiment*, Jonathan Cape, London, 1941, p. 66.

⁴ Wilson, Woodrow, *International Ideals*, Harper Bros., New York, 1919, p. 126.

that later there was a movement, which never came definitely into the open, but was understood to have the backing of some of the great powers, that the founding of the League should stand over awaiting a "more convenient season". This Wilson opposed with such determination that the project was abandoned. His course on this point has been much criticized, especially by Americans. Professor Bailey is the latest voice to be heard in condemnation.

Probably it was recognition by Wilson of the "geological slowness" of human nature that moved him to seize the occasion and keep on striking while the iron was hot. If the Conference adjourned without acting in the matter the League would never be established. This was Wilson's opinion; and the evidence that it was soundly based is strong, if not wholly conclusive. A League in existence which failed to prevent war because its members defaulted in their plain duty has had a much more potent educational effect upon world opinion than could have been reached had the whole idea of an organization to prevent war been allowed to die out from indifference and neglect. The people of the Allied Nations know why the League failed. Looking at the present state of the world, and knowing that it is the direct result of this failure, they are resolved that this time they will profit by the dear lesson they have learned in the school of experience. By building the League in 1919 ahead of public opinion, Wilson and his associates may have made possible a League that will now work, thereby speeding up the processes of human change. If left to operate with "geological slowness", it might take a dozen world wars

to teach *homo sapiens* the obvious fact that war is biological lunacy and moral bankruptcy.

This disparaging estimate of Wilson's work at Paris was rather effectively discounted two days before it was delivered by a commanding voice coming over the air from far South Africa. On December 28, which was the eighty-seventh anniversary of the birthday of Woodrow Wilson, there was a ceremony in New York at which the medal of the Woodrow Wilson Foundation was presented to Field Marshal Jan Smuts in Pretoria, and was accepted by him in a radio address. Marshal Smuts played as large a part as Woodrow Wilson in fashioning the Covenant; his contribution was inferior to that of Wilson's only in respect to the power which he could command to enforce his support of the League. He does not, in his Pretoria speech, deny that in approaching the problem anew in the conditions of today, the nations can profit by the mishaps of the past; but he says the just and fitting word about the stock criticisms of Wilson. "How pitifully, how devastatingly," he says, "all this sort of criticism has been exploded by the experience of this war."

Whatever mistakes Wilson may have made, they are dust in the balance in judging the greatness of his work and its enduring qualities. Whatever form the future structure of world peace may take, it will rest on foundations laid by Wilson and his co-workers in Paris in 1919. To forget about Wilson's mistakes and take pride in his great achievements would be in keeping with the temperament and genius of the American people, and this will be made manifest tomorrow if not today.

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